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The thesis draws upon the work of Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, and Norman 
Fairclough to analyse Westminster narration of the neoliberal capitalist crisis from 
2010-2015. It is argued that Westminster parties sought to ‘resolve’ the crisis by 
intensifying the neoliberal conditions that caused it. This served the interests of private 
capital whilst inflicting harm and injustice on the less powerful and less wealthy. The 
thesis centres on Westminster definers’ discursive strategies of crisis narration, which 
sought to rationalise their ‘resolution’ and maintain hegemony.  
 
This thesis addresses lacunae in the existing literature of elite narration of the crisis in 
a British context in a number of ways. It is concerned with the comparatively broad 
scope of Westminster definers’ narration of ‘causes’, responses and proposed 
responses to the crisis, and the discursive strategies for countering challenges 
presented by oppositional movements. It contributes an analysis of Westminster’s 
narration of challenges that began to emerge over the period. This thesis provides a 
longitudinal study examining the development of Westminster narratives between 
2010 and 2015, contributing a detailed analysis of three ‘intense narration moments’: 
the General Election 2010, the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014, and the 
General Election 2015. Utilising Fairclough’s framework of critical discourse 
analysis, it critically analyses a comprehensive data set of 185 texts disseminated by 
Westminster definers. Texts include televised election debates, radio interviews, 
manifestos, budget statements, speeches, and posters. 
 
The thesis evidences that false, inaccurate, and misleading representations were 
central, systematic, and ubiquitous to Westminster’s narration of the crisis. It is argued 
that Westminster: restricted debate within narrow boundaries that excluded non-
neoliberal alternatives and reinforced the ‘necessity’ of neoliberal responses. They 
identified ideologically advantageous but false ‘causes’ of crisis that had concomitant 
neoliberal responses and favourably structured Britain’s political agenda and shifted 
debate onto more neoliberal terrain. They operated to generate misunderstanding of 
Britain’s fiscal position to justify austerity, and constructed neoliberal responses as 
moral imperatives. Westminster definers countered challenges by representing parties 
inaccurately, constructing alternatives as unviable and immoral, and reinforcing an 
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element of a challenge’s narrative but adopting a different framing to redirect Britain 



















































I would like to thank my supervisors Alana Barton, Howard Davis, and John Diamond for 
their unwavering and invaluable support and excellent guidance. Discussions with John 
always brought a fresh perspective and fostered reflection and ideas. His experience in PhD 
supervision brought precious reassurance. Alana and Howard’s dedicated mentorship from the 
beginning of my undergraduate studies underpins all of my academic achievements over the 
last seven years. The lucidity of Alana’s feedback gifted valuable direction at important 
moments. Sharing an office with Alana gave me the opportunity not only to develop a great 
friendship but also to learn from an exemplary academic and I admire her approach to all that 
the role entails. I cannot overestimate Howard’s support. He is generous with both his 
knowledge and his time. His belief in my abilities, his encouragement, and his strong 
endorsement of me offered the opportunity to study for a PhD. He has been a companion 
through the blood, sweat, and tears, always available to talk about whatever I needed to, and 
bountiful in his counselling. I will forever be grateful that he was my teacher, Director of 
Studies, and he is now my friend.  
 
I would also like to thank members of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and 
Social Control for their knowledge and feedback on my ideas. I would particularly like to 
thank Dave Whyte, Steve Tombs, and Mark McGovern for their willingness to examine my 
work and their enthusiasm.  
 
Special thanks to my family and friends for their patience, understanding, unconditional 
support, and welcomed distractions. My Mum and Dad have set my brother Jake and I 
examples of dedication and commitment to a cause, and created a family that gives us the 
strength to pursue our desired endeavours. Sean my partner has shared all the highs and lows 
with me. His love and support and genuine interest and concern have carried me through.  
 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Frank O’Malley – my Grandad and best friend. His 
intelligence, imagination, and humanity have always been my example, and his explanation 
for why I needed to go to university delivered over an ice-cream sundae marked a key moment 






LIST OF IMAGES 5 
LIST OF TABLES 5 
 
INTRODUCTION  
A CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF WESTMINSTER’S NARRATION OF CRISIS 6 
 
CHAPTER ONE  
A NEO-MARXIST THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NARRATING A CRISIS TO ATTAIN  
AND MAINTAIN HEGEMONY 16 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
EXPLORING NEOLIBERALISM AND RETRACING THE BRITISH PATH 37 
 
CHAPTER THREE  
THE NEOLIBERAL CRISIS AND A REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON ITS NARRATION 63 
 
CHAPTER FOUR  
FOR OBJECTIVE PARTISANSHIP: AN OPEN AND DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE  
RESEARCH DESIGN 84 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WESTMINSTER’S NARRATION OF THE GENERAL ELECTION  
2010 105 
 
CHAPTER SIX  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WESTMINSTER’S NARRATION OF THE SCOTTISH 
 INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM 2014 137 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WESTMINSTER’S NARRATION OF THE GENERAL ELECTION 
 2015 160 
 
CONCLUSION  






A SUMMARY OF THE SCOPES OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON ELITE NARRATON OF  
THE CRISIS IN A BRITISH CONTEXT 285 
 
APPENDIX B  
PRIMARY SOURCES LISTED BY INTENSE NARRATION MOMENT AND OUTSIDE  








List of Images 
 
Image One: Graph from Better Together (2014b)           149 
 
Image Two: Scales from Liberal Democrats (2015)                    162 
 
 
List of Tables  
 
Table One: Structure of the Findings and Analysis Chapters                        101 
 
Table Two: The Nouns and Antonyms of Better Together Definers’ 146 
Logic of Difference 
 





































A Critical Criminological Analysis of Westminster’s Narration of Crisis  
 
Rationalising the Irrational, Harmful, and Unjust?  
2008 marked the commencement of a major moment in Britain’s history, the onset of 
a capitalist crisis, this time, rooted in neoliberalism. In particular, the neoliberal 
project’s generation of dramatic inequality, heavy dependence upon, and deregulation 
of, the finance industry, and a largely unrestrained prioritisation of profit accumulation 
driven by narrow individualism and corporate greed, led to the financial system 
reaching the edge of collapse. Contrary to the tenets of market fundamentalism, 
unprecedented state intervention rescued finance capital from disaster. The crisis 
provided seemingly undisputable evidence that the neoliberal project had failed. 
Rational ‘evidence based’ thinking it might have seemed, would lead to the end of the 
project’s dominance. However, extraordinarily, Westminster elites, and corporate 
elites regrouped and, despite crisis, neoliberalism was empowered and conditions were 
intensified. Rather than addressing the structural causes or attempting to hold to 
account the most blameworthy social actors, Westminster used the strategic opening 
to accelerate the erosion of resistant elements of social democratic capitalism and to 
intensify neoliberal conditions. The consequences of crises were placed on the 
shoulders of the public sector, the public, and particularly the most vulnerable.  
 
Westminster did not challenge the power of finance capital or seek fundamental reform 
of the finance industry, and private capital was indeed, gifted further deregulation (see 
Tombs, 2016a). Banks were rescued at public expense without conditions (which was 
in sharp contrast to the intensification of the conditionality of welfare benefit 
provision) and are currently in the process of being sold back into private hands, to 
date, at a loss for the public (see Treanor, 2015a). Rather than reducing power and 
wealth inequalities, the Conservative-led Coalition further reduced trade union power 
and cut welfare benefits, reduced real wages in the public sector, and cut local services. 
Whilst financial elites have escaped punishment for their role in the crisis, welfare 
benefit claimants are now subjected to actions more closely associated with the 
criminal justice system than the welfare state including trials by private companies to 
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determine ‘fitness to work’1, harmful sanctions for perceived inactivity2, and coerced 
provision of free labour for corporations3 . Westminster responded to a privately 
generated crisis with further privatisation of the public sector, opening up to private 
capital more opportunities for profit accumulation. The National Health Service 
(NHS) for example, publicly valued and once untouchable, but gradually becoming 
profitable for private capital under New Labour, was further privatised. In sum, 
neoliberal elites seized the opportunity presented by neoliberal crisis to further 
implement neoliberal conditions. 
 
Whilst the extent of criminality in the crisis (to some degree intentionally) remains 
unknown 4 , measurements of the harms of responses indicate their extent 5 . 
Predominantly as a result of low incomes and benefits sanctions, delays, and changes, 
there has been an increase in food poverty (The Trussell Trust, 2017). In 2011-2012 
the Trussell Trust provided 128,697 emergency food supply packages, and by 2015-
2016 this rose to over one million (ibid). These conditions coupled with mortgage and 
rent arrears, expensive private rent costs, and a failure of the state to provide adequate 
levels of social housing caused increasing homelessness (see Butler, 2016). In 2010 
an estimated 1,768 people were sleeping on the streets in England, and by 2015 the 
figure was 3,569 (Homeless Link, 2016). In 2016 over a quarter of a million people 
were homeless (Shelter, 2016a). Higher levels of stress, anxiety, and alcohol abuse 
                                                     
1 Work Capability Assessments collect ‘evidence’ and judge whether an individual is entitled 
to Employment and Support Allowance, often leading to people appealing the decisions and 
living with uncertainty. The assessments have caused long-term damage to people’s mental 
health (see Stone, 2017).  
2 The Department for Work and Pensions imposed more sanctions than the courts. Its decisions 
on a claimant’s guilt are made in secret and penalties can include all of a person’s welfare 
benefit income (Webster, 2015). 
3 The coalition government’s workfare programme requires unemployed welfare claimants to 
provide free labour for corporations in exchange for public funded welfare support (see 
Staufenberg and Stone, 2016).  
4 There has been no “thoroughgoing inquiry into the potential illegalities involved in the near 
collapse of this sector” (Tombs, 2016a: 185). Consequently,  
 
“we do not know, nor are we likely to know, to what extent criminal 
activity was implicated in the events leading up to the crisis, nor the forms 
and extent of criminal activity which those companies in receipt of 
financial assistance continued to engage in even while receiving that 
assistance” (ibid: 187).  
 
5 For a wider discussion of the harms of austerity see Cooper and Whyte (2017).  
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have been documented (see World Health Organisation, 2011). Between 2007-2009 
the prescription of anti-depressants in the United Kingdom (UK) rose by 22 percent 
and in 2010 doctors prescribed 3.1 million more anti-depressant tablets than in 2008 
(Stuckler and Basu, 2013). Austerity policies were a key cause of the 9 percent rise in 
the death rate between June 2014 and June 2015 (Dorling, 2016a). Whilst the pre-crisis 
suicide rate was falling, between 2008 and 2010 debt, unemployment, homelessness, 
and austerity seem to have contributed to an additional 1000 males committing suicide 
and up to 40,000 additional attempted male suicides (Gunnell et al, 2015). In this 
period of Britain’s history, the concept of ‘benefit-related death’ came into existence, 
reflecting the major shift in the role and approach of the welfare benefit system. A 
system created under social democratic capitalism to protect the vulnerable from 
economic harm has been ‘reformed’ to such an extent that it has caused deaths of 
socio-economically vulnerable persons. Following a Freedom of Information request 
by Disability News Service, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) released 
49 peer-reviewed reports on deaths following social security claims6 (see Butler and 
Pring, 2016). Raquel Rolnik, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on housing, 
critiqued the Coalition’s ‘bedroom tax’ policy for making people feel their right to 
housing was being breached (see Gentleman, 2013). There have also been successful 
claims brought against the UK government for discrimination in relation to the 
‘bedroom tax’ policy for social housing under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Bowcott and Butler, 2016).  
Harms of crisis responses have been unjustly inflicted in accordance with structural 
divisions, therefore deepening inequality and increasing the vulnerability of the 
already vulnerable (Clarke and Newman, 2012). The poor, the young, the sick, and 
disabled have disproportionately suffered (see Hall, 2011; Levitas, 2012). “Half of 
people living in poverty are either themselves disabled or are living with a disabled 
person in their household” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016). In 2016 13.5million 
people in the UK (21 percent of the population) were living in poverty (Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, 2016) and child poverty is at its highest level since 2010 
(Butler, 2017). In contrast, those with power and wealth have been protected and 
                                                     
6 Brian McArdle (see Burns, 2012), Tim Salter (see McVeigh, 2015), and Linda Wootton (see 
Huffington Post UK, 2013) are three victims who died after Work Capability Assessments 
deemed them ‘fit to work’.   
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privileged (Beitel, 2010; Peck et al, 2013). The wealthiest 10 percent of the population 
have become wealthier during the crisis and own 54.1 percent of total wealth in the 
UK (Credit Suisse, 2014). To highlight the injustice of responses, whilst banks were 
unconditionally bailed out of crisis with public funds, publicly funded crisis loans for 
the public were abolished7. For Blyth (2013a: 207) the least blameworthy, “those most 
disconnected from the boom”, have suffered the most. There has been an inversion of 
the traditional offender/ victim dichotomy, where the least guilty have suffered the 
greatest punishments.  
If the neoliberal project is not viewed as a class project, but evaluated, utilising 
historical and contemporary evidence, as a vehicle for successful economic 
functioning, defined as operating without crisis and benefitting the lives of the 
majority, then its resurrection seems completely irrational. If Westminster’s crisis 
‘resolution’ is not viewed as a process for furthering private capital’s interests, but 
assessed by whether it addresses causes to prevent repetition of the crisis, and whether 
it reflects evidence about the way to move the economy and the public out of crisis as 
swiftly as possible with minimal harm, then the choice of ‘resolution’ again, appears 
irrational. As Davies (2016a: 121, 122) suggests, there is “seeming irrationalism from 
above” and “a shift to unreason”. “Increasingly it appears…that government are 
operating outside of the norms of judgement altogether” (ibid: 122). “Apparently 
impervious to evidence, evaluation or the merits of alternatives” neoliberal conditions, 
notably deregulation of private capital and austerity, “persist” (ibid: 121). When 
evaluated as a project for serving class interests on the other hand, ‘resolving’ the crisis 
with neoliberal measures comes to be seen as perfectly ‘rational’.  
 
Westminster, possessing the significant power to determine responses and to influence 
public sense-making of the crisis, operated to rationalise the ‘resolution’ disguising its 
class-based character. Westminster definers narrated the crisis to attain support, and 
acquiescence, towards a ‘resolution’ that maintained and deepened crisis-causing 
conditions, inflicted unnecessary harm and major injustices and prioritised the 
                                                     
7 The government provided crisis loans to help citizens with living expenses in emergency 
situations (Citizens Advice, 2014). For example, if a person had been made redundant or had 
been released from prison and were waiting for their benefits a crisis loan could be used to pay 
for food and shelter. The coalition government abolished crisis loans on the 1st April 2013 as 
part of a programme of public spending retrenchment (ibid).  
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interests of private capital Remarkably, in the period of 2010-2015 they successfully 
defended the existing project (see Clarke and Newman, 2012; Gilbert, 2013), 
preventing the crisis in neoliberalism becoming a crisis of neoliberal capitalism and 
what Gramsci (2000 [1932-1934]: 218) termed a “crisis of hegemony”.  
 
The Research’s Focus and Contributions  
When volunteering between 2010 and 2013 for Citizen’s Advice, a charitable 
organisation providing advice on debt, welfare benefits, and housing, amongst other 
areas, I witnessed and sought to help manage the impact of harms that were 
intensifying as a result of crisis responses. Local authorities were experiencing cuts 
and legal aid was cut (see Citizens Advice, 2011) leading to reductions in the charity’s 
funding and therefore less availability of experts and services at a time when austerity 
policies were also causing more people to require advice. I became deeply concerned 
about the infliction of harms and the injustice of the burden of the crisis being carried 
by the most vulnerable. I sought to understand how Westminster definers’ were 
justifying their crisis ‘resolution’.  
 
This thesis draws on the work of Antonio Gramsci, Stuart Hall, and Norman 
Fairclough to analyse Westminster’s narration of the neoliberal capitalist crisis 
between 2010-2015. It centres on Westminster definers’ discursive strategies for 
rationalising their ‘resolution’ and maintaining hegemony, at best in the form of active 
support or at least acquiescence. The focus is given to their developing narration of 
‘causes’, responses and proposed responses, and the discursive strategies for 
countering oppositional movements’ challenges. The thesis contributes a detailed 
analysis of three ‘intense narration moments’ (INMs): the General Election 2010 
(GE10), the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 (SIR14), and the General 
Election 2015 (GE15). Utilising Fairclough’s framework of critical discourse analysis, 
185 texts disseminated by Westminster definers have been critically analysed. Texts 
included televised election debates, radio interviews, manifestos, leaflets and booklets, 
televised adverts, Prime Minister’s Questions, newspaper articles, budget statements, 
other statements, speeches, and posters.  
 
This thesis addresses lacunae in the existing literature of elite narration of the crisis in 
a British context in a number of ways. It contributes a longitudinal analysis of 
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Westminster narration of the crisis between 2010 and 2015. It analyses a 
comprehensive data set and is concerned with the comparatively broad scope of 
narration of crisis causes, responses and proposed responses. It presents an analysis of 
Westminster’s narration of challenges that began to emerge over the period. It also 
contributes comprehensive analyses of narration in the three INMs.  
 
When developing the idea for this research in 2013 a challenge to Westminster’s 
neoliberal ‘resolution’ did not exist and was not visible on the horizon. The dominant 
consensus around neoliberal responses continued without powerful opposition. The 
Labour party, in opposition, indeed remained strongly supportive of the key elements 
of retrenchment. However, during the research process and towards the end of 2010-
2015 challenges began to emerge, challenging neoliberal ‘resolution’ to varying 
degrees. They included: the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) anti-austerity, pro-social 
justice challenge in SIR14 NM, the SNP, Green Party, and Plaid Cymru’s anti-
austerity, pro-social justice challenge in GE15, UK Independence Party’s (UKIP) 
pursuit of ‘independence’ from the European Union (EU) seeking to restrain the 
movement of people, and the Jeremy Corbyn-led movement’s post GE15 challenge of 
the neoliberal ‘resolution’. Recognising the significance of the challenges in this 
period, analysing Westminster definers’ narration of them became a developing focus 
of the research. The research, which was well underway, had to be adapted 
accordingly. It was not however possible to undertake a systematic, rigorous, 
comprehensive, and detailed analysis of all these late challenges due to limited space 
in the thesis and time restraints. The Corbyn challenge emerged after GE15 and 
developed over two leadership campaigns and elections, and a General Election in 
2017. The Corbyn-led challenge had to lie outside of the remit of this project. It 
requires the attention of a further research project. It would be odd however, not to 
reflect on these developments and so the conclusion gives consideration to the INMs 
and challenges that have emerged since the end of GE15. These include the UK EU 
Membership Referendum 2016 and ‘Brexit’ (Britain’s exit process from the EU), the 
election of Donald Trump in the United States, the Corbyn-led and Sanders-led 
movements, and the General Election 2017. Ideas for future research projects 
emanating from this project are also discussed.  
Political Science or Criminology? A Critical Criminological Analysis of Political 
Parties’ Narratives   
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Historically, Criminology limited its concerns within the comparatively narrow 
boundaries of state-defined crime (acts that breached the criminal law) (Hillyard et al, 
2004). However, a social harms approach, whether conceptualised as residing within 
the discipline of Critical Criminology or in a new “academic space” of social harm or 
Zemiology (see Pemberton, 2015: 6), expands horizons beyond dominant definitions 
of crime and includes a whole range of different types of harms not captured by 
mainstream criminology and the criminal justice system (see Barton et al, 2007; 
Currie, 2002; Dorling et al, 2008; Hillyard et al, 2004; Hulsman, 1986; Pemberton, 
2015). The approach is concerned with: “physical”/ material harms, including 
mortality and fatality, failures of the state to provide “adequate food or shelter”; 
“financial/economic harm” including poverty, “regressive taxation and welfare 
policies”, and ‘mis-selling”; “emotional and psychological harm” including stress, 
anxiety and depression; and cultural harm, including “access to intellectual and 
informational resources” (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 19-20). It moves away from 
individualised accounts of crime and gives focus to structural harm (see Barton et al, 
2007; Pemberton, 2015). “The vast majority of harms are structurally determined”, as 
Tombs and Hillyard (2004: 53) recognise: “of course, individuals are responsible at 
some point, but they act collectively following the dictates of the neo-liberal 
paradigm”.   
 
Capitalism is “inherently harmful” (Pemberton, 2015: 35). Harm is a “necessary and 
essential part of the system” (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004: 34). A key tenet of all forms 
of capitalism is inequality in power and wealth and the exploitation of workers to 
produce surplus value (Pemberton, 2015; Young, 1975). Crucially the harms of 
capitalism are not natural 8  (Pearce, 1976; Pemberton, 2015). Rather, “continuous 
effort” goes into maintaining capitalism and the state “repressively, organisationally 
or ideologically” maintains discipline (Pearce, 1976: 56). If corporations, 
governments, key political parties have a will to end or ameliorate the harms of 
capitalism they can. Different forms of capitalism have different intensities of harm. 
States and corporations can install or rollback what Pemberton (2015: 79) terms “harm 
                                                     
8 In the Condition of the Working Class in England Engels documented how harms inflicted 
during the Industrial Revolution including deprivation and disease were not natural but the 
consequences of a human led implementation of a capitalist form (Pemberton, 2015). 
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reduction systems”, such as a strong welfare state. Social democratic capitalism was 
less harmful than neoliberalism (Pemberton, 2015; Tombs and Hillyard, 2004), and 
the harms of neoliberalism have intensified during the neoliberal crisis. Failure to 
discuss “capitalist harm” “contributes to the political myopia towards” extensive social 
harms (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004: 53). Frank Pearce’s (1976) seminal Crimes of the 
Powerful called for Marxist Criminology. This endeavour has created an area within 
the discipline that is known by the title of his book and is the location of this research.   
 
Whilst corporations play a key role in inflicting the harms of capitalism, states can be 
complicit and also inflict their own harms (see Tombs and Hillyard, 2004). 
“Governments…have been pivotal actors in producing inequality and social harm” 
(ibid: 52). They possess the power to facilitate, inflict, ameliorate, and prevent 
capitalist harms. They can create, maintain, ‘reform’, rollback or dismantle national 
health, welfare benefits, and social housing systems. Governments can gift trade 
unions with powers or take them away. They can introduce, increase, or remove 
university tuition fees. They can regulate or de-regulate private capital. They can 
privatise national industries, nationalise industries, and choose whether to exert their 
energy into collecting corporate taxes. They can protect the rights of immigrants and 
ensure support for asylum seekers, or not. They can increase or reduce public 
spending. They can design social policies that inflict harm or improve people’s lives. 
They have major influence over whether responses to crisis achieve justice or injustice. 
Importantly they also determine what is officially labelled as criminal and can 
influence whether criminalisation reflects or challenges existing power relations (see 
Barton et al, 2007). Key political parties not in government also play a key role in 
determining the extent of the harms of capitalism because they have significant power 
to campaign for particular conditions, pressure governments for different approaches, 
and cultivate public support, or to support the government in their endeavour. 
Crucially governments along with other political parties possess the power to influence 
public sense-making and therefore support and acquiescence towards particular 
conditions. Consequently, for scholars concerned with social harm and emancipation, 
the practices of political elites are of vital importance.  
 
 “It is exactly through the state (at whatever scale) that the position 
and role of the citizen and his/her relationship with society is 
defined, institutionalised, and, on occasion, contested and 
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challenged…If we are concerned with formulating emancipatory 
policies and strategies, the state and other forms of governance 
remain key areas for challenging processes of exclusion and 
disempowerment” (Sywngedouw, 1996: 1502). This thinking about 
what progressive social change might look like – as well as the 
possibilities for its emergence – necessitates an understanding of the 
state’s institutional and discursive power…Serious consideration 
should…be given to how the state both represents itself and 
mystifies itself with respect to its relationship to the maintenance and 
reproduction of the current, inequitable social order, as well as to the 
mechanisms through which critical voices within and outside the 
state terrain remain in a process of contestation” (Coleman et al, 
2009: 15).  
The thesis evidences that false, inaccurate, and misleading representations were 
central, systematic, and ubiquitous to Westminster’s narration of the crisis. It is argued 
that Westminster: restricted debate within narrow boundaries that excluded non-
neoliberal alternatives and reinforced the ‘necessity’ of neoliberal responses. They 
identified ideologically advantageous but false ‘causes’ of crisis that had concomitant 
neoliberal responses and favourably structured Britain’s political agenda and shifted 
debate onto more neoliberal terrain. They operated to generate misunderstanding of 
Britain’s fiscal position to justify austerity, and constructed neoliberal responses as 
moral imperatives. Westminster definers countered challenges by representing parties 
inaccurately, constructing alternatives as unviable and immoral, and reinforcing an 
element of a challenge’s narrative but adopting a different framing to redirect Britain 
towards Westminster’s ‘resolution’.  
 
Structure of the Thesis  
Following this introduction, chapter one presents the neo-Marxist theoretical 
framework underpinning this research. It explores the relationship between the key 
concepts of crisis, hegemony, and discourse and particular attention is given to the 
opportunities crises present, contestation, challenge and their implications. In chapter 
two the meaning of neoliberalism is explored and key moments in its ascendancy in 
Britain are discussed. Attention is given to neoliberal theorisation and neoliberals’ 
dissemination of their theory, neoliberalism’s capture of Conservatism and permeation 
of (New) Labour, its exploitation of crisis, and discursive strategies for attaining and 
maintaining neoliberal hegemony. Chapter three gives emphasis to neoliberalism’s 
seizing of the crisis opportunity, the ‘irrationality’ of the ‘resolution’, and locates the 
 15 
research within existing literature clearly detailing the original contributions to 
knowledge. Chapter four presents an open and detailed explanation of the decisions 
made when designing this research. Particular attention is given to the concepts of 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis framework, the process of distilling the data, 
and to ‘objective partisanship’.  
 
The findings and analysis chapters take the form of three case studies of intense 
narration moments. Chapter five presents a critical analysis of Westminster’s narration 
of crisis, responses and proposed responses during GE10. Chapter six critically 
analyses Westminster’s narration of the SNP’s anti-austerity and pro-social justice 
challenge in SIR14. Chapter seven critically examines Westminster’s narration of 
GE15 giving particular attention to the narration of the SNP, Green Party, and Plaid 
Cymru’s anti-austerity, pro-social justice challenges and UKIP’s drive to restrain the 
free movement of people through ‘independence’ from the EU. Finally, the conclusion 
summarises Westminster’s key strategies for narrating the crisis, considers the 
condition of hegemony between 2010 and 2015 in Britain, and reflects on 
developments, including INMs and challenges, since the end of GE15 and the 






















A Neo-Marxist Theoretical Framework: Narrating A Crisis to Attain and 
Maintain Hegemony  
 
Introduction  
This chapter presents the theoretical framework underpinning this research. It explores 
the relationship between the key concepts of crisis, hegemony, and discourse. Three 
closely connected central arguments are made: crises present opportunities that leaders 
of the existing political economic project may seek to utilise for intensifying 
conditions and oppositional movements may seek to use to implement major change, 
in ‘liberal democracies’ efforts to maintain hegemony include mechanisms of 
coercion, but narration is the dominant form and challenges tend to take the form of 
discursive struggles, and discourses are key tools for gaining acceptance of 
‘resolutions’ to crises.  
 
Following justification of a neo-Marxist framework, discussion and argument 
develops over three stages. Stage one identifies key features of crisis giving particular 
focus to the political opportunities they present and the struggles that may unfold to 
seize them. A key focus of discussion is contestation and challenge and their 
implications. Stage two explores the concept of hegemony, giving particular attention 
to the condition of acquiescence and the role of the mass media. Stage three considers 
the dissemination of texts to direct ‘resolutions’ to crisis, attain and maintain consent 
of a form of capitalism, and focus is given to the prevalence of strategic inaccurate 
representations of reality in official discourse.  
 
A Neo-Marxist Framework  
Seeking to challenge harmful capitalist orders and struggle for socially just, equal, and 
non-harmful alternatives “requires a theoretical perspective that has been constructed 
for this” very purpose (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 222). Neo-Marxism contributes 
analyses of class domination, oppression, and exploitation in capitalist societies and 
seeks to understand reproduction of exploitative social orders, efforts for attaining 
acquiescence in a context of harm, inequality, and injustice, and crucially considers 
mechanisms for challenging these orders (see Jessop, 2014).  
Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall’s theoretical contributions underpin this thesis. 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and in particular his analysis of the opportunities that 
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crises present form the theoretical foundations of this research. Hall et al’s (1978) 
seminal Policing the Crisis utilises Gramsci’s thesis of hegemony and hegemonic 
crisis to analyse political elite and media narration of the 1970s conjuncture, the crisis 
of Keynesianism and the advent of neoliberalism. Whilst Hall et al analysed discursive 
strategies for exploiting a crisis to attain hegemony of a new project, this research 
analyses definers’ narration for attempting to maintain hegemony whilst intensifying 
the existing project and seeking to protect it from challenges, their analysis of definers’ 
roles and relationships, challenger movements, discursive strategies for gaining 
consent to more authoritarian responses towards ‘enemies within’, and legitimising 
shifts to the right, amongst other contributions, have been key tools in this research. 
Hall’s further extensive work on discourse, hegemony, and Thatcherism has been of 
great value for exploring official narration of neoliberal crisis.  
 
Neo-Marxists recognise that the state is the powerful centre of political and economic 
decision-making and therefore scrutinise the state and its implementation, 
maintenance, and intensification of neoliberal conditions (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). 
In contrast, Postmodernism conceptualises “power as an almost ethereal force” 
dispersed throughout society with the state as one of many objects that possess power 
(ibid: 223). It focuses on power relations between social actors of a range of positions 
and consequently postmodernism may not apportion the necessary concern to 
scrutinising the power of the state. Neo-Marxism acknowledges that social actors 
excluded from the dominant class possess power and agency and in particular can 
collectively be powerful, as both Foucault and Marx emphasised, but for Neo-Marxists 
the state has central importance.  
 
A ‘critical realist’ perspective is taken here in the sense that there is a reality and whilst 
definers compete to frame it, some framings are more accurate than others. It is argued 
that Westminster in their narration of the crisis did not seek to accurately represent 
reality. To argue that there is “a mismatch”” there must be recognition of a reality 
beyond discourse (see Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 77). Interpretations9 of Foucault’s 
theorisations as “nothing exists outside of discourse” serve to diminish material 
                                                     
9 It is important to note that Foucault himself does not deny that reality exists outside of 
discourse (Hall, 1997). Rather, he suggests that discourses attach meaning to reality (ibid). 
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reality 10  (Hall, 1997: 73). Fundamental to challenging Westminster’s crisis 
‘resolution’ is a need to recognise the reality that harm, inequality, and injustice are 
inflicted by a powerful state. Differing from Foucault, who was concerned with 
discourse framed as the ‘truth’ and its exercise of power in society, Neo-Marxists are 
also concerned with challenging inaccurate representations in pursuit of progressive 
transformations (see Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  
 
Defining ‘Crisis’  
From 2007 it was emphatically communicated in academic, political, media, and 
public discourse that Britain was in a period of crisis. Meanings of crisis have 
developed over history11 . For the purposes of this thesis, a crisis is an acute or 
protracted period of insecurity and abnormality for a subject that cultivates a sense of 
urgency, because it threatens disastrous harm, and it presents opportunities.  
 
Whilst the financial crisis was comparatively acute, it triggered protracted political, 
economic, and social crises12. Such crises tend to take the form of impasses with 
moments of drama (see Gamble, 2009). To recognise the complexity of a capitalist 
crisis the period can be conceptualised as a conjuncture (Clarke, 2010a; Hall et al, 
2013 [1978]). Crises accumulate and entangle together in the same period (Clarke, 
2010a; Hall and Massey, 2010; Hall et al, 2013 [1978]; Shannon, 2014a), they often 
trigger other crises (Fink, 2002), do not develop in a linear manner, and are “complex 
and multi-layered” (Koselleck, 2006: 387). Consequently, they tend to take years to 
‘resolve’ (Gamble, 2009).  
 
                                                     
10 For some postmodernists, “truth is a discursive construction”; “there is no possibility of 
getting behind the discourse to a ‘truer’ truth” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 13, 18). For them, 
“it is not possible to gain access to universal truth since it is impossible to talk from a position 
outside discourse: there is no escape from representation” (ibid: 14).  
11 For detailed etymological analyses of crisis see Habermas (1975), Koselleck (2006) and 
Starn (1971).  
12  Moreover, arguably contextualising the capitalist crisis at a deeper level yet, an 
environmental crisis has convened in the contemporary moment (see Barragàn, 2014; Clarke 
and Newman, 2010; Gamble, 2009; Klein, 2014). Klein (2014) highlights that if emissions 
continue at their current rate “climate change will change everything about our world”. Mark 
Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, has warned that climate change could trigger 
another major crisis in a key industry – the insurance industry (see Rankin, 2015). 
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Crisis engenders insecurities and uncertainties about origins, duration, direction, 
responses, and resolutions (see Boin, 2005; Fink, 2002; Gamble, 2009; Panitch and 
Gindin, 2010). For Clarke (2010a: 341) it is “underdetermined”, its ‘resolution’ cannot 
certainly be known.  There is also uncertainty whether the threat of disastrous harm 
will come to pass and if so, for whom.  
 
Capitalist accumulation itself “is a turbulent…process” (Shaikh, 2010: 44). The 
inherent internal structural contradictions lead to imbalances, sometimes several 
simultaneously, between production and consumption, investment and demand, and 
work and labour (Harvey, 2011). Hay (1999) suggests that as capitalist crises are 
thought to be cyclical, they are not necessarily abnormal. Whilst crises are a normal 
part of capitalism, during a capitalist crisis capitalism malfunctions. There is a 
“disruption” in capitalism’s normality (Clarke, 2010a: 339). It “ruptures the everyday” 
(Pludwin, 2011: 470), demarcating a period of relative stability from a period of 
exceptional instability, which closes when a ‘resolution’ and ‘new’ normality is 
secured. Crises, therefore, mark significant moments in capitalism’s history (Panitch 
and Gindin, 2010): “dramatic historical pressure point[s]” (Starn, 1971: 15), and 
“transition[s] between phases of historical-political time” (Hay, 1999a: 317). As 
contradictions make crises inherent to capitalism, arguably capitalism never truly 
resolves its crises (see Harvey, 2011). Rather its ‘resolutions’ return capitalism to a 
period of (only temporary) normal functioning before the next crisis hits. The 
‘resolution’ then, leads to, and informs, the next crisis (Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2011). 
 
The term crisis connotes importance, threat, risk, pressure, and urgency (see Edelman, 
1977; Fink, 2002; Gamble, 2009; Shaluf et al, 2003). The concept is closely linked to 
that of disaster but they have distinct meanings. A requisite characteristic of disaster 
is harm whereas a crisis threatens harm (see Brewton, 1987; McMullan, 1997; 
Rosenthal et al, 1991). Whilst a crisis may lead to a disaster, they may happen 
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independently 13 , consequentially 14  or conterminously. In the period of analysis 
economic crisis and disaster have unfolded conterminously; some have experienced 
disastrous harm and the threat of further disastrous harm continues. Capitalist crises 
may threaten “slump, depression, polarisation, political unrest, even war, affecting all 
parts of the global economy and the international state system” (Gamble, 2009: 5). 
Consequently, capitalist crises are high politics (Froud et al, 2010a). They must be 
‘explained’ and the threats must appear to be responded to (Pludwin, 2011; 
Soederberg, 2008).  
 
Political Exploitation of Crisis Opportunities  
Abnormal instability and the perception of threat create “strategic openings” (Gamble, 
2009: 66). Starn (1971: 14) suggested that a capitalist crisis “connotes hope for the 
Left, fear for the Right”. However, they “are moments of paradox and possibility out 
of which all manner of alternatives…can spring” (Harvey, 2011: 216). Whilst a 
capitalist crisis has the potential to render dominance of a form of capitalism, or 
perhaps even capitalism itself, intensely vulnerable, it can also be exploited by leaders 
of the existing project to intensify its conditions.   
 
A capitalist crisis may threaten “the legitimacy of political and economic order, the 
presumed social contract which underlies it and the distribution of power” (Gamble, 
2009: 37). Crises may be “focussing events” (Birkland, 1998: 53), making actions 
undertaken for many years without much attention now the focus of public and media 
attention and high politics. They can, therefore, create contexts more amenable to 
restructuring political economic conditions (Gramsci, 1971 [1929-1935]). For 
Gramsci, (2000 [1932-1934]: 208), they create a “terrain more favourable for the 
dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving 
questions”. It may become politically viable to introduce alternative ways of thinking 
                                                     
13 For example, the Scottish Referendum 2014 presented a constitutional crisis for the UK but 
it did not result, at that point at least, in disastrous harm for the UK constitution. The 2008 
bailout of banks prevented the financial crisis turning into calamity for the UK financial 
industry. In terms of disasters without crises, chronic disasters, such as asbestosis and poverty, 
tend only to create crises at the personal level for victims. The culprits of the harm may not 
experience crisis.   
14 Disasters can cause political crises, where blame is directed and contested (Davis, 2013). 
For example, in 2005 Hurricane Katrina inflicted disastrous harm in New Orleans (see Dart, 
2014) and led to a political crisis for the US government (Moynihan, 2009).  
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and acting and to elicit consent to the previously unacceptable (see Edelman, 1977; 
Klein, 2007). As Milton Freidman (2002 [1962]: xiv) recognised, “when that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around”. Therefore 
the role of intellectuals should be “to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep 
them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically 
inevitable” (ibid: xiv).  
 
A crisis marks a “state of exception” when exceptional measures can be constructed 
as necessary, and legitimised (Agamben, 2005: 1). The perception of urgency and 
threat may provide those in power with the opportunity and legitimacy to respond in 
whatever way is ‘necessary’ (Klein, 2007). The label of crisis “justifies the actions of 
leaders and the sacrifices leaders’ demand of others”; the public may become pliable 
and accepting of change and loss (Edelman, 1977: 44). Crises can “generate the pre-
conditions for constituted dictatorship” including: the centralisation of power 
concentrated in the hands of a few ‘experts’, authoritarian decision-making and 
coercive responses15 towards some populations (Rosenthal et al, 1991: 212). Michael 
Bruno (cited in Klein, 2007: 260), Chief Economist of Development Economics at the 
World Bank, stated “the notion that ‘things have to get worse before they get better’ 
emerges naturally”. For Harvey (2005: 190-192), “retrenchment in public 
expenditures and…attacking the standard of living of the mass population while 
feathering the nests of the rich can be best accomplished in the midst of financial 
turmoil and crisis”. Consequently, some may deem it expedient to construct a pseudo-
crisis16 or exacerbate real crisis. Klein (2007: 256) suggests that John Williamson 
spoke the “subconscious of the financial world” when in 1993 he suggested actively 
constructing an artificial crisis to legitimise sacrifice.  
 
 
                                                     
15 For example, in some ‘liberal democracies’ unelected technocratic elites have played key 
political roles and been primarily responsible for responding to the crisis. In Italy in 2011, 
Mario Monti, a European Commissioner and economist, was appointed as Prime Minister and 
largely determined the responses to Italy’s debt crisis (Skelton, 2011). In Greece in 2011, 
Lucas Papademoc, former Governor of the Bank of Greece, was appointed as the Prime 
Minister and led the response to the Greek crisis (ibid).  
16 A pseudo-crisis, termed “counterfeit crises” by Starn (1971: 15), refers to when powerful 
definers construct a perception of crisis unsupported by material reality or a crisis is 
intentionally created in reality. For an example of pseudo crises see Klein (2007) on Canada 
and Trinidad.  
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Discursive Struggle to Seize the Opportunity  
“No project achieves a position of permanent ‘hegemony’. It is a 
process, not a state of being. No victories are final. Hegemony has 
constantly to be ‘worked on’, maintained, renewed and revised. 
Excluded social forces, whose consent has not been won, whose 
interests have not been taken into account, form the basis of counter-
movements, resistance, alternative strategies and visions…and the 
struggle over a hegemonic system starts anew. They constitute what 
Raymond Williams called ‘the emergent’ - and the reason why 
history is never closed but maintains an open horizon towards the 
future” (Hall, 2011: 727-728).  
 
For Gramsci, in advanced capitalist societies with their “sophisticated and ubiquitous” 
“agencies of socialisation” “the dominant ideology…is highly institutionalised and 
widely internalised” (Femia, 1987: 52). Consequently, drawing comparisons between 
military conflicts and political struggles, he suggests that those who seek to challenge 
its dominance should not engage in what he terms a “war of manoeuvre” (defined as a 
“rapid frontal assault of the adversary’s base”) (ibid: 51). This approach could only 
ever attack “the outer perimeter” (Gramsci cited in Femia, 1987: 51) of a much deeper 
and stronger defence and therefore would inevitably lead to “defeat” (Femia, 1987: 
51). Rather, a “‘war of position’ on the cultural front” is required (ibid: 53). This 
approach involves protracted and “steady penetration and subversion of the complex 
and multiple mechanisms of ideological diffusion” (ibid: 52). Counter-hegemonic 
ideas must be disseminated and the ideological work of “the agencies of civil society” 
including mass media, universities, schools must be targeted (ibid: 52). Challengers 
must be concerned with managing the ways the public think and feel so that “a largely 
hostile population" confined with the boundaries of dominant ideology does not block 
the oppositional movement but instead “proletarian counter-hegemony” is created 
(ibid: 52).  
 
Oppositional movements (which can include powerful political parties and public 
groups) can form “counter-ideologies capable of challenging the hegemony of ‘ruling 
ideas’” and may take “the transformation of society as a whole as their object” (Hall 
et al, 1978: 155). A movement may engage in a “struggle to contest and disorganise 
an existing political formation” and to secure a level of “social authority sufficiently 
deep to conform society into a new historic project” (Hall, 1988a: 7). “When the 
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normal run of things is traumatically interrupted, the field is opened up for a 
‘discursive’ ideological competition” (Žižek, 2014: 17). Movements may disseminate 
a conflicting crisis narrative to influence public sense-making and attain the support 
required to appropriate the state apparatus and implement their desired changes (see 
Hall, 1988 [1987]). “Framing contests” may ensue (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009: 23). 
“Competing perspectives, narratives and interpretations of events” may struggle to 
legitimise their ‘resolution’ (Clarke and Newman, 2010: 710). Those who are 
successful in discursive struggle then seize the power to determine the ‘resolution’ and 
therefore the ‘new’ normality (although the purity of their ‘resolution’ may be limited 
by the commitment to governing with consent). A capitalist crisis, or a conjuncture, 
becomes  “the site of political-cultural work” where “the heterogeneity of forces, 
antagonisms and contradictions needs to be navigated, needs to be directed and needs 
to be connected into a project for the future” (Clarke, 2010a: 341).  
However, “there is no ‘level playing field’ on which such wars of position are played 
out” (Hay, 1999a: 336). Power and access to public minds cannot be separated (Hall, 
1973a). There is a structural gap between those who dominate public communication 
and those who receive it (Hall, 1973a). However, there are occasionally opportunities 
for the less powerful to widely share their voices. Elite definers are at the top of what 
Becker (1967: 241) terms the “hierarchy of credibility”. They hold the position of 
“primary definers” whose narrative forms the official version or “primary definition” 
of reality, which “sets the limit for all subsequent discussion by framing what the 
problem is” (Hall et al, 1978: 57). Struggling against the dominant is made more 
difficult by what Fairclough (2000: 127) terms: 
“the squeezing out of the public sphere, of spaces where people can 
openly dialogue over matters of common concern free from the 
constraints of both the state and the market, and in a way which can 
influence government”.  
 
Whilst there may be critiques of a project, and individuals and groups may resist they 
do not necessarily pose a challenge to the existing dominant project. For resistance to 
form a challenge it must truly rival the dominant project threatening its ability to 
implement its ‘resolution’ and maintain widespread consent. An “oppositional 
movement” must have an “alternative vision” and importantly significant power 
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(Harvey, 2011: 227), which privileges it with the ability to widely disseminate a 
conflicting narrative at the national level. It must be a “powerful counter-veiling force” 
(Hall et al, 2013 [1978]: 67). It has to “represent an organised majority or substantial 
minority” and “a degree of legitimacy within the system or can win such a position 
through struggle” (ibid: 67). That challenges in the neoliberal crisis came from entities 
that already had some legitimacy in the political system reinforces Hall’s analysis. The 
degree to which the movement challenges the project or crisis ‘resolution’ may vary 
from resisting a core element of it, and therefore supporting an amalgamation of old 
and new, to the whole project and therefore supporting a dramatic transformation.  
 
Leaders of the existing project are likely to work to “defend the existing structure”, 
seeking to “overcome” contradictions and maintain hegemony (Gramsci, 1971 [1929-
1935]: 179). They may strive to avoid a “crisis of hegemony” (Gramsci 2000 [1932-
1934]: 218). Leaders may operate to prevent and counter perceptions of its failure in 
the public mind and counter challenges from movements seeking to seize the 
opportunity for change. They may work to counter and “fragment counter-hegemonic 
groupings, whether this means that they are derided, de-legitimated, disrupted, 
disempowered, surveilled, controlled and so on” (Tombs, 2016a: 20). The degree to 
which forces “are won over, neutralised, incorporated, defeated or contained” 
determines the project’s success (Hall et al, 1978: 313).  
As capitalist crises may mark periods in which the previously unacceptable can 
become acceptable, leaders of the existing project may not only defend the status quo 
but also use the opportunity to accelerate the implementation of their desired actions 
and conditions (see ‘t Hart, 1993). As “neoliberal restructuring projects” are 
undertaken in particular national or local contexts a project may accommodate or 
inherit aspects of previous projects, even if temporarily, if elites are to maintain 
consent (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349). Neoliberals then, used the strategic 
opening of the financial crisis to erode resistant elements of social democratic 
capitalism and intensify neoliberal conditions. Whilst some oppositional movements 
may seek a crisis of a project, leaders of the existing project may operate to defend it 
and ensure the capitalist crisis is only within a project (see Saad-Filho, 2010). The 
latter mark moments of vulnerability but an absence of a powerful oppositional 
movement successfully superseding the existing. Therefore the ‘resolution’ of the 
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crisis is within the boundaries of the pre-crisis ideological project (Saad-Filho, 2010). 
Neoliberals ultimately exploited the opportunity presented by the 1970s capitalist 
crisis to supersede Keynesianism and ensure a crisis of hegemony for social 
democratic capitalism but have worked to make this crisis a crisis within.  
Crises are widely demarcated as turning points (see Starn, 1971; De Rycker and Mohn 
Don, 2013; McMullan, 1997) and moments of  “decisive change” (Chalozin-Dovrat, 
2013: 88). Burckhardt (cited in Koselleck, 2006) conceptualises a real crisis as one 
where the outcome involves major changes where if not everything then much is 
different. However, the view is taken here that a crisis is a period in which significant 
change can happen (see Davies and Walters, 1998; Gamble, 2009; McMullan, 1997; 
Shaluf et al, 2003). Whilst capitalist crises can be “moments of transformation in 
which capital typically reinvents itself and morphs into something else” and “the 
‘mother of invention’” (Harvey, 2014: 3-4), this is not necessarily the case. Capitalism 
can be renewed and ‘rationalised’ within the boundaries of the capitalist form of the 
previous normality without undermining the seriousness of the period of abnormality 
and insecurity (see Harvey, 2011). Crucially, a crisis is an opportunity for alternative 
ways of thinking and alternative strategies to be introduced. Whether it leads to a 
period of revolutionary restructuring is determined by how the crisis is ideologically 
interpreted, represented, and perceived (Žižek, 2009). Consequently, a crisis is a 
potential turning point (De Rycker and Mohd Don, 2013; McMullan, 1997).  
 
Hegemony of an Ideology  
A developed theory of ideology is key because it can help us explain how: “mass 
consciousness is shaped and transformed” (Hall, 1996: 26), “a particular set of ideas 
comes to dominate the social thinking of an historical bloc…and maintain its 
dominance and leadership over society as a whole” (27), “a particular form of power 
and domination” is stabilise[d]” (27), working class consent to capitalism is achieved, 
“social ideas arise” (26) that become “a material force” (27), and “new forms of 
consciousness” are developed that mobilise people to struggle against  and challenge 
the existing (27).   
 
“By ideology I mean the mental frameworks – the languages, the 
concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of 
representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in 
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order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the 
way society works” (ibid: 26).  
 
When the framework “grip[s] the minds of the masses” it can “become a material 
force” (Hall, 1996: 27). Ideologies shape particular structures and behaviours 
organising and developing the social world. They deem some actions right or desirable 
and others as wrong or undesirable (van Dijk, 1998). 
 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony explains the ways in which a framework of ideas 
dominates and unites “the social thinking of social groups” and  “maintains its power 
over society” (Hall, 1996: 27). It captures when a dominant group attains “intellectual 
and moral leadership” (Femia, 1987: 24). Their ideology directs society determining 
material conditions and norms (Gilbert, 2013). Their ideas and values inform the 
coercive state apparatus and are widely shared through the ideological state apparatus 
(Althusser, 2006 [1968]), therefore gaining “dominance in, over and through 
mainstream social institutions” (Tombs, 2016a: 20). The powerful’s mental 
framework underpins the dominant construction of reality, holds significant influence 
over public sense-making, and can act as a form of “internal control” (Femia, 1987: 
24). Its ideas and values are widely accepted across classes (see Gramsci, 2007 [1930-
1931]; Whyte, 2007). When these conditions have been achieved “a period of 
hegemony or hegemonic domination” has been established; the dominance of an 
ideology has been stabilised (Hall et al, 1978: 216). The majority become: 
 
“confined within the boundaries of the dominant world-view, a 
divergent, loosely adjusted patchwork of ideas and outlooks, which, 
despite its heterogeneity, unambiguously serves the interests of the 
powerful, by mystifying power relations, by justifying various forms 
of sacrifice and deprivation, by inducing fatalism and passivity, and 
by narrowing mental horizons. Such social conflict as exists is 
limited in both intensity and scope…the reigning ideology moulds 
desires, values and expectations in a way that stabilises an 
inegalitarian system” (Femia, 1987: 44-45).  
 
In a period of hegemony “there is room for difference, or for a plurality of ideas” 
(Whyte, 2007: 112). Social actors can transcend an ideology and reimagine an 
alternative normality (Fairclough, 2010). Alternative ideas created and disseminated 
by those who are able to imagine outside of the hegemonic project’s boundaries are a 
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reason why work is needed to maintain hegemony, why capitalist crises can make 
existing project’s vulnerable, and “why history is never closed” (Hall, 2011: 728).  
 
Passive Consent  
Gramsci (1971 [1929-1935]) argues that hegemony operates through two modes: 
consent and coercion. In Britain efforts to maintain hegemony include mechanisms of 
coercion, but there is a heavy dependence on narration. As Whyte (2007) recognises, 
Gramsci’s theorisation should not be understood as a binary.  The rise of coercive force 
does not necessarily reduce the need for the mode of consent or vice versa. Rather, 
elites may attain popular consent for more intense coercive practices (ibid). 
 
“The hope of every ideology is to naturalise itself out of History into Nature, and thus 
to become invisible, to operate unconsciously” (Hall, 1988a: 8). Ideally, for the 
powerful, the political intent behind structures and the interests they serve is disguised 
(Hall et al, 1978; van Dijk, 1998). Ideas and practices become “taken for granted” 
(Hall, 1988a: 8) and discourses attain the status of “naturalised truth” (Pludwin, 2011: 
468). An ideology becomes so embedded that it was difficult to imagine and 
comprehend, or even desire, an alternative form of social organisation (Fisher cited in 
Fisher and Gilbert, 2013). Their naturalised status frames oppositions as ‘deviant’, 
‘political’ and ‘unnatural’17 (Jessop, 1974). Ideas and values become equated with 
common sense obscuring “differences between classes” and establishing “a false 
coincidence of ideas” (Hall et al, 1978: 156). Ideally, “domination not only seems to 
be universal…and legitimate (not won by coercive force), but its basis in exploitation 
actually disappears from view” (ibid: 216, emphasis in original).  
 
However, this does not have to be the case for an ideology to be hegemonic. 
“Consent…can vary in its intensity” (Femia, 1987: 39). As “consent refers to a mental 
disposition there are weaker and stronger, more passive and more active sense and 
forms of it” (ibid: 38). Gramsci recognised that amongst other forms, there is an ideal 
form of hegemony, where there is belief in the project and active commitment, and a 
                                                     
17 An opponent’s ideas are commonly referred to as an ideology to construct them as political 
and as deceiving true interests (van Dijk, 1998). 
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decadent form of hegemony, where there is class leadership and the ideology 
dominates but there is a lack of true public active support and commitment to the cause.  
 
Gramsci argued that hegemony could be attained and maintained for a project that 
does not serve public interests without ‘false consciousness’. For him, social actors 
may hold true consciousness, they may recognise contradictions between elite 
discourse and reality and be deeply discontented but present “moral and political 
passivity” that facilitates the continuation of the project (Gramsci cited in Femia, 1987: 
43). On this view, a lack of, and exclusion from, real alternatives contributes to 
“pragmatic acceptance” (ibid: 40). Gramsci developed the term ‘contradictory 
consciousness’:  
 
“the thinking of the common man is neither coherent nor consistent 
over time; it is instead disjointed and episodic; elements of 
intellectual and moral approbation coexist in unsteady equilibrium 
with elements of apathy, resignation, and even hostility. To be more 
schematic…[he] expresses a great deal of agreement with, or at least 
passive acceptance of, the dominant conception of the world…but 
on a situational level he reveals not outright dissensus but 
nevertheless a reduced level of commitment to the ‘bourgeois’ ethos, 
because it is often inappropriate to the realities of his class position” 
(Femia, 1987: 45).  
 
Critiques of Gramsci’s theoretical relevance perceive consent as active and therefore 
argue it does not capture contemporary conditions (Gilbert, 2013). However, crucially, 
to argue that hegemony of neoliberalism continues is not to argue that subordinates 
believe in, and actively support, the project or that there is a ubiquitous ‘false 
consciousness’. Although as Hall (1996: 39) notes consciousness may be “partial”.  
 
Ideological State Apparatus: The Role of the Mass Media  
Althusser (2006 [1968]) considered how social actors come to internalise ideology, 
how they come to think and speak ‘with it’. He turned attention to the role of discourse 
in the interpellation of social actors. Drawing upon Karl Marx’s analysis of base and 
superstructure and aligning with Gramsci’s (1971 [1929-1935]) argument that 
hegemony operates through two modes, Althusser (2006 [1968]: 97, 158) argued that 
there is both a “repressive state apparatus”, which includes the police, the military, and 
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an “ideological state apparatus”, a set of institutions including educational 18  and 
religious institutions that support the state in the interpellation of the public into 
dominant ideology. Whilst the institutions do not belong to the state, they “promote 
the dominant definitions” contributing towards “the tendency towards ideological 
closure” (Hall et al, 2013 [1978]: 67). Ideological permeation of the institutions makes 
the ideology and narration appear socially sanctioned and popular (see Graber, 2010). 
It is a key reason why the hegemonic is difficult to challenge; oppositional movements 
have to struggle against the dominant definition shared through the agencies of 
socialisation that institutionalise and internalise ideas and values (see Fairclough, 
2010; Femia, 1987).  
 
The mainstream media is a key institution of the ideological state apparatus. It 
“provide[s] the main channel through which politicians and government 
representatives communicate with the public (Cameron and Panović, 2014: 66). 
“Political discourse is to a large extent also media discourse” (ibid: 66). Political elites 
directly utilise the media as a vehicle to communicate their “messages” for the 
purposes of attaining and maintaining hegemony (Herman and Chomsky, 1994: 2). 
Elites “structured over-accessing” 19 of the industry encourages media reproduction of 
dominant definitions that support the existing order (Hall et al, 2013 [1978]: 61). 
Elites’ direct engagement with the media allows them to share their messages with a 
larger audience. For Hall et al (1978: 57, 56), media outlets are “secondary definers”, 
they interpret news through the hegemonic framework and reinforce “consensual 
notions”. For Richards (2017), “a partisan media accepted” the terms Westminster 
placed on debate in both GE10 and GE15.  
 
To write that the media share and reinforce dominant constructions is not to argue that 
media reporting is homogenous or to fail to recognise that the media critiques elites 
and the political economic project. Even within the mainstream media, there exist 
critiques of neoliberalism and endorsements of alternatives. There are occasionally 
“windows of opportunity” for those who are critical of the project (Spannos, 2014: 
                                                     
18 Spannos (2014: 372) states the education system “breeds obedience and conformity” to 
dominant ideology.  
19 The mainstream media relies on statements from ‘experts’ for information (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1994) and credibility (Hall et al, 1978).     
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371). However, whilst there may be critical reports, as Beetham (2015: 44) stated in 
relation to elite corruption, the mainstream media fails to provide “a coherent 
narrative, which links these different phenomena together” and therefore fails to draw 
attention to the shared structural context of the individual events they critique.  
 
Over the last few decades, politics and the mainstream media have become more 
closely intertwined (Fairclough, 2000). “Many significant political events are now in 
fact media events (for instance, a TV interview with the Prime Minister can itself be a 
major political event)” (ibid: 3). “Many news reports are compiled from the contents 
of press releases, government briefings, written records of Parliamentary debates, 
official reports or the texts of speeches politicians have yet to deliver…” (Cameron 
and Panović, 2014: 72). There has been a “mediatisation of politics and government” 
(Fairclough, 2000: 4).  
 
In a crisis, the media play a key-supporting role in ‘managing’ public sense-making 
(Panitch and Leys, 2006). Berry (2013, 2015, 2016) analysed mainstream media 
reporting of the financial crisis and evidenced elite over-accessing. Political and city 
sources were given an “almost monopoly status to define the issues and how they 
might be resolved” (Berry, 2013: 267). Other stakeholders, such as organised labour, 
were “almost completely absent” (ibid: 258). Notably George Osborne MP, soon after 
the termination of his position as Chancellor, became Editor of the Evening Standard 
newspaper, whilst also holding a major position at Blackrock the world’s largest 
investment management corporation.  
 
In March 2017, in the days leading up to the Prime Minister triggering article fifty, 
seventy Conservative MPs wrote an open letter to the BBC stating that its bias was 
causing it to overrepresent bad news about the referendum and neglect good news (see 
Cowburn, 2017). This could be interpreted as the BBC inaccurately representing the 
truth about Britain’s economic position or as political elites seeking a favourable 
misrepresentation, and perhaps raises a question about the extent to which the BBC 
were reinforcing Conservatives’ representations. It certainly reinforces the argument 
that political elites seek to influence the messages channelled through a key element 
of the ideological state apparatus in order to ‘manage’ public sense-making of crisis 
and economic conditions.  
 31 
Narrating Crisis  
Discourse is sometimes used to refer to a perspective’s narrative of a notion, for 
example, “neoliberal discourse of globalisation” (Fairclough, 2009: 163). It is also 
used to refer to a group of statements connected by a theme, for example the ‘third 
way’ discourse (see Fairclough, 2003: 4). It may also be used to refer to the language 
of a field, for example political discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). A further use is 
in reference to speeches or interviews, and the term ‘text’ can also be used for this 
purpose. Discourses are “ways of representing aspects of the world”, not only in its 
current form but they can also form “projective, imaginaries, representing possible 
worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the 
world in particular directions” (Fairclough, 2003: 124).  
 
“Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to manage and manipulate 
the consent of men” (C Wright Mills, 2000 [1959]: 41). Legitimisation, concerned 
with making ways of thinking and acting “publicly justifiable” and “publicly shared” 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 109, emphasis in original), is an on-going process 
of disseminating discourses that justify, argue for, account for, and explain 
perspectives and actions so that they are determined moral and reasonable and become 
socially accepted (van Dijk, 1998). Through narration powerful definers can convey 
the ideas and values of the dominant ideology seeking to embed them and ensure 
influence over sense-making. Ideas and values are taught through, and maintained by, 
elites’ narration of events, issues, periods, individuals, and social groups (ibid).  
 
Attaining and maintaining consent is an intensive process. It involves the construction 
and dissemination in the public sphere of many oral and written texts and images 
(Fairclough, 2014; Hall and Massey, 2012). As “merchants of ideas” (Stiglitz, 2012: 
202), political elites disseminate extensive “chains and networks of texts”, including 
interviews, speeches, debates, and reports (Fairclough, 2009: 176). In countries that 
are the most ‘democratic’ governments heavily invest in text dissemination and the 
public relations industries are largest (Chomsky, 2002). As maintaining consent 
becomes “more difficult as the economic conditions become more perilous” (Hall et 
al, 1988 [1978]: 32), narration intensifies to prevent questioning, imagining beyond 
ideological boundaries, support for alternatives, resistance, and challenges emerging, 
and then if required, to counter challenges. Powerful definers’ representation of 
 32 
challenges is important because it influences public sense-making through dominant 
and alternative ideas (ibid). Challengers also intensely narrate the crisis to contest the 
leaders’ narrative and influence public sense-making. Definers’ texts are “shaped 
through contestation with…other positions” producing an “embattled language” 
(Fairclough, 2010: 15). This thesis argues that Westminster definers had to produce 
texts to counter oppositional movements that were challenging their narratives and 
adjust their narrative to recognise the growing momentum of alternatives.   
 
Directing ‘Resolutions’: Including and Excluding Responses  
 
“Natural and social worlds differ in that the latter but not the former 
depends upon human action for its existence and is ‘socially 
constructed’. The socially constructive effects of discourse are thus 
a central concern” (Fairclough, 2010: 5).  
 
“Different social understandings of the world lead to different social actions, and 
therefore the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences” 
(ibid: 6). Texts “can bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from 
them), our beliefs, our attitudes, values and so forth” and determine decisions that have 
“political and material consequences and effects” (ibid: 8, 14). “Texts can start wars, 
or contribute…to changes in industrial relations” (ibid: 8). “Within a particular world 
view, some forms of action become natural, and others unthinkable” (ibid: 6). 
Therefore “social transformations”, and the absence of transformations, cannot be 
made sense of “without thinking about language” (Fairclough, 2003: 203).  
 
“The difference between…[which scenarios unfold] is not 
determined by some inexorable ‘law of history’ but by the 
effectiveness of our political ideological intervention, above all the 
‘theatre’ of popular politics and popular conceptions” (Hall, 1988b: 
273-274). 
 
“Those who are able to define what the crisis is all about also hold the key to defining 
the appropriate strategies for resolution” (‘t Hart, 1993: 41). Consequently, discursive 
power is “a particularly ‘powerful’ power” (Fuchs, 2007: 146).  
 
Framing is a fundamental tool for manipulating crises in ways that legitimise particular 
responses that serve particular interests (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009; Stiglitz, 2012). 
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Frames are “simultaneously productive and repressive, working to define and delimit 
the field of intelligibility, including the truth of the crisis itself” (Pludwin, 2011: 470). 
A frame has a “concomitant resolution” (Tombs, 2016a: 54).  Particular discourses 
include and exclude or discredit particular ways of thinking and acting (see Fairclough, 
2014; Hall, 1997; Miller and Rose, 1990). Dominant ideas about what is feasible and 
desirable “are always a product and thus an effect of economic, political and social 
power” (Tombs, 2016a: 33). As Žižek (2009) stated in relation to 2007-8 financial 
crisis, the ‘resolution’ “depends on how it will be symbolised, on what ideological 
interpretation or story will impose itself and determine the general perception of the 
crisis”. 
 
Crisis narration can therefore facilitate “strategic responses” (Hay, 1999a: 328). Hay 
(1999a: 337) divides responses into four categories: responses that completely and 
directly “resolve the contradictions and failures”, those that selectively resolve real 
causes, responses that resolve the discursively constituted ‘causes’ (there is a response 
despite the identified ‘problem’ not being the real problem), and “purely discursive 
responses” where there is no real action. He argues that in relation to state crisis the 
first option is not viable because it is not possible to remove all the contradictions from 
complex social, political, and economic systems and the fourth option is not currently 
feasible because the public possess a level of awareness that means those in power 
would struggle to maintain legitimacy if the responses were “purely discursive” (ibid: 
337). Similarly, Ross (2015: 370) suggests the state may “engage in satisficing 
activities”; going “through the motions by enacting superficial changes in policies, 
practices and laws” to satisfy public expectations of response. This thesis makes the 
argument that political elites have identified false but ideologically advantageous 
‘causes’ to rationalise ‘responses’ that intensify neoliberalism.  
 
Hall’s (1973b, 1992a) theorisation of encoding and decoding recognises that definers 
construct a narrative and after production, circulation and dissemination, social actors 
consume the discourses. As “ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect 
with a particular constellation of social forces” (Hall, 1996: 43), definers adopt 
discursive strategies for this purpose in the encoding process (Hay, 1995). Definers 
seek “to find resonance with individuals’ and groups’…lived experiences” (Hay, 
1996: 255). As Gramsci [2000 [1926]) argues those who want their ideology to be 
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hegemonic must understand the experiences and desires of the subordinate and appear 
to incorporate them into their programme and struggle for them. For example, Hall et 
al20 (1978: 140) identified a number of “core images” of the dominant “traditionalist’ 
ideology”, which were drawn upon in constructions of crime that held class consensus 
in England in the 1960s/ 1970s. The images included respectability, work, social 
discipline, family, and the city. “Together, these images produce and sustain an un-
codified, but immensely powerful, conservative sense of Englishness…it also, by its 
very density of reference, asserts everyone shares to some extent” (ibid 140). 
Nationalisation of the images helps to disguise the sectional interests neo-conservatism 
serves, and helps to unite various life experiences and interests within the same 
framework, seeking to achieve cross-class consensus (ibid). In this way, “‘the English 
way of life’ provide(s) the basis of ideological consensus” (ibid: 140) or the “cement” 
of society (ibid: 141).  
 
To attain consent for a project definers may construct a narrative with key characters 
that encourages the public to adopt particular identifies and positions (see Hall, 1992b; 
Hay, 1995, 1996; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), for example ‘hardworking taxpayer’. 
Constructing a moral panic is a key strategy of those working for interpellation (Hay, 
1995; van Dijk, 1998). It invites social actors to view themselves as threatened by the 
‘folk devil’ (Hay, 1995) and attempts to secure social unity, cohesion, and 
homogeneity against the ‘threat’ and in support of the project (Coser, 1956). 
Collectively social actors share disgust against ‘the other’ and perceive themselves as 
victims of their actions (Coser, 1956), leading to anxiety and coldness towards the 
identified threat. As Hall’s (1979: 15) concept of “authoritarian populism” captures, 
powerful definers possess techniques to gain popular consent for authoritarian 
responses to ‘threats’. They may be able to manipulate social actors into supporting 
the idea that some people are “inferior, deviant or otherwise illegitimate” (Hay, 1996: 
260). Through narration, groups can be manipulated into supporting an order that does 
not best serve even their own interests (see Edelman, 1977; van Dijk, 1998).  
 
Inaccurate Representations: Discouraging Genuine Understanding  
                                                     
20 Hall et al (1978) analysed mainstream media and public letters to gain an understanding of 
public sense-making in the 1970s crisis.  
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It has been widely recognised in critical literature that official discourses often 
inaccurately represent reality and seek to discourage genuine understanding. This 
thesis evidences that definers have sought to discourage genuine understanding in 
order to include and exclude particular responses to crisis. The powerful may 
strategically operate to limit what is known and unknown by the public (Tuana, 2008: 
109, 110). They withhold some information, evidence, and knowledge that it would 
be ethical for the public to know. Some definers “actively work to organise doubt or 
uncertainty or misinformation” (Proctor, 2008: 8) and misunderstanding. In some 
cases powerful definers seek to “deliberately” and strategically “engineer” ignorance 
(ibid: 3). “Ignorance – far from being a simple, innocent lack of knowledge – is a 
complex phenomenon, which like knowledge, is interrelated with power” (Tuana, 
2008: 140). Whereas some are privileged with knowledge and benefit from not sharing 
it, others are unable to access the knowledge and are consequently disadvantaged 
(Tuana, 2008). Tuana (2008: 111, 140) termed this phenomenon “power/knowledge 
ignorance” and “the power-politics of such ignorances”.  
 
Ignorance “intersects with systems of oppression” (Tuana, 2008: 109) and can be a 
key “political and commercial resource” (Davies and McGoey, 2012: 80). Proctor 
(1995, 2008), in his case study of the tobacco industry, detailed the lengths corporate 
elites went to in order to manufacture public ignorance, including the funding of biased 
research and suppression of undesirable data. Whilst the harms of asbestos eventually 
became known across Europe and North America (following years of industry denial), 
in South Africa this knowledge was silenced at the expense overwhelmingly, of black 
labourers and their families (Braun, 2008).  
 
A number of criminologists have made important contributions on the issue of false, 
inaccurate, and misleading representations in official discourse, most notably, Cohen’s 
(2001) seminal work on state denial of atrocities and Scraton’s (1999) analysis of 
systematic police deception to prevent accountability for Hillsborough. Contributions 
have also been made on strategic representations by the media. Herman and Chomsky 
(1995) analysed US media reporting of a range of case studies to argue that rather than 
providing necessary information for the public to accurately make sense of important 
issues, media reporting was propaganda for social orders serving powerful interests. 
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Analysing racial thoughts in the historical moment of Obama’s election, Gilroy (2014: 
5) discussed the power of a history of “systematic mystification” and “agno-politics”.  
 
The prevalence of powerful definers attempting to obscure truth has also been widely 
recognised in critical work. Walters (2009: 204) states the government “conceals, 
manipulates and supresses truth’”. Sanbonmatsu (2006: 196) suggests in capitalist 
culture “the destruction of the truth is …advanced”. Panitch and Leys (2006: vii), who 
suggest, “unprecedented levels of secrecy, obfuscation, dissembling and downright 
lying…now characterise public life”, refer to normalisation of powerful definers’ lying 
as “chronic mendacity”. A number of eminent theorists in Criminology have also 
recognised its prevalence. Cohen (2001: 114) stated “official discourse is inevitably a 
mixture of blatant lies, half-truths, evasions, legalistic sophistries, ideological appeals 
and credible factual objections”. C Wright Mills (2000 [1959]: 191) recognised that 
public life is informed by “official definitions…myths and lies”. Nils Christie (1981) 
argued that official definers seek to blur the truth in order to protect themselves and 
their interests. Howard Becker (1967: 242, 243) suggested that as “things are seldom 
as they ought to be” powerful definers “usually have to lie”; “officials develop ways 
both of denying the failure of the institution to perform as it should and explaining 
those failures which cannot be hidden”. Hall (2011: 724) stated, “what corporate 
spokespersons say…is often misleading, sometimes deliberately evasive double talk, 
smoke and mirrors ‘spin’”. For Streeck (2017a: 7) powerful definers’ lying has 
intensified under neoliberalism. He states, “lies even blatant lies, have always existed 
in politics…however, with the neoliberal revolution…a new form of political deceit 
was born – the expert lie”. He suggests that lies by experts are now used to justify 
“absurd” decisions (ibid: 7). This thesis evidences that falsehoods, inaccurate, and 
misleading representations were central, systematic, and ubiquitous to Westminster’s 
narration of the crisis between 2010 and 2015.  
Conclusion 
This neo-Marxist theoretical framework has explored the relationship between the 
concepts of crisis, hegemony, and discourse. It has presented the key arguments from 
the literature for understanding the narration of crisis to attain and maintain hegemony 
and crucially processes of contestation and challenge. It has argued that capitalist 
crises present opportunities both for leaders of the existing project and oppositional 
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movements (which must have power and legitimacy in the political system), and that 
a discursive struggle between powerful groups seeking to seize the opportunity for 
change may unfold. It has also recognised that passive consent may be the condition 
of hegemony. The centrality of discourses for attaining and maintaining hegemony, 
struggling for major change, and directing the ‘resolution’ has been asserted. The 
following chapter explores neoliberalism and neoliberals seizing of the opportunity 
presented by the 1970s capitalist crisis and key moments of the project’s ascendancy 























Exploring Neoliberalism and Retracing the British Path 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the meaning of neoliberalism and discusses key moments in its 
ascendancy in Britain. Firstly, it details neoliberalism’s key tenets, and recognises 
points of convergence and divergence between its theoretical and actual forms. 
Secondly, it relatively briefly examines seminal moments of, what Peck and Tickell 
(2007: 47) term, the “British path to neoliberalism”. Focus is given to neoliberal 
theorisation and neoliberals’ dissemination of their theory, neoliberalism’s capture of 
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Conservatism and permeation of (New) Labour, and discursive strategies for 
exploiting crisis, attaining and maintaining hegemony of neoliberalism whilst 
intensifying neoliberal conditions.   
 
Exploring Neoliberalism  
“It can be difficult to think about them when it has become so commonplace to think 
with them” (Peck, 2010: xi, emphasis in original). Neoliberalism became so 
naturalised that its presence was not necessarily recognised (ibid).  It was just the way 
of the world, particularly for those who had never lived ‘outside neoliberalism’. Whilst 
the concept is “unknown and unused by the public-at large” (McChesney, 1999: 7) 
and its use by a politician is “a rare…event”, it is well used in academia (Peck, 2010: 
13). Critics of the concept call it “reductive, sacrificing attention to internal 
complexities and geo-historical specificity” (Hall, 2011: 706). For them, it is used to 
encompass too broad a collection of values, ideas, and practices to be useful (ibid). 
Whilst there are variations in theoretical ideas, and neoliberal projects are “neither 
monolithic in form nor universal in effect” (Sites, 2007: 36), neoliberal projects have 
a number of key tenets that are prevalent and enduring conditions. Neoliberalism can 
be an appropriate term for encapsulating interconnected tenets, as long as 
complexities, mutations, and different applications in different places are recognised. 
The “historical geographies” of existing projects must continue to inform the 
understanding of neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 48).  
 
Crucially, “neoliberalism is…not one thing” (Hall, 2011: 708). It is “a theory of 
political and economic practices” (Harvey, 2005: 2) and a real-world project (or 
projects) (Sites, 2007). Neoliberalism, building on classical liberalism dominant in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is a set of theories of how capitalism should 
operate that is used, sometimes loosely, to underpin the form of capitalism in a 
particular place.  
 
Impure Real Neoliberal Projects  
Neoliberal theory tends not to be “fully actualised” in the real-world (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002: 353). The ideational construction is a “utopian vision”, an “imagined 
destination” (Peck, 2010: xiii). Neoliberalism is “a long-term tendency” (Hall, 2011: 
708). The theory cannot “remake the world in its own image” (Peck, 2010: 7). Rather, 
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“neoliberal restructuring projects” are undertaken in particular contexts with existing 
legacies that the project must accommodate or inherit, even if temporarily (Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002: 349). There is not often a “unilinear transition” from one coherent 
project to another (ibid: 366). Destruction of the old and construction of the new is an 
“uneven and open-ended” process (ibid: 366).  
 
If elites seek to govern with consent they must accommodate, whilst gradually and 
carefully eroding, the existing. Augusto Pinochet’s implementation of neoliberal 
conditions through military dictatorship allowed a comparatively “rapid-fire 
transformation” in Klein’s (2007: 7) terminology. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher 
recognised that a slower transformation was needed to manage consent (ibid). 
Capitalist crisis can accelerate accepted implementation. But, even then, attachment 
to the old may be resilient. “Intense conflicts between preservationist and restructuring 
orientated political blocs” can be obstacles to the latter implementing their vision 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 359). Strong public support for the welfare state and a 
fully national NHS meant the neoliberal project in Britain had to work to gradually 
rollback harm reduction systems. Neoliberals seized the opportunity presented by the 
neoliberal crisis to accelerate the erosion of welfare support and secure acceptance of 
further privatisation of the NHS. However, support for challenges calling for an end 
to austerity and the return of a fully nationalised NHS suggests neoliberal narration 
has not been wholly successful. This complexity of implementation connotes 
Polyani’s (1944>2001) “double movement”, whereby marketisation may be resisted 
by a counter-movement pushing for social protection and vice versa, resulting in 
limited implementation. These complexities can result in “politico-ideological 
hybrids” “amalgamations of inherited and emergent institutional arrangements” 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 360, 366).  
 
Neoliberal Theory and the Reality of the British Project: Some Divergences  
Real neoliberal projects often diverge from the stipulations of neoliberal theory. 
Neoliberal theory asserts that “open, competitive and ‘unregulated’ markets, liberated 
from state interference and the actions of social collectivities, represent the optimal 
mechanism for socio-economic development” (Theodore et al, 2013: 15). There is 
unrivalled “faith” in the ability of free markets (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 29). The 
personified market (‘it thinks’, ‘it does’, ‘it loses confidence’) is constructed as 
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‘natural’, rational, and fair (Clarke, 2010a; Hall, 2011; Soederberg, 2010). Theorists 
view interference in the market as political and unnatural (Clarke, 2010a; Gilbert, 
2013; Resnick and Wolff, 2010).  
 
For them, state intervention leads to biases as different interest groups pressurise states 
to manipulate markets therefore forcing them from their ‘natural paths’ (Harvey, 
2005). Market failure is the result of too much interference and from their view, the 
market should be left to self-correct (Blyth, 2013b). This is in stark contrast to 
Keynesianism, which argues that state failure to effectively intervene leads to price 
spirals, inflation bubbles, and recessions (Chomsky, 1999; Resnick and Wolff, 2010) 
and that therefore, state intervention is necessary to counteract capitalism’s self-
destructive tendencies (Resnick and Wolff, 2010).  
 
However, as Peck and Tickell (2007: 31) state, “no matter what it says on the bottle, 
neo-liberalisation rarely involves unilateral acts of state withdrawal”. “Real existing 
markets…require state intervention in order to function” (Leitner et al, 2007a: 10 
emphasis added). “The free economy requires a strong state” (Gamble, 1983: 116). 
Exploring Marxist conceptions of the state, Hay (1999b: 154) states that for Engels 
and others the state is “an ideal collective capitalist”. This conception recognises that 
capitalism and its particular form is not capable of achieving its own reproduction. The 
state is required to intervene “on behalf of capital in its long term general interests” 
(ibid: 155).  
 
The state ensures the material conditions required by the neoliberal project (Harvey, 
2005, 2011). It dismantles barriers that restrain the market (Gamble, 1983; Hall, 2011; 
Peck and Tickell, 2007). The state seeks out favourable international trading 
conditions facilitating “the trans-nationalisation of circuits of accumulation” (Saad-
Filho, 2010: 243). It disempowers organised labour (Harvey, 2005) but facilitates the 
collective action of capital through the joint stock corporation. It opens up new 
opportunities for capital accumulation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) through 
privatising public assets and allowing plunder of natural resources (Harvey, 2005), and 
corporate access to public revenue streams. It guarantees the construct of private 
property, its protection, and the means for its exchange. As this thesis recognises, the 
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state also takes the lead role in managing public sense-making in a way that facilitates 
the functioning of the form of capitalism.   
 
The real neoliberal project in Britain indeed, involves “not a withdrawal but a 
redirection of state energies and goals, and constant vigilance to maintain and extend 
the market order” (Gamble, 1983: 116). In practice, powerful interests shape selective 
state intervention (Fisher in Fisher and Gilbert, 2013; Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2011). 
There is a rollback of “a particular kind of state” and a rollout of a different kind of 
state (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 29). For example, the state rolls back corporate 
regulation but rolls out regulation of ‘welfare’. Some criminologists have accepted 
claims that the power of the state has been mitigated (Coleman et al, 2009) and 
dispersed (Hallsworth and Lea, 2012).  However, “the state never went away” and 
indeed, “it’s no exaggeration to assert that the global economic crisis…has decisively 
settled the issue of the continued centrality of the state as an instrument of both 
economic and social policy” (ibid: 193). 
 
Whilst theorists claim that the market should be protected from powerful interest 
groups, the dominant role of finance in the British economy21 allows it to influence 
investment, employment, demand, and exchange rates (Saad-Filho, 2010), and 
crucially its own regulation (Tombs, 2015a). For Gilbert (2013: 17), the neoliberal 
state promotes “the interests of finance capital and the processes of financialisation 
above and – if necessary – to the exclusion of all other interests”. This has been 
demonstrated in its responses to financial crisis. 
 
                                                     
21 From the mid 1980s UK finance’s trade surpluses have dwarfed those of other countries and 
sectors (Gamble, 2009). In 2013 it was £71bn, two and half times bigger than the US’s trade 
surplus, and three times that of the third biggest-Luxembourg (The City UK, 2014). “In 2014 
financial and insurance services contributed £126.9billion in gross value added (GVA) to the 
UK economy, 8.0% of the UK’s total GVA” (Tyler, 2015: 1). The finance sector provides 3.4 
per cent of UK jobs (ibid). Finance “is so pervasive…it spreads across the entire economic 
cycle, co-existing with it…from start to finish…finance is co-substantial with the very 
production of goods and services” (Marazzi, 2011: 27, emphasis in original). It has become 
commonplace for large non-financial corporations, including manufacturing corporations, to 
gain most of their profit through investment and speculation (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberal 
conditions have also pressured the public into becoming reliant on finance to fund living costs. 
“Neoliberalisation has meant, in short, the financialisation of everything” (ibid: 33). 
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For neoliberal theorists the state “must not…take as its objective the amelioration of 
capitalism’s propensity to create inequality” (Hall, 2011: 706), because, rather than a 
problem, inequality is the ‘natural’ expression of the meritocratic market. For 
neoliberal theory, intervention to limit “enormous salaries, benefits and bonuses” or 
welfare provision is unjust, it undermines incentives and rewards (Hall, 2011: 707).  
 
However, in real neoliberal projects, rather than “forces of nature” “real and often dirty 
hands” govern the market (Pludwin, 2011: 467). They ensure that incomes are unfairly 
polarized and meritocracy is not upheld (Saad-Filho, 2010).  In contrast to claims of 
natural forces, “specific moralities” are furthered by the economic order (Tombs, 
2016a: 36). “Neoliberalism is more than an economic or political project”, it is also a 
moral project (ibid: 36). Neoliberal projects combine neoliberal theory with political 
neo-conservatism, advocating “intrusive government action for the regulation of the 
ordinary citizenry in the name of public security and traditional values” (Steger, 2009: 
56). As the findings and analysis chapters evidence, neo-conservatism favours 
traditionalist ideals of family, nation, work, respectability, and discipline (see Fisher 
in Fisher and Gilbert, 2013; Hall et al, 1978). 
Neoliberal theory stipulates that the state should withdraw from corporate regulation 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2010). Wealth creators should be “freed from state interference” 
(Harvey, 2005: 65). For neoliberals, regulation is a ‘burden’ on business and 
bureaucratic ‘red tape’ hinders efficiency and productivity (Tombs and Whyte, 2010). 
They advocate the ‘compliance school’ approach where the state trusts the corporation 
to apparently self-regulate (ibid).  
However, in practice, in Britain Tombs and Whyte (2010: 62) suggest there has been 
a “collapse of enforcement” and consequently corporate “impunity” has become 
“institutionalise(d)”. For Tombs (2015: 67), the purpose of the regulatory approach to 
finance “has been to ensure the ability of the financial system to grow and extract 
profits”. The financial crisis undoubtedly demonstrates an absence of effective self-
regulation in financial markets, yet deregulation and regulatory failings have not been 
addressed (Tombs, 2016a). In fact, the apparent ‘necessity’ of austerity has been used 
to justify further reductions in regulation of private capital (Tombs, 2016b).  
Neoliberal theory claims that emancipated markets allow entities to compete, ensuring 
 43 
efficiency, quality, and competitive prices (Crouch, 2011; Soederberg, 2008) therefore 
helping to control inflation (Harvey, 2005). The state as a sole provider is constructed 
as inefficient because it does not have to compete to maintain its customers or 
accumulate profit (Sayer, 1995). For neoliberals, the state must compete with the 
private sector (Amable, 2011). Some neoliberals claim that oligopolies and 
monopolies are the end result of competition and now the most efficient “prevail over 
inferior competitors” (Wolin, 2008: 7). 
In contrast, Lenin (2000 [1916]) suggested that ‘free competition’ capitalism would 
be displaced with monopoly capitalism. Financial organisations would become 
“powerful monopolies having at their command the whole of the money capital of all 
of the capitalists…” (ibid: 58). In Britain’s real neoliberal project, a few corporations 
have attained financial oligopoly (Wilks, 2013). HSBC, Barclays, Lloyds Banking 
Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland dominate the market (Treanor, 2015b), which 
makes it difficult for new corporations to compete (see Harvey, 2005).  
Furthermore, the oligopolies are then able to manipulate conditions and prices, often 
at the consumers’ expense. Privatisation of public services has often led to higher 
consumer prices serving private interests not public (Tombs, 2007). In 2011 the ‘big 
six’ British energy companies made an average of £30 profit per household, in 2013 
this rose to £105 (Bawden, 2013). Their profits continued to rise despite falling prices 
in the wholesale market (Farrell, 2015). The number of people living in fuel poverty 
has increased (Wilks, 2013). The state responds to this by using public money to 
supplement fuel bills (ibid). Since privatisation, prices have risen, quality has 
deteriorated (McChesney, 1999). The rail industry demonstrates that privatisation and 
state investment in infrastructure for the private sector serves private interests and not 
the public interest. The state borrows to invest in infrastructure, the corporation 
charges the consumer more than if rail travel was publicly owned and public ownership 
would not be detrimental to national finances (for a full explanation see Card, 2016; 
Corporate Watch, 2014).  
To gain support, or at least acceptance, of capitalism over its history powerful definers 
have claimed that the greater the prosperity of the wealthy and the greater economic 
growth, the greater the prosperity for all (Whyte, 2007). “As citizens we have 
increasingly been, and remain, constantly encouraged to believe that the ‘success’ or 
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‘failure’ of business activity matters to us” (Tombs, 2016a: 41). The “universal 
prosperity rationale” dictates that wealth for private interests will improve the living 
standards of even the poorest socio-economic groups (Whyte, 2007). Neoliberal 
discourses continually claim, “a rising tide lifts all boats” (Harvey, 2005: 64). 
Therefore corporate elites’ pursuit of profit “enjoys an overwhelming privilege as a 
social goal” (Crouch, 2011: 167).  
 
However, as the rise of inequality during the British neoliberal project evidences, 
‘trickle down’ is a myth manufactured to legitimise favourable conditions for finance 
and corporate accumulation that actually serves sectional interests as opposed to 
universal interests (Wilks, 2013). The interests of a few are privileged at the expense 
of the many  (Stiglitz, 2012).  “The Keynesian bond which tied the profits of the rich 
to the wages of the poor is severed, cutting the fate of economic elites loose from that 
of the masses” (Streeck, 2014: 59). Neoliberalism inflicts “stagnating or declining real 
wages, increasing poverty…inequality”, and suffering for the many, “and booming 
markets and profits for the few” (Chomsky, 1999: 122). Post World War Two, in the 
United States “the wealth of the poorest 40 percent increased in real terms” but from 
the 1980s “the wealth of the poorest 40 percent has decreased in real terms” (Whyte, 
2015). In the UK FTSE 100 CEO pay leapt “from around 20 times the pay of the 
average UK worker in the 1980s, to 60 times in 1998, to 160 times in 2012” (Hildyard, 
2015: 177). Over the same period, “the share of total UK income accruing to the richest 
1 percent of the population…more than doubled from 6 percent in 1979 to 13 percent 
in 2011” (ibid: 178). The incomes of the top 0.1 percent are rising four times faster 
than the incomes of the lowest 90 percent (Perkins, 2014). The five richest families in 
the UK have the same wealth as the collective wealth of the poorest 20 percent of the 
population (Goldring cited in Perkins, 2014). This has a significant impact on life 
expectancy. On average the top 1 percent live for 10 years longer, and a man living in 
Chelsea and Kensington lives fourteen years longer than a man in Glasgow (Dorling, 
2014).   
 
Inequality is often perceived as a by-product of neoliberalism but it is more accurate 
to perceive it as “the fundamental core of what neoliberalisation has been about” 
(Harvey, 2005: 119).  
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“One persistent fact within this complex history of uneven 
neoliberalisation has been the universal tendency to increase social 
inequality and to expose the less fortunate elements in any society  
…to the chill winds of austerity and the dull fate of increasing 
marginalisation” (ibid: 118).  
 
It is “the direct result of complex social relations, class power dynamics, and partisan 
politics” (Pludwin, 2011: 469). Notwithstanding a lack of economic credibility and 
material evidence the claim of trickle down, continues to be a staple of political elites’ 
discourses and shapes government policies (Whyte, 2015).  
 
Neoliberal Paths 
Neoliberal projects are “geographically differentiated yet transnationally 
interconnected” (Leitner et al, 2007b: 325). Whilst the central tenets of neoliberalism 
inform projects across the globe, their form, the extent to which they are implemented 
and resisted, their path to dominance, and their strategies, policies and discourses, 
vary. There are a number of different paths to neoliberalism (Peck, 2010: 3). 
Overwhelmingly they can be traced back to a moment ripe for exploitation that has 
been seized by a powerful entity. However, this has taken the form of shock therapy 
by military dictatorship in Chile (see Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Leitner et al, 2007b), 
“direct military intervention – in [attempted] humanitarian disguise” (Hall, 2011: 716), 
for example in Iraq22, structural adjustment programmes dictated in the ‘bailout’ of 
countries in crisis (Harvey, 2005: 29), for example Greece, and by elected 
governments choosing to seize the opportunity presented by a capitalist crisis to 
legitimise neoliberal measures.  
 
Key Moments in The British Path to Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal Theorisation and Dissemination  
Neoliberal theory developed through a “transatlantic dialogue” (Peck, 2010: 3). In 
1938 German ordoliberal theorists, Austrian economists and Chicago school 
economists, who had been developing variations of economic liberalism, gathered at 
Colloque Lippmann in Paris to share ideas (ibid). Although the schools varied, they 
                                                     
22 In Iraq the US Bush Administration, in the name of removing weapons of mass destruction 
and implementing democracy, exploited disorganisation and utilised their power to privatise 
public entities, including media and transport, and remove trade barriers that restricted foreign 
investment in Iraq’s banks (Harvey, 2005: 6). 
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were united in their desire to challenge Keynesianism and to prevent the spread of 
Soviet Union ‘communism’23 (ibid: 17).  
 
Fredrick von Hayek, an Austrian economist, and Milton Friedman, a Chicago school 
economist, sought to pioneer the theoretical development of a project that would free 
the market and end an era of collectivism (Peck, 2010). Hayek established the Mont 
Pelerin Society, of which Friedman was a member (ibid). Foundations and wealthy 
individuals, including financial elites. funded think tanks and academics to generate 
and disseminate theories that favoured their political economic goals (Chomsky cited 
in Shannon, 2014b; Harvey, 2005; Leitner et al, 2007a). In 1955, Keith Joseph, a 
Conservative who became Thatcher’s key advisor, established the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA) (Peck and Tickell, 2007). The Centre for Policy Studies, set 
up in 1974, and the Adam Smith Institute, established in 1976, developed the IEA’s 
ideas into policies24 (ibid). A number of newspapers, including the Financial Times, 
the Daily Telegraph and the Times (Peck and Tickell, 2007), “strongly endorsed 
neoliberalism” and were “critical players in establishing hegemony of neoliberal ideas 
and dismantling post war” Keynesianism (Berry, 2015: 3). Hall and Jacques (1983: 9) 
describe 1974-1979 as “the period of intense political propaganda and preparation for 
power”.  
 
When the 1970s capitalist crisis struck, those who had been disseminating ideas, when 
neoliberalism was a “dissenting presence” (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 47), finally had an 
opportunity to seize dominance. Neoliberals operated to discredit the existing 
orthodoxy and promote the virtues of neoliberalism25 (Blyth, 2013b) Neoliberal ideas 
had:  
 
“been scrupulously formulated for this very eventuality…and they 
had been peddled relentlessly through free-market think tanks, 
through the financial community and business organisations, and 
                                                     
23   In Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) he envisioned ‘state-led capitalism’ leading to 
communism (Leitner et al, 2007a). He sought to exploit fears cultivated by the Soviet Union’s 
operations (ibid).  
24 Many key Thatcherite policies “including monetarism, the lifting of capital controls, ‘right 
to buy’ and restrictions on union power … originated” in these think tanks  (Berry, 2015: 3).  
25 Von Hayek and Friedman used their platform after winning the Nobel Prize to promote 
monetarism and neoliberalism (Shannon, 2014a).  
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through the elite and mainstream media, not least by Friedman 
himself” (Peck, 2010: 5).  
 
“A three decade process of intellectual institution building and corporate-led 
knowledge production played a key role in the resulting hegemony” (Sites, 2007: 124). 
What was once a marginal perspective attained “ideological triumph” and became a 
“dominant political-economic state project” (ibid: 120), when “at last, political and 
economic conditions were propitious” (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 38). The rise of 
neoliberalism demonstrates the importance and expediency of developing and 
disseminating alternative ideas (ibid).  
 
The Crisis of Social Democratic Capitalism    
Ideas developed during the Great Depression by socialist movements, economists, and 
the Labour party to respond to inequality, which came to be known as Keynesianism 
in homage to John Maynard Keynes, were operationalised in the aftermath of World 
War two (Hall, 2011). “A high-wage mass-production industrial economy that 
included an alliance between capital and organised labour” was established (Radice, 
2010: 34). It was an era of Fordism; a period marked by mass manufacturing and 
consumption. High levels of employment favoured workers who successfully 
struggled for improved conditions and wage increases (Panitch and Gindin, 2010), 
which in turn helped to ensure demand  (Crouch, 2011).  
 
The state adjusted spending and policies 26  to manage demand and balance the 
economy (Crouch, 2011). When demand was lax the government spent more and when 
inflation and demand were high it reduced its spending (ibid). The state also managed 
currencies and international financial flows. In marked contrast to more recent 
governments, during the period the government perceived its role as:  
 “intervening in the economy, redistributing wealth, universalising 
life-chances, attacking unemployment, protecting the socially 
vulnerable, ameliorating the condition of oppressed or marginalised 
groups and addressing social injustice. It tried to break the ‘natural’ 
link between social needs and the individual’s capacity to pay” (Hall, 
2011: 707). 
 
                                                     
26 Leys (1989: 313) describes the demand management as at first “gentle touches on the 
accelerator or brakes (more often the brakes) through changes in taxation, state spending and 
the control of credit” and then it became engaged in more “radical repairs”. 
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It overtly intervened to create a more “social and moral economy” (Harvey, 2005: 11). 
Reflecting the findings of the Beveridge report, the state designed harm reduction 
systems, including the National Health Service, the welfare state, and social housing, 
to protect the vulnerable and ameliorate inequality (Hall, 2011). The state nationalised 
water, electricity, gas, and transport to improve affordability (Leys, 1989). Parties 
competed by promoting “full employment and prosperity, accepting a considerable 
public sector alongside the private, financing high government spending on welfare 
out of high taxation, and conciliating trade-union power” (Gamble, 1983: 127).  
 
The 1970s were marked by a serious inflation crisis27 to which higher wage demands 
and high commodity prices contributed (see Gamble, 2014; Harvey, 2005; Lapavitsas, 
2009). It became a decade of governments attempting to ‘resolve’ the crisis. Edward 
Heath, Conservative and Prime Minster between 1970 and 1974, advocated state 
withdrawal from market management (Leys, 1989) and a more interventionist 
approach to organised labour (Jacques, 1983). Heath “unleashed an ideological 
onslaught” upon trade unions, and the media “seized on this lead” (Hall et al, 1988 
[1978]: 20). He constructed miners, who went on strike in 1972 and 1974 as unpatriotic 
(Hall et al, 1978; Harvey, 2005). A ‘Red Scare’ was used to cultivate fear of unions 
and the Labour party (Hall et al, 1988 [1978]). The media engaged in ‘exposing’ 
“‘Totalitarian Marxist(s)’” in the Labour party (ibid: 20). Daily Telegraph reported on 
“Communism’s ‘creeping insidious, cancer like growth’” and Lord Chalfront warned 
of “Communist ‘maggots and termites’” who threatened democracy (ibid: 24). “A key 
theme of the Heath government…was the need [for the state] to reassert authority and 
law and order – in relation to working class militancy, crime, student unrest, etc.” 
(Jacques, 1983: 45). The Industrial Relations Act 1971 introduced a punitive approach 
to industrial conflict28 (Leys, 1989). Chancellor Anthony Barber “shifted the burden 
of taxation substantially away from companies and the richer taxpayers and onto the 
working class” (ibid: 90). “The class character of the new fiscal policy was 
                                                     
27 In 1975 the inflation rate was 26 per cent (Harvey, 2005). To demonstrate the abnormality, 
in 1970 inflation was 6.4%. 
28 It permitted “financial sanctions on registered unions whose members took industrial action 
other than by prescribed procedures”, enforced pre-strike ballots, and disallowed unofficial 
and sympathetic strikes  (Leys, 1989: 90).  
 
 49 
unmistakable” (ibid: 90). There was fierce resistance of Heath’s and Barker’s approach 
(Jacques, 1983). Britain experienced: 
 
 “four states of emergency, an unprecedented post-war level of 
industrial conflict, high unemployment, high inflation, and the 
spectacular shipwreck of the Government’s attempt to expand the 
economy on the rocks of the oil crisis, the miner’s strike, and the 
three-day week” (Gamble, 1983: 112).  
 
In February 1974 a snap election seeking a mandate to repress the miners, resulted in 
the fall of Heath’s government (Jacques, 1983).  
 
The Wilson-led Labour government of 1974-1976 (elected as a minority in February 
1974 but securing a small majority in October that year) “returned to office…at the 
beginning of a major downturn in the world economy” (Gamble, 1983: 110). They: 
 
“inherited something of a poisoned chalice. This noxious cocktail 
comprised: an economy characterised by a massive public sector 
borrowing requirement; high rates of inflation; rising levels of 
unemployment, and in a condition of shock following the 1973 
energy crisis…a highly politicised trade union movement which was 
widely perceived as having ‘brought down’ the previous government 
…and a widespread public desire for some miraculous mollifications 
of the trade unions at the same time as radical wage constraint” (Hay, 
1996: 256-257).  
 
In attempt to resolve conflict Wilson’s government rolled back a number of 
Conservative industrial relations policies (Jacques, 1983) and established the Social 
Contract (Hay, 1996), a corporatist form of “bargain and compromise” (Hall, 1988a 
[1980]: 134). It sought to create a partnership for negotiation of wages between capital 
representatives (generally through the CBI), labour (through the Trade Union 
Congress) and the state as the neutral arbiter between the classes” (ibid: 135). It was 
part of “the government’s attempt to ensure working class acquiescence in the central 
tenets of its strategy” (Hall, 1979: 49). The contract was an “incomes policy, first by 
consent, then by imposition” (ibid: 16). There was an intensification of the “feeling of 
‘national crisis’” and the impending recession was used to discipline labour into 
accepting reduced real wages (Jacques, 1983). “Real wages fell by an average annual 
rate of 13 percent between 1975 and 1978” (Hay, 1996: 259). Attempts to control 
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inflation produced high levels of unemployment (Gamble, 1983). The party became 
seen as an “establishment party” not a workers’ party (ibid: 56).  
 
By 1975 there was a:  
 
“fully fledged capitalist recession, with extremely high rates of 
inflation, a toppling currency, cuts in the social wage and in public 
spending, a savaging of living standards, and a sacrifice of the 
working class to capital; all managed by a Labour government” (Hall 
et al, 1978:  308).  
 
The UK sought an IMF bailout, conditional on an austerity programme (Harvey, 
2005). Working class strength was “systematically whittled away [by]…severe cuts in 
welfare and public expenditure”. There was growing public frustration (Peck and 
Tickell, 2007) and conflict (Jacques, 1983), and a period of “managed dissensus” (Hall 
et al, 1978: 320). The 1970s saw social democratic capitalism lose momentum both 
“materially and discursively” (Leitner et al, 2007a). The “Keynesian apparatus for the 
control of recession” was “in tatters” and its proponents were, with great difficulty, 
trying and failing to construct a ‘resolution’ (Hall et al, 1978: 302). The period, like 
the contemporary one in Britain as discussed in the thesis conclusion, can be captured 
using Gramsci’s concept of ‘interregnum’ (see Streeck, 2017a). The old form of 
capitalism was dying but preservationists were trying to revive it and the new form 
was still being born. For Hay (1996: 260-261), the ending of the social contract in the 
‘Winter of Discontent’ 1978-1979 marked “the final exhaustion of a last-ditch attempt 
to manage the contradictions, tensions, and failures of a post-war settlement that had 
been visibly disintegrating”. It marked the break of working class acquiescence that 
governments had struggled to maintain over the decade (Jacques, 1983). “A growing 
crisis of hegemony” “challenged the established structures, assumptions and 
ideologies” (ibid: 52).  
 
The late 1970s marked “a moment of transition” for Britain (Hay, 1996: 253). The 
arrival of the Thatcher Government marked the moment that the break with social-
democratic politics was explicitly acknowledged” (Gamble, 1983: 130) and neoliberal 
theory began to be operationalised in Britain. Neoliberals successfully exploited the 
crisis and ensured it became a crisis of social democratic capitalism. “Thatcherism 
aimed for a reversal in ordinary common sense” (ibid: 164), constructing a powerful 
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counter-hegemonic narrative to encourage the public to make sense through the 
neoliberal framework of ideas (Hall, 1988a). It emerged at a historical conjuncture 
marked by a British economic crisis, a global recession, a crisis of the social 
democratic settlement, and of the Labour government (Hall and Jacques, 1983). It 
exploited the problems between Labour and trade unions and of wide public 
discontent.   
 
Thatcher’s Seizing of the Crisis  
“Thatcher had long been subscribed to the individualist, anti-state, anti-union, anti-
egalitarian views of her party’s right wing” and she became an advocate of monetarist 
doctrine (Leys, 1989). She successfully secured dominance of an alternative political 
economic project through what Hall (1979: 15) termed “authoritarian populism”. His 
concept captured the ideological work undertaken to harness popular opinion and 
discontent and gain populist consent of a shift towards authoritarianism (Hall, 1988a 
[1980]). In Hall’s (1988b [1980]: 151) terminology, the shift was to some extent 
legitimised by a “populist groundswell”. Thatcherism utilised its “’populist’ appeal” 
to gain support for “the imposition of order and authority” (Hall and Jacques, 1983: 
10). 
 
Conservatives constructed ‘a crisis of law and order’ and moral decline through a 
number of moral panics that generated social anxieties (Hall et al, 1978). Folk devils 
included youths, immigrants, blacks, organised political student movements then 
working class power, “political extremism”, “trade union blackmail” and “the threat 
of anarchy, riot and terrorism” (ibid: 321). Texts claimed that the crime rate evidenced 
the levels of social disintegration and “the threat to ‘ordinary people going about their 
private business’ from thieves, muggers” (Hall, 1979: 19).  
 
“Thatcherism as a state project, although conceived long before, was born in the 
context of crisis during the Winter of Discontent” (Hay, 1996: 254). The winter 
marked “a protracted wave of industrial conflict” and the language of the Thatcherite 
project centred on the themes of “crisis, siege and subterfuge” (ibid: 253-254). “‘The 
dead were left unburied’…the ‘bins were left unemptied’…‘Britain was under siege’ 
from ‘militant trade unionists and ‘communist leaders” (bid: 254). Militant trade 
unionists were constructed as ‘enemies within’ holding the country to ransom (Hall, 
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1979). The media invited ‘us’ to adopt the preferred subject position of victim or 
potential victim of militant dissidents who disrupt ‘our’ daily lives (Hay, 1996). For 
example:  
“it will be glum if Lancastrians during a water strike have to get 
appalling diseases, if Merseyside children during the social workers’ 
strike have to continue to be battered, if housewives in an island 
blockaded by lorry drivers have to go hungry, if patients deprived of 
ambulances and other emergency transport have to die, if many more 
small firms have to go bust, many more workers to become 
unemployed, more of Britain’s exports and imports have to stay 
stuck at the docks, if sewage has to run in the streets, hyperinflation 
has to escalate…” (Economist 1979 cited in Hay, 1996: 269).  
 
The ‘enemies’ signified “the threat to the state, the breakdown of social life itself, the 
coming of chaos, the onset of anarchy” (Hall et al, 1978: 323). To address the ‘crisis 
of law and order’ it was claimed there was a need for “more policing, tougher 
sentencing, better family discipline” (Hall, 1979: 19), and “decisive intervention” 
(Hay, 1996: 254).  
 
The crisis was narrated by setting “’the unions’ against ‘the nation’…the ‘sectional 
interests of workers against the ‘national interest’…and…‘the housewife’ and ‘the 
family’ against the ‘militant trade unionist’” (Hall, 1988a [1980]: 135) and the non-
unionised worker ‘who worked in worse conditions without complaining’ (Gamble, 
1983). Thatcher constructed the trade unions as only representing the interests of white 
skilled males, and unions were not able to successfully counter this construction (Hall 
and Jacques, 1983). In the 1979 General Election the Conservative party had support 
from “the City, big capital and the traditional ‘upper classes’” (Jacques, 1983: 45). It 
had a “cadre” of the “middle classes, the professional groups, the self-employed, 
foremen” (ibid: 45). It also spoke for those who resented “the organised strength of 
waged labour”, the “public service workers who [were]…alleged to work less hard” 
but were paid more (ibid: 171). The “petty bourgeoisie and low-level industrial 
functionaries” held strong resentment for “‘iniquitous’ trade unions” (ibid: 171). This 
cros-class support demonstrates:  
 
 “the power which popular moral ideologies and discourses have in 
touching real experiences and material conditions, whilst at the same 
time articulating them as a ‘cry for discipline’ from below, which 
favours the imposition of a regime of moral authoritarianism ‘in the 
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name of the people’, which inflicts worse conditions on ‘the people’ 
(Hall, 1988a [1980]: 138).  
 
Whilst “there was anger, protest, resistance”, there was “also a surge of populist 
support for the ruthless exercise of strong leadership” (Hall, 2011: 712). “Ordinary 
people” become “actively recruited into crusades for the restoration of ‘normal times’ 
– if necessary through a more-than-normal imposition of moral-legal force” (Hall, 
1988a [1980]: 143). This marked “the drift towards ‘exceptional’ forms of control for 
‘exceptional’ times” (ibid: 138). “Popular consent” for “new forms of statist 
authoritarianism” was won (ibid: 127). Society moved into “iron times”; consent was 
given to coerce ‘the other’ and achieve order (Hall et al, 1978: 323). The consent of 
the many was secured for “the extension of police powers, for a stiffening of criminal 
justice procedures, for the suspension of legal rights, for harsher penalties, tougher 
sentencing policies and abrasive prison regimes” (ibid: 138). However, there was also 
resistance to high unemployment, repressive policing of black residents, and 
‘saturation policing’ most notably in ‘riots’ across thirty cities in July 1981 (ibid). 
 
Thatcherism was in essence a “vigorous form of class struggle from above” (Miliband, 
1985: 16), inflicting “the burden of economic adjustment on the working class, the 
unwaged, the social state, and (even) on domestic manufacturing capital” (Peck and 
Tickell, 2007: 30). It sought to reverse post war working class “gains and 
encroachments”, repress workers’ resistance (Gamble, 1983: 126), and replace 
collectivism with individualism (Jacques, 1983), attempting in particular to erode the 
popular base upon which the welfare state had been built (Hall, 1988 [1987]). 
However, from the beginning Thatcher acknowledged that transformation would 
require more than one parliamentary term (Leys, 1989). Consent to neoliberalism’s 
implementation had to be carefully managed. She made “concessions where 
necessary…only pursuing those lines of action for which support [could]…be won” 
(Gamble, 1983: 127).  
 
In order to attain cross-class consensus Thatcherism forged together “new discursive 
articulations between the liberal discourses of the ‘free market’” and traditional 
conservative values (Hall, 1988a: 2). Thatcher did not:   
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“promise us the giveaway society. She said, iron times; back to the 
wall; stiff upper lips; get moving’ on your bike; dig in. Stick by the 
old, tried verities, the wisdom of ‘Old England’. The family has kept 
society together; live by it. Send the women back to the hearth. Get 
the men out to the Northwest Frontier. Hard times – to be followed, 
much later, by a return to the good old days. She asked you for a 
long leash – not one, but two and three terms. By the end, she said, 
I will be able to redefine the nation in such a way that you will all, 
once again, for the first time since the Empire started to go down the 
tube, feel what it is like to be part of Great Britain Unlimited...Britain 
will be great again” (Hall, 1988 [1987]: 167). 
 
Claims of national interest were key to legitimising neoliberal changes and the 
coercion of neo-conservative enemies (Gamble, 1983), including attacks on  
“immigrants, welfare recipients and unions” (Gough, 1983: 154).  
 
Thatcher’s Neoliberalisation of Britain 
Thatcher constructed the state as an “overgrown and parasitic obstacle to economic 
recovery” (Leys, 1989: 100) burdening entrepreneurs with regulation, tax, and the 
power of organised labour (Bleaney, 1983). The government sought to naturalise the 
free market (Leitner et al, 2007a: 3). Thatcher’s government ensured the dominance 
of financial capitalism over industrial capitalism (Wilks, 2013). Deregulation of the 
City of London, marked by the Big Bang of 1986 (Gamble, 2009), facilitated the City 
becoming the “centre of international finance” (Harvey, 2005: 56). At the same time, 
the free market, overpricing of sterling, and a short-term approach to investment and 
strategic planning, and prioritisation of low inflation over full employment, 
contributed to the decline of manufacturing. Manufacturing jobs were systematically 
exported (Huws, 2011). Whilst free trade opened British manufacturing to 
competition, it also allowed for mass unemployment, caused by offshoring and 
deflationary policies, which was a vital mechanism for reducing the power of 
organised labour (Harvey, 2005). Surplus labour meant workers had to compete for 
jobs (Saad-Filho, 2010). Pay and conditions worsened (Gamble, 2009; Huws, 2011), 
many skilled workers had to accept low skilled and low paid service sector jobs 
(Bowman, 2014; Shannon, 2014a), which widened inequality (Stiglitz, 2012). 
Privatisation of public assets reduced trade union members because less private sector 
employees are unionised (Chomsky in Shannon, 2014b).  
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Although tightening money supply was prescribed for inflation (Hall and Jacques, 
1983), high unemployment led to high welfare spending and falling tax revenue 
(Gamble, 1983; Leys, 1989). In 1981 Chancellor Geoffrey Howe further raised taxes 
and cut public spending, increasing unemployment (ibid). The burden of taxation for 
business and the public was higher two years after Thatcher entered government than 
when Labour left (Gamble, 1983). In 1982 unemployment was over 3million for the 
first time since the Great Depression, and rose to 3.1million by 1986 (ibid). Despite 
these failings Thatcher proclaimed “the lady is not for turning” (The Independent, 
2013).  
 
Neoliberalism strongly opposed the “redistributive social protection” of post war 
social democratic capitalism (Amable, 2011: 7). It was said to dis-incentivise work 
(Gough, 1983), encourage “’soft’ attitudes towards crime, immigrants, the idle, the 
feckless, skivers, the sexually aberrant and so forth” (ibid: 154). Discursive figures 
were deployed to justify the revival of competition and responsibility (Hall, 1979; 
Hall, 2011). Discourses constructed ‘the taxpayer’ as personifying good moral values 
and the ‘scrounger’ as personifying an absence of them (see Hall, 1988a [1980]; Hall, 
1988b; Hall, 2011). Thatcher constructed a “discourse of the ‘spendthrift state’ 
recklessly giving away wealth the nation ha[d] not earned” (Hall, 1988a [1980]: 144). 
Keith Joseph endorsed the modest, self-reliant, thrifty family and criticised 
unemployed teenage single mothers for being frequent, and bad, parents (Hall et al, 
1988 [1978]). Rhodes Boyson (cited in Hall et al, 1988 [1978]: 27) stated, the welfare 
state was destroying “personal liberty, individual responsibility and moral growth” and 
“sapping the collective moral fibre of our people as a nation”.  
“The image of the overtaxed individual, enervated by welfare 
coddling, his initiative sapped by hand-outs of the state-
Thatcherism…found a powerful means of popularising the 
principles of a Monetarist philosophy and in the image of the welfare 
‘scavenger’ a well-designed folk devil” (Hall, 1979: 17).  
This was propaganda for a reduced welfare state framed in a way that political elites 
had not dared to attempt in public for many years (ibid). “A sustained assault on 
‘welfare scroungers” began” (Hall et al, 1988 [1978]: 27). “Ideals of ‘universality’”, 
collectivism and “‘caring’…were increasingly devalued” (Leys, 1989: 125). Keith 
Joseph (cited in Hall et al, 1988 [1978]: 26) praised naturalised “selfishness”, “self-
interest”, and “egoism”. Wealth became “admirable and enviable” (Wilks, 2013: 69). 
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“There [wa]s an open, frontal attack on the whole idea of equality, a shameless 
advocacy of elitism” (Hall et al, 1988 [1978]: 26). “The ‘winners’– the employed, in 
general, and the higher-paid, including skilled manual workers, in particular – began 
to endorse the philosophy of individualism” (ibid: 107).  
 
In the 1980s Thatcher orchestrated two waves of privatisation of public assets and 
services (Leys, 1989). Privatisation boosted the Treasury budgets but assets were 
undersold to incentivise buyers (Harvey, 2005). The first wave involved the sale of 
council houses to the public and utilities to corporations (ibid). The subsidised selling 
of council houses incorporated working class families into the Thatcher project (ibid). 
It allowed Thatcher “to create a new property-owning segment of the working-class 
electorate, while simultaneously weakening one of the bastions of traditional Labour 
support, the council housing estate” (Leys, 1989: 113).  
 
Middle class support was elicited through promotion of entrepreneurship, self-
reliance, self-employment, shareholding, and property ownership (Hall, 2011). 
“Between 1979 and 1987 the proportion of the population owning shares increased 
from 7% to 20%” (ibid) and home ownership rose from 52 percent to 66 percent (Leys, 
1989). Britain was purportedly becoming a ‘property owning democracy’, a classless 
society where all could share the benefits of the free market (Clarke, 2010a). Crucially, 
these developments greatly increased the number of people with mortgages 
(Hodkinson and Lawrence, 2011) and tied large amounts of people to an economy 
reliant on asset price inflation (see Stiglitz, 2012).  
 
A second wave of privatisation saw ‘compulsive competitive tendering’ introduced in 
local government (Leys, 1989). The public sector was to compete with the private for 
contracts (ibid), which largely resulted in multi-national corporations securing 
contracts (Huws, 2011). It was claimed that ‘competition’ would provide greater 
efficiency (Peck and Tickell, 2007) ensuring ‘value for money’ for an “overstretched 
government” state thus allowing tax cuts (Mannin, 2010: 229).  Also, the private sector 
would not be hampered by trade union power (Huws, 2011). The neoliberal discourse 
of free choice was used to legitimise privatisation (Hall, 1988b). Rather than being 
‘forced’ to deal with the inefficient state service consumers could choose (Leys, 1989). 
However, resistance limited the extent of privatisation. The post WW2 view that 
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services for basic human needs should be free and collective remained strong (ibid). 
In 1982 when the possibility of privatising parts of the health service arose, Thatcher 
was forced to declare that it would remain a national asset (ibid). However, by 1988 
privatisation of aspects of the NHS started to be publicly considered and it became 
touchable (ibid: 125). Privatisation and tax revenues from the windfall of oil and gas 
were used to fund tax cuts in 1985 (ibid).  
 
“Neoliberalism’s loudest message is that there is no alternative” (McChesney, 1999: 
15). “Thatcherism however morally uncomfortable and economically 
problematic…gradually became the reality, to be improved upon if possible, but 
otherwise to be lived with” (Leys, 1989: 117). Whilst neoliberalism was not loved it 
had “no serious rival” and therefore remained hegemonic (Leys, 1990: 127).  
Thatcherism left “the left in disarray, the defences of the labour movement 
weakened…and the overall balance of political forces tilted much more favourably 
towards a hegemony for the right” (Hall and Jacques, 1983: 13).  
 
New Labour  
In 1994 the Labour party renamed itself New Labour to reflect its claim of 
‘modernisation’ (Fairclough, 2010: vii). In May 1997, after 18 years of Conservative 
government, New Labour was elected. “The party had never secured so many votes or 
won so many seats” (Driver and Martell, 2006: 1). It claimed to provide a ‘third way’ 
of politics transcending the left and right, interventionism and laissez faire divisions 
(Fairclough, 2010). The party purported an ability to blend seemingly incompatible 
aspects, for example, stronger public services but limited public spending predicated 
upon ‘reform’ via managerialism (ibid). Its change was symbolised by removing 
clause IV29 from its constitution (Wilks, 2013). The party’s previous core values of 
redistribution and social protection to mitigate inequality and poverty were to a large 
extent superseded with neoliberal values and discourses (Fairclough, 2000). New 
Labour presented a “variant” of British Thatcherite neoliberalism (Hall, 2011: 714; 
Peck and Tickell, 2007: 44). It accepted the presentation of globalisation as inevitable 
                                                     
29 Clause IV stated: “to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their 
industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the 
common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best 
obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service” (New 
Labour cited in White, 1994).  
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and advocating business friendly reform to ensure Britain’s competitiveness and 
therefore public prosperity (Fairclough, 2010: 26). The party named itself ‘the party 
of business’ (ibid) and prioritised strong relationships with corporations (Wilks, 2013). 
Blair (cited in Wilks, 2013: 71) stated:  
 
 “if thirty chief executives, employing thousands of people in 
companies worth billions of pounds says its Labour that will put the 
economy at risk, who does the voter believe? Answer: the chief 
executive. Once you lose them, you lose more than a few votes. You 
lose your economic credibility”.  
 
New Labour gave greater freedom to corporations and signalled withdrawal from some 
functions of economic management. Specifically, the Bank of England was given the 
power to control interest rates (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004). The party established the 
Financial Services Authority, which provided light touch regulation to encourage 
‘innovation’ and ‘competition’ (Froud et al, 2010a). Chancellor Brown cut corporation 
tax (Fairclough, 2000) and Labour distanced itself from trade unions and became more 
closely aligned with the City (Moody, 1997). Cost-benefit analysis of regulation was 
informed by “structural biases towards less regulation rather than more”, and 
concerned itself with financial, rather than social, costs (Tombs and Whyte, 2010: 50). 
“Market-based regulation” “in effect…meant a shift further toward self-regulation and 
wholesale regulatory disengagement” (ibid: 50, 61).  
 
The newly branded party extended outsourcing, privatisation, and marketisation 
principles into the public sector30. It “opened one door after another through which 
private capital could slip into the public sector and hollow it out from within” and 
create UK Plc.”  (Hall, 2011: 714, 716). ‘Public-private partnerships’ became a means 
for the private sector to extract public money (Stiglitz, 2012). Private Finance 
Initiatives allowed for hospitals and schools to be built funded and owned by private 
corporations that then leased them back to the state for repayments of “six times the 
capital value” (Mair and Jones: 2015: 126). In 2008 UK public private contracts were 
worth €61billion whereas the collective cost of Europe’s equivalent contracts was 
                                                     
30 As neoliberalism “seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market” (Harvey, 
2005: 3), public services that have not yet been privatised became operated in accordance with 
‘market’ principles (Crouch, 2011). “The habits and assumptions of the private sector became 
embedded in the state” (Hall, 2011: 715). 
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€37billion (Wilks, 2013). Outsourcing of public services constituted almost 6 percent 
of UK Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and had a turnover of £79million, which was 
an increase of 126 percent from 1996 (Huws, 2011). Peter Mandelson (cited in Eaton, 
2014) in 1998, the year he was promoted from a Minster to Secretary of State, was 
“intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich as long as they [paid]…their taxes”, 
and New Labour were to wait thirteen years before raising – in a moment of crisis – 
the top rate of tax. “Regressive redistribution of wealth, income and life chances [were 
consolidated] for most groups of people”31 (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004: 30). New 
Labour’s shift further narrowed the “voices contesting neoliberalism” (Berry, 2015: 
5). 
 
New Labour spent more on public services and modestly redistributed wealth (Driver 
and Martell, 2006). However, it was critiqued for “governing by media spin” led by 
the ‘spin-doctors’ Peter Mandelson and Alistair Campbell (Fairclough, 2000: vii). The 
party intensely managed language to sell their ideas (ibid). Extraordinarily, for a 
‘progressive’ ‘labour party’ it aimed to remove notions of class and class inequality 
from political discourse and public minds. Following his election Blair (cited in Tyler, 
2013: 153) claimed, “the class war is over” and “Britain is a meritocracy”. This was, 
and remains completely untrue: “class distinctions do not die; they merely learn new 
ways of expressing themselves” (Hoggart, 1989: viii). Thus, New Labour incorporated 
many discursive elements of Thatcherism. The ‘third way’ claimed to blend ‘economic 
dynamism’, ‘social justice’, and ‘fairness’ (Peck and Tickell, 2007). ‘Enterprise’, 
‘fairness’, ‘patriotism’, ‘responsibility’ were taken from the right and ‘rights’, ‘social 
justice’, ‘internationalism’, and  ‘attacking poverty’ were taken from the left (ibid). 
However, the meanings of left wing terms were hollowed out. Internationalism no 
longer meant “international labour movement solidarity” but “international 
cooperation between states”, social justice no longer entailed equality rather it meant 
“‘fairness and ‘inclusion’” (ibid: 45-46). ‘Community’ no longer meant collectivism 
(Fairclough, 2000). Rather, it was used alongside ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ to 
responsibilise individuals and de-responsible the state (Hancock et al, 2012).  
“The Blair and Brown governments…commenced to mobilise 
around a desperately populist, highly punitive (for the powerless) 
                                                     
31 Whilst New Labour undertook some progressive changes, including the minimum wage, the 
wealth gap between those at the top and the bottom severely increased.   
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law and order and social welfare strategy which was no less toxic in 
its implications than policies pursued under the previous 
Thatcher/Major regimes” (Coleman et al, 2009: 7).  
 
Blair shared Thatcher’s heavily moralised approach. They both spoke of a  “strong 
moral sense”, ‘the right thing’, and making “tough” but moral decisions (Hall, 2011: 
716, 717). New Labour claimed that a section of social actors, notably the ‘anti-social’, 
were detached “from the moral order of society” and this was “corrosive” both for the 
individual and social moralities (Fairclough, 2000: 51, 52).  The folk devils were living 
in local authority housing estates; they were educational failures, the homeless, the 
unemployed, and broken families (ibid). Estates were portrayed as areas of crime, 
deprivation, moral decay, and worklessness (ibid). The concept of ‘Anti-Social 
Behaviour’ was created to encapsulate the ‘immoral’ and undesirable behaviour of ‘the 
poor’ (ibid). The ‘chav’, allegedly an acronym for Council Housed and Violent, 
symbolised the morally deprived ‘underclass’ (ibid).  
 
Avoiding discussion of structural conditions, social exclusion was constructed as a 
condition individuals got themselves in  (Fairclough, 2000). The ‘big state’ and its 
‘’burdensome’ welfare state were taking away personal responsibility and encouraging 
a culture of dependency (ibid). They chose not to work (ibid). Echoing Thatcher, New 
Labour asserted that ‘something for nothing’ days were over (ibid). Welfare ‘reform’ 
was necessary to incentivise work and savings (Fairclough, 2010). 
Blair and Brown claimed the welfare state desperately needed ‘modernising’ (Wiggan, 
2012). For New Labour social justice and inclusion meant designing policies to 
address “moral underclass” deficiencies (Fairclough, 2000: 57). New Labour (cited in 
Fairclough, 2010: 187) spoke of the need for benefit claimants to understand that their 
rights were attached to responsibilities, individuals had to work if the state provided 
the opportunity to, and had to improve their ‘employability’. The concept of ‘welfare 
to work’ led “neoliberalisation of welfare” (Slater, 2012: 956). Welfare became a 
contract between government and the claimant (Fairclough, 2010), a part of a 
“something for something society” (Fairclough, 2000: 39).  
 
New Labour engaged in authoritarian “moralistically driven legalistic zeal” (Hall, 
2011: 714). For example, a 2003 White Paper titled Respect and Responsibility 
proposed welfare cuts for immoral families, moving young offenders to foster homes, 
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and re-training parents (Tyler, 2013). Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and Parental 
Orders were created (ibid). Between 1997 and 2008 the government legislated for 3605 
new criminal offences, “almost one for everyday…in office” (Morris, 2008).  
 
Hubristic Claims and Political ‘Opposition’ Alignment  
Following the millennium neoliberals and their political representatives in New 
Labour made hubristic claims of the end of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ (Fairclough, 2010). 
Lucas (2003: 1), a Nobel Prize winning economist, claimed the “central problem of 
depression prevention has been solved”. In 2002 Alan Greenspan, former Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, received an honorary knighthood for securing economic 
stability (Gamble, 2009). In 2006 Chancellor Brown claimed that his two rules of the 
Code of Fiscal Stability32 had broken the “stop-go” pattern and secured long-term 
growth (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 118). There was an “almost unquestioning 
faith in efficient market theory” (Lastra and Wood, 2010: 534). Evidence to the 
contrary was “neglected”, “forgotten”, and excluded in favour of a “utopian 
interpretation” of the promises of neoliberalism (ibid: 544).  This wilful ignorance 
would have devastating consequences.   
 
New Labour’s adoption of a selection of Conservative policies and discourses 
combined with ‘modernised’ elements of traditional Labour policy allowed the party 
to harness greater electoral support than Thatcher. Consequently, it was now 
Conservatives who had to undertake the task of repositioning themselves (Fairclough, 
2000). In 2005 David Cameron was elected as Conservative party leader. He portrayed 
himself as a politician of the middle ground and the heir to Blair (Driver and Martell, 
2006). He spoke of economic success being a means for social justice, tackling 
poverty, and protecting the NHS (ibid). Such was the extent of the rightward shift 
embodied in New Labour however, that not much repositioning was required by 
Cameron to stake a claim to ‘the centre’. Both ‘New Labour’ and ‘Compassionate 
Conservatism’ accepted the fundamentals of neoliberalism. “The only thing new about 
New Labour was its acquiescence in neoliberalism; even in this sense, it was not new 
but a derivative of Thatcherism” (Jacques, 2017).  
                                                     
32 Brown’s two rules were government would only borrow for investment and “public sector 
debt will be held at sustainable and prudent levels” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 118). 




This chapter has explored neoliberalism and key moments in its ascendancy in Britain. 
Whatever the claims of neoliberal theory, neoliberal reality in Britain is oligopolistic 
markets, an over-powerful financial sector, and increasing inequality. The capitalist 
crisis facilitated neoliberals’ implementation of their desired conditions but they had 
to work to gradually erode aspects of social democratic capitalism. Neoliberals 
constructed and disseminated their theory, exploited crisis, and neoliberalism captured 
(New) Labour, not only Conservatism. The following chapter explains how the 
neoliberal conditions implemented by governments since 1979 led to crisis and 











The Neoliberal Crisis and a Review of Existing Literature on its Narration 
 
Introduction  
This chapter seeks to capture the neoliberal crisis from 2007 to 2015 and locate this 
research within the existing literature. Neoliberal elites seizing of the neoliberal crisis 
to intensify the neoliberal project is explored. The injustices, and seeming 
irrationality, of the ‘resolution’ are given focus. The second part of the chapter reviews 
existing literature, highlighting lacunae to explicate the original contributions of this 
thesis.  
 
The Conditions Preceding the 2007-8 Financial Crisis  
The ‘resolving’ of the 1970s social democratic capitalist crisis with the onset of a 
neoliberal project led to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Deepening wealth inequality had 
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disastrous consequences for capitalism’s functioning. The wealthy lacked outlets for 
investment; there was a  “capital surplus disposal problem” (Harvey, 2012). 
Manufacturing was no longer a productive site of investment therefore new markets 
were needed (ibid). At the same time, working class wage repression, caused by 
offshoring of skilled work, consequent deindustrialisation, and unemployment, meant 
others lacked the income required to ensure demand. Moreover, simultaneously lower 
taxes on wealth meant that the state too saw income falling below what was required 
for spending. These developments had potentially detrimental consequences for 
growth. The financial sector stepped in to manage the imbalance. Deregulated finance 
ensured credit flows to maintain consumption (Crouch, 2011; Panitch and Gindin, 
2010; Shannon, 2014a). The financial system expanded enormously and many became 
reliant upon credit (Saad-Filho, 2010), to engage in “debt financed consumerism” 
(Harvey, 2005: 190). A “narcissistic” “consumer culture” was generated to encourage 
demand (ibid: 41, 62). Household credit became normalised (Radice, 2010). Through 
the financialisation of households, workers reliant on credit stimulated the economy. 
Government too sought to fund projects through costly ways, including ‘Private 
Finance Initiatives’. Capital surplus came to be recycled less through tax and more 
through lending. In Streeck’s (2017b) terminology, the tax state became the debt state.  
 
Eventually the financial industry reached a barrier. Financial institutions were limited 
by the need to possess the capital required to support their loan books  (Lapavitsas, 
2009). To continue their expansion they needed to release further capital (ibid). The 
doctrine of deregulation installed by Thatcher and maintained by her successors freed 
financiers to develop risky and toxic, complex and non-transparent financial products, 
which allowed them to securitise the risk of default and free institutions from their 
credit restrictions – they could now lend without the supporting capital (see Gamble, 
2009). 
 
“One of the causes of the crisis was not just risk-taking behaviour on 
the part of these institutions, but the nature and level of regulation at 
both national state and international levels which either allowed or 
encourages such activities – in other words, the crisis represented 
not just forms of corporate crime and harm, but of state complicity 
in these” (Tombs, 2016a: 75).  
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Financial elites innovated to create products that allowed them to circumvent the limits 
placed on the capital accumulation process (Harvey, 2011). The “exotic” (Chomsky 
cited in Shannon, 2014b: 48) financial instruments provided a new market of 
investment where the commodity was debt.  The wealthy speculated in financial assets 
and leveraged to produce returns on their investment (Harvey, 2012). 
 
A key product or derivative33 was the mortgage-backed collateralised debt obligation 
(CDO). Thousands of mortgages with different risk levels were bundled together to 
form a mortgage-backed security, up to one hundred and fifty of these were packaged 
together to form a CDO (Crotty, 2009). CDOs were then sold on to investors. Credit 
default swaps allowed investors to pay a premium to an insurance company in 
exchange for protection if the debtor defaulted (ibid). The products were ‘insurance 
obligations…swapped (in fact, bartered) between operators in order to protect 
themselves against the risks of investment” (Marazzi, 2011: 35). Banks increased their 
leveraging ratio to provide greater profits, but by doing so also created greater potential 
losses (Harvey, 2011).  
 
Traders in commercial and investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, and 
private equity funds had perverse incentives, which encouraged them to engage in 
excess (Crotty, 2009; Crouch, 2011). Bankers received a fee for each mortgage they 
sold, investment bankers received a fee for each sale of CDOs, and the insurance 
companies that insured the investments received premiums (Crotty, 2009). The CDOs 
were quickly sold over and over again because the greater the velocity the higher 
traders’ bonuses (Chomsky in Shannon, 2014b). Trader remuneration was granted 
even if the transaction did not add value to the account (Harvey, 2005). Also if a 
security produced losses bankers did not have to repay their fee, which meant there 
was no personal financial risk (Crotty, 2009). Entrepreneurial financiers and 
corporations that engaged in financial securitisation accumulated large amounts of 
                                                     
33  Derivatives are contracts based on assets, which have varying levels of risk that are 
measured, priced, and sold (Bryan and Rafferty, 2010). The price of a derivative varies 
depending on underlying assets, such as stocks, market indexes, interest rates, exchange rates, 
oil prices, credit default risk, and house prices (ibid).  
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wealth (Harvey, 2005). There were ‘astronomic executive salaries and bonuses”34 
(Hall, 2011: 717). “In the phase of overtrading…activity becomes frenetic, the 
aspirations of individuals do not cease to grow, the velocity of transactions is 
accelerated, and the prices of real or virtual financial assets…are inflamed” (Aglietta 
cited in Marazzi, 2011: 26-27). This led to “extraordinary” levels of leveraging, 
“which reached a historical maximum in June 2007” (Lastra and Wood, 2010: 542).  
 
Wall Street and the City of London led trading of the products (Harvey, 2011). Risk 
was commoditised across a global market35 (ibid). Securitisation of mortgages allowed 
risks to be sold on and loans to be kept off balance sheets, which allowed financial 
institutions to expand their credit services (Lapavitsas, 2009). The absence of 
restrictions on supporting capital and personal incentives gave bankers the freedom 
and the motive to loan other people’s money to those who could not afford to repay it 
(Kay, 2015). Financial innovation and deregulation facilitated subprime and predatory 
lending (Shannon, 2014a). Subprime lending is when credit is given to those who have 
poor credit ratings and would not be eligible for a standard loan (Gamble, 2009). The 
loans tend to have higher interest rates (ibid). Predatory lending refers to when 
institutions sell mortgages (using both legal and illegal practices, Glasberg et al, 2014) 
to some of the poorest knowing that they do not have the incomes to support the debt 
(Lapavitsas, 2009). The subprime market increased from $35billion in 1994 to 
$600billion in 2006, 75 percent of which had been securitised (ibid). Consumers were 
aggressively targeted for re-mortgaging, which included the transfer of other debts to 
their mortgage (Glasberg et al, 2014). It did not matter to the banks that the debtor 
could not afford the mortgage because they could securitise the loan allowing sellers 
to receive their fee and the bank a profit (Chomsky in Shannon, 2014b; Glasberg et al, 
2014). Ethnic minorities and women, for whom credit had historically been harder to 
obtain, became targets of lenders (Dymski et al, 2013). In the US African Americans 
                                                     
34 Between 2004 and 2008 Fred Goodwin, who was the CEO of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group, received £15million (The Guardian, 2009). Over the nine years prior to the financial 
crisis ten Wall Street bankers had incomes of over $1.7billion (ibid). 
35  As many investors came from overseas when US interest rates inevitably rose the 
consequences would be (and were) global (Harvey, 2005). A Norwegian council invested its 
funds for public services in the mortgage industry (Aalbers, 2009). Consequentially, when the 
crisis hit schools were closed, nursing home budgets cut and the fire department, in a town 
where most houses were made from wood, became a daytime only service (ibid).  
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were particularly targeted (Aalbers, 2009). These conditions led to the property credit 
bubble from 2001 to 2007 (Lapavitsas, 2009; Wilks, 2013). 
 
In ten years UK house prices doubled (Gamble, 2009). Price rises meant people were 
able to re-mortgage and release equity (Panitch and Gindin, 2010). Many became 
reliant on “inflation of asset value” for consumption; their homes became “ATM 
machines” (Harvey, 2011: 26). Equity from house price inflation became the collateral 
for further borrowing. Asset inflation created an effect of wealth, particularly for those 
bought and sold many houses explicitly to generate profit (Radice, 2010). The 
financial industry helped to cultivate the perception that the wealth of the boom was 
‘trickling down’, which Blyth (2010) terms “the illusion of prosperity”. Credit helped 
to obscure wealth inequalities (Blyth, 2013a). However, ‘homeowners’ became 
owners of bigger and bigger potentially unaffordable mortgages (Bowman, 2014). For 
governments wealth creation and growth were a result of free market led capitalism, 
but the neoliberal boom period was fuelled and sustained by debt (Fairclough and 
Fairclough, 2012; Soederberg, 2010).  
There was no independent (Gamble, 2009) or centralised pricing system for financial 
products (Engelen et al, 2012). Securities were priced based on estimates of unknown 
risk and return (ibid). Rating agencies and corporate accounting systems started using 
abstract stock market values (Chomsky in Shannon, 2014b) legitimised by efficient 
market hypothesis. Finance capital was working on “fantasies” (Clarke, 2010a: 339). 
Some bankers referred to the process of pricing a CDO as “magic” (Crotty, 2009: 567). 
This caused “speculative bubbles…in which 90-95 percent of all money 
[was]…actually speculative with no connection to production or trade” (Graeber cited 
in Stern-Weiner, 2011). Efficient market theory would turnout to be a “fairy-tale” 
(Crotty, 2009: 564). Warren Buffet’s description of derivatives as “time bombs” and 
“financial weapons of mass destruction” would prove to be accurate (Bryan and 
Rafferty, 2010). 
“What came to light after 2008 beat everything [previous financial 
corruption]: rating agencies being paid by the producers of toxic 
securities to award them top grades; offshore shadow banking, 
money laundering and assistance in large scale tax evasion as the 
normal business of the biggest banks…the sale to unsuspecting 
customers of securities constructed so that other customers could bet 
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against them; the leading banks worldwide fraudulently fixing 
interest rates and the gold price, and so on” (Streeck, 2014: 61-62).  
 
Deregulation of finance allowed “speculation, predation, fraud, and thievery” (Harvey, 
2005: 161) and the financial industry to become toxic, oversized and particularly 
vulnerable to crisis (Saad-Filho, 2010). It was highly volatile and fragile (Shaikh, 
2010). Financialised capitalism had built an “enormous superstructure of debt” 
(Lapavitsas, 2009: 138). The financial system was “a bricolage of long, fragile chains” 
linked across global institutions (Froud et al, 2010a: 99). Deindustrialisation, 
unemployment, offshoring, inequality, privatisation, globalisation, 
entrepreneurialism, ‘innovation’, greed, and deregulation collectively formed the 
foundations of the neoliberal capitalist crisis.  
 
Neoliberal Crisis, Opportunity, and Responses 
In 2008 the financial system brought the economy “to the edge of the abyss” (Crotty, 
2009: 575). Financialisation, globalisation and deregulation, proclaimed over previous 
decades as the paths to security and success, culminated in a financial crisis (Crotty, 
2009; Lapavitsas, 2009; Saad-Filho, 2010). Financialised capitalism met its limit 
(Harvey, 2011).  
 
Many U.S subprime and predatory mortgages were tracker mortgages (Glasberg et al, 
2014). When the Federal Reserve, in response to rising inflation, raised interest rates 
many debtors defaulted on their payments 36  (ibid). Hundreds of thousands of 
mortgagees were left in arrears and repossessions significantly increased 37 . As 
financial risk had been securitised globally through casino style 38  banking 
(Montgomerie, 2008; Saad-Filho, 2010), there was a “domino effect” across financial 
systems (Shannon, 2014a: 4) or as Garland (2014: 280) states, an international “chain 
reaction”. Stuckler and Basu (2013) describe the financial crisis as spreading like a 
                                                     
36 Harvey (2011) notes that in 2006 there were significant increases in mortgage defaults in 
the US amongst African Americans and single parent families in low-income areas. When 
defaults significantly increased across the white middle class population political and media 
concern heightened (ibid). 
37 In the UK the number of households in more than three months of arrears peaked in 2009 at 
280,900 and the number of home repossessions was 48,900 (Shelter, 2016b).  
38 Strange (1997) proposed the concept ‘casino capitalism’ to refer to the gambles and risks 
taken in unregulated global capitalism. 
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virus from its origins in the US mortgage system across the Atlantic to the UK and 
European markets. By autumn 2008 a US housing market crisis became a liquidity 
crisis for the UK financial industry (Albo and Evans, 2010).  
 
Financial products quickly became unsellable (Lapavitsas, 2009), and consequently 
financial institutions suddenly held significant losses39  (Crotty, 2009; Shaikh, 2010) 
and leading banks faced bankruptcy40 (Shannon, 2014a). When the US government 
left Lehman Brothers to fail the shock through the global financial system led financial 
institutions to stop lending to, and investing in, one another (Paul, 2014). Insurance 
corporations, such as AIG, which had supposedly insured against risk of defaults, were 
undercapitalised for the scale of losses (Crotty, 2009; Harvey, 2011). Banks and 
insurers were in “a financial crisis of indebtedness” (Harvey, 2005: 178). Saad-Filho 
(2010: 249) describes capitalism as “bleed(ing) uncontrollably” for a number of 
weeks, with daily announcements of unprecedented losses and banks on the brink of 
collapse. The “depth and complexities grew faster than economic and political leaders 
could grasp” (Jessop, 2013: 245).  
 
The illiquid financial system approached collapse (Froud et al, 2010a; Saad-Filho, 
2010) and became a “political emergency” (Gamble, 2009: 39). It shifted from low to 
high politics (Froud et al, 2010a) becoming a primary concern of the Prime Minister, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the House of Commons41 (Froud et al, 2010a), and 
the public. Contrary to the prescriptions of market fundamentalists42, political elites 
                                                     
39  To illustrate the fall in value of financial products, Bear Stearns, a US-based global 
investment bank that traded in exotic financial products, was valued at $18billion in 2007 but 
was sold to Morgan Chase, a US financial services corporation, for $240million in 2008 
(Gamble, 2009). “Within one minute, literally, one of the most important investment banks on 
Wall Street was compelled to sell itself to JP Morgan Chase at defeating prices, $2 per share, 
when only 48 hours before it cost $30” (Marazzi, 2011: 9).  
 
41 Between 1997 and 2007 only one meeting of the Tripartite Standing Committee, which 
coordinated the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority, and the HM Treasury and 
was nominally chaired by political elites, was actually attended by political elites (Froud et al, 
2010b). 
42 Market fundamentalists blamed the crisis on too much government intervention and central 
bank power to manipulate inflation and argued that political elites should not intervene and 
the financial industry should not be bailed out (Gamble, 2009; Thompson, 2009). Rather it 
should be left to fail and follow its ‘natural’ path (Gamble, 2009; Thompson, 2009). Gamble 
(2009) notes that this view was not one widely taken by elites in the UK when the financial 
industry was in crisis, but notably there was more support for minimal state intervention after 
the financial industry had been saved.  
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urgently became “managers of the financial system”, in partnership with financial 
elites (Froud et al, 2012: 47). Paradoxically, financial elites actually deepened their 
permeation of politics with “the very highest reaches of the core executive” being 
opened up “in the form of both ministerial appointments and in the shaping of 
institutions like UKFI” (Froud et al, 2010b: 30). There was a trans-boundary 
relationship43. HM Treasury, for example, paid Credit Suisse £107 million of public 
money for advice on how political elites should respond to the financial industry (see 
Grice, 2009). As finance became central to political debate elites had to disseminate 
texts about the financial industry for public consumption (Froud et al, 2012). 
Moreover, some financial elites, for example the Governor of the Bank of England, 
shifted from technocratic positions to the position of key public figure (Pritchard, 
2009). Whilst political elites dominated narration, financial elites played a key role 
(Berry, 2015).  
 
Saving the Banks, Finance Capital, and Neoliberalism 
“In order to save neoliberalism from itself” (Saad-Filho, 2010: 242), political elites 
nationalised financial institutions44, brokered mergers and takeovers, provided loans 
and guarantees of deposits, undertook quantitative easing (QE) to inject liquidity into 
the system, and the Bank of England reduced interests rates (Brassett and Vaughan-
Williams, 2012; Froud et al, 2012; Saad-Filho, 2010). Lloyds TSB took over Halifax 
and the Bank of Scotland (HBOS), which was partially the result of the Prime 
Minister’s negotiations at a social event where he promised the Lloyds’ Chairman the 
bank’s exemption from competition regulation (Froud et al, 2010b). Consequently the 
merged entity held a third of the UK saving and mortgage industry (Goddard et al, 
2009). Breaching the touchstone neoliberal theory principle of competition, banks ‘too 
big to fail’ became even bigger. Political elites extracted public money and gifted it to 
a few private institutions. In cash terms by March 2011 the UK government had spent 
                                                     
43 Paul Myner, a former chairman of Guardian media group and Marks and Spencer’s, became 
a member of the House of Lords in 2008 and was the Financial Services Secretary between 
2008 and 2010.   
44 Northern Rock was nationalised in February 2008 and RBS, HBOS and Bradford and 
Bingley were partially nationalised between April and August 2008 (Pritchard, 2009). By July 
2009 UKFI held 70 per cent of the share capital of RBS and 43 per cent of Lloyds banking 
groups share capital, or as the UKFI framed it each UK household possessed £3000 worth of 
shares in RBS and Lloyds (Froud et al, 2012).  
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£123.93billion 45  on purchasing shares in banks and providing them with loans 
(National Audit Office, 2011). The cost of the UK bailout is widely claimed to be 
£850billion46 (Grice, 2009). However, the overall monetary cost for the public is 
unknown, and will largely be determined by the amount received when nationalised 
banks are fully re-privatised, although sales so far suggest major losses. According to 
the Bank of England (cited in Froud et al, 2012: 35) the bailout was “the largest UK 
government intervention in financial markets since the outbreak of the First World 
War”.  
 
Some analyses have suggested that between October 2008 and June 2009 there was a 
temporary but dramatic return to a Keynesian state intervention to provide liquidity 
and stimulate growth, and a temporary abandonment of neoliberal economics (see 
Blyth, 2013b; Froud et al, 2010b; Saad-Filho, 2010). Froud et al (2010b: 30) write of 
“New Labour, the Treasury and the Bank of England” tearing up “their neo-liberal 
scripts”. Whilst the central bank cut interest rates 47 , engaged in QE, bought 
government bonds, this was coupled with tight fiscal policy and the cutting of public 
spending, a move more closely associated with neoliberal theory. Whilst monetary 
policy was more closely associated with Keynes and the bailout breached neoliberal 
theory’s tenet of non-intervention, the approach was used to save the financial system. 
The central bank did not inject money into infrastructure to create adequately paid 
employment (Shaikh, 2010), in the style of ‘People’s QE’ (see Murphy, 2015). 
Neoliberalism allowed banks to produce inconceivable wealth for the few at the 
expense of the many. Then, the state used public money to bail out banks and then 
sought to address this by engaging in a period of austerity harming the many, 
particularly the vulnerable. Arguably the monetary and fiscal response is the epitome 
of the real neoliberal project. The government “guarantee[d] the…solvency of 
financial institutions at no matter what cost”, even “the wellbeing of the population” 
(Harvey, 2005: 73, 71). The financial crisis certainly proved that real existing 
                                                     
45  The government gave the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) £45.80billion, Lloyds 
£20.54billion, Northern Rock £22.99billion, and Bradford and Bingley £8.55billion and 
£26.05billion for loans to support deposits (National Audit Office, 2011). In fees and interests 
the government received £2.64billion in the financial year of 2010-2011 (ibid).  
46 For a clear breakdown of costs see Grice (2009).  
47 In October 2008, the month of the bailout, the Bank of England cut the interest rate from 
5% to 4.5% and by March 2009 it was 0.5% (Bank of England, 2016).  
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neoliberalism requires a powerful state prioritising the finance industry’s interests 
(Chomsky, 2010). It also shows that where theoretical principles conflict with 
dominant interests they “are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be 
unrecognisable” (Harvey, 2005: 19).  
 
As a result of the state bailout the financial system was, at least in the short term, 
stabilised (Armaline and DeLeon, 2014; Love and Mattern, 2011). However, many of 
the public who were victims of the actions of the financial system were not fortunate 
enough to be rescued by the state and became ‘bad’ financial subjects whose poor 
credit rating placed them in chronic crisis given the centrality of credit to affording 
living costs. They may, for example, be ineligible for a mortgage, certainly an 
affordable one, or not pass landlord checks necessary for private rental leaving them 
reliant on depleted social housing.  
 
The financial industry’s critical condition and dependence upon the state for rescue, 
coupled with popular hostility towards banks, provided the opportunity to subject it to 
reform (Stiglitz, 2012; Froud et al, 2010a, b). Neoliberalism was overtly discredited 
(Froud et al, 2010a). Bailouts could have been granted on the conditions of an end to 
long chains of debt, the introduction of a tax on each financial transaction, interest free 
loans for students, or contributions to infrastructure development to name a few. 
However, no conditions were attached to the “massive transfer of wealth” from the 
public to private finance (Stiglitz, 2012: 210). “The political elite bailed out the 
financial elite without imposing any conditions and without any plan of what to do 
next” (Froud et al, 2010b: 30). “Never in the history of the planet had so many given 
so much to so few who were so rich without asking anything in return” (Stiglitz, 2012: 
210). The state’s un-conditionality when protecting the banks stands in stark contrast 
to the intensification in the conditionality of welfare (see Wiggan, 2011). Those whose 
actions inflicted mass harm were given an unconditional safety net whilst support for 
those at the bottom of the class hierarchy became evermore conditional, exemplifying 
the injustice of crisis responses.  
 
Whilst Iceland tried and imprisoned senior executives of banks for their roles in the 
crisis (see Birrell, 2015) and tried its Prime Minister (see Neate, 2012), political and 
financial elites in Britain were not subjected to a criminal justice response for their 
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role in the financial crisis48. Whilst Armaline and DeLeon (2013: 428) state that 
bankers committed “reckless criminal fraud”, Chomsky (2010) refutes suggestions 
that the actions of financial elites were irrational and taken with disregard of the 
consequences. Rather, financial elites undertook actions that benefitted them 
personally and, for a long time, seemingly their corporations 49  (Chomsky, 2010; 
Hargie et al, 2010). Traders undertook “win-win gambles” (Crotty, 2009: 570). 
Arguably financial elites recognised their power and knew the state would operate in 
their interests (Chomsky, 2010; Wolf, 2008). “The belief that some institutions were 
too-big-to-fail…triggered moral hazard” (Lastra and Wood, 2010: 539). The 2008 
confirmation of the state’s commitment to banks demonstrated, consolidated, and 
enhanced the power of the financial industry (Harvey, 2009, 2011; Henwood, 2010). 
Furthermore, the state’s failure to reform the financial industry in its responses to crisis 
(Tombs, 2016a) reinforces the perception of too-big-to-fail.  
 
The financial industry has a talent for ensuring, with the support of the government, 
that gains are privatised and losses and failings are socialised (see Engelen et al, 2012; 
Harvey, 2011; Wolf, 2008). This supports Beck’s (1992: 19, 35) theorisation that “the 
social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of 
risks” but that wealth and risks are not equally distributed rather “wealth accumulates 
at the top, risks at the bottom”. “Privatisation of profit and the socialisation of risk” 
are endemic to capitalism (Tombs, 2016a: 69). Lastra and Wood (2010: 531) argue 
that “the fear of failure” and the threat of “management, shareholders, bondholders, 
and all creditors (except small depositors)” being the ones who “suffer in a failure” 
needs to implemented through major reforms.  
 
                                                     
48 In the UK three bankers were imprisoned for rigging the Libor rate (see Bowers, 2016) and 
a HBOS manager and five of his colleagues were imprisoned for inflicting a loan scam on 
some small businesses (see Neate, 2017). However, unlike in Iceland, there have not been 
criminal prosecutions of bankers and politicians for their role in the crisis. As Streeck (2014: 
62) states, fines paid by banks have been “minuscule when compared to the banks’ balance 
sheets - not to mention the fact that all of these were out-of-court settlements of cases that 
governments didn’t want or dare to prosecute”.  
49 See Punch (2009) for explanations of corporate harm and why workers commit harm in 
corporations. Lastra and Wood (2010: 543) suggest “excessive ‘group think’ and ‘herd 
behaviour’” were a cause of the crisis. Also see Tett (2009) for a discussion of the cause of 
‘group think’.  
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In 2008-2009 the financial crisis spread into the real economy (Broome et al, 2012). 
Banks tightened their lending to businesses and the public (Love and Mattern, 2011). 
QE and cutting interest rates and taxes (rather than ending a low wage economy) 
sought to encourage more household borrowing and consumption. For QE to be 
effective banks must not hold onto the money rather it must be re-spent or invested. 
The injected monies: 
 
“appear on the face of it appear largely to have been hoarded by 
banks to prop up reserves and balance sheets – and thus profits for 
shareholders (Konzelmann, 2014) – rather than engaging in the 
stimuli which most post-crises economies desperately needed and 
which central banks at least claimed was their intention” (Tombs, 
2016a: 187).  
 
The government’s failure to require banks to pass on injected monies meant household 
and small businesses did not feel the benefit whereas the wealthy benefitted from rises 
in share and bond values (Allen, 2015). Unemployment and the threat of it, falling real 
incomes, and reduced access to finance meant consumers drew back on their non-
essential spending (see Wood, 2011; Wray, 2010). 
 
Lack of demand, in turn led to a reduction in production (Lapavitsas, 2009). This 
caused businesses to close or cut costs, which contributed to unemployment50, falling 
real incomes, and insecurity that perpetuated the lack of demand (ibid). The 
contraction led to significantly reduced mortgage availability, which coupled with 
increased property repossessions depressed house values (Harvey, 2011). 
Consequently, many mortgagees were left in negative equity (Lapavitsas, 2009). One 
effect of early and large quantitative easing is the restoration and even the increase of 
property values, as shown with Japan’s comparatively large-scale QE programme.  
 
Crouch (2015: 6) states there was a “defeat” of neoliberalism. The claim “that failure 
of deregulated finance was impossible” was “disproved” (ibid: 6). Given that the crisis 
was rooted in neoliberalism it would perhaps follow that there would be a crisis of 
neoliberalism and therefore a new form of capitalism introduced as the ‘resolution’ 
                                                     
50 At its peak in 2011 the unemployment rate was 8.4 per cent (Office for National Statistics, 
2012).  
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(Crouch, 2011). Hillyard and Tombs (2004: 32) suggested that “when the first bank 
collapses the reality” of the senselessness of neoliberalism might become apparent. 
When financial crisis struck, for a moment, faith was questioned and some claimed 
neoliberalism had reached its end (Massey, 2012a, b).  However, these were only “a 
few lone voices” (Watkins, 2010: 13). Remarkably, in the aftermath of the crisis and 
during the period of 2010-2015 there was a “strange non-death of neoliberalism” 
(Crouch, 2011: viii). As Hall (2011: 728) stated: 
“in ambition, depth, degree of break with past, variety of sites being 
colonialised, impact on common sense and everyday behaviour, 
restructuring of the social architecture, neoliberalism does constitute 
a hegemonic project”.  
“Virtually everything” remained (Crouch, 2011: 179) and the neoliberal project 
intensified (Blyth, 2013b; Jessop, 2013; Peck et al, 2013). Peck et al (2013: 1091) refer 
to neoliberalism as having a “Houdini-like ability” to not only survive crises but gain 
momentum from them. The ‘resolution’ was more of what caused it.  
Neoliberal elites’ choice of responses “constitute[d] a neoliberal shock doctrine” 
(Levitas, 2012: 320). They seized the opportunity to intensify neoliberal conditions in 
ways that had long been desired but difficult to publicly justify (Huws, 2011: 64). “The 
financial crisis [was]…recreated as an opportunity for a significant power and wealth 
grab on the part of capital and political elites” (Tombs, 2016a: 70). Hall (2011: 718, 
721) describes the financial crisis as “the alibi” the Conservative party needed to 
deepen neoliberalism and shift wealth and power “to the already rich and powerful”. 
The crisis was transferred from the financial sector and its elite to the public sector and 
the public (Albo and Evans, 2010; Blyth, 2013a; Curtis, 2013). The “shifting of blame 
and cost to the public sector, and public sector workers in particular, has been nothing 
less than astonishing” (Evans and Hussey, 2011: 37). Saad-Filho (2010: 244) suggests 
that “never in economic history has so much trouble and expense been rewarded with 
such effrontery”.  
Austerity: An Illogical and Harmful Response  
A core element of the neoliberal ‘resolution’ was austerity - fiscal consolidation by the 
government (Blyth, 2010). The extent of cuts has been unprecedented in a UK context 
(Levitas, 2012). Whilst some governments were forced by Troika to impose austerity 
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in exchange for national bailouts in what are termed structural adjustment 
programmes51, (Harvey, 2011; Žižek, 2009) in Britain the government determined 
austerity (Levitas, 2012). In 2010 the cost of the bailout and lower tax revenues due to 
recession were problems for UK finance (Gamble, 2015). The rise in public spending 
as a share of GDP demonstrated the change (ibid). At this point, the government had 
several options for responding: increase taxes on under-productive or counter-
productive wealth, cut spending, and/or increase borrowing (ibid). Austerity was 
framed as the necessary means to address deficit and debt (ibid). Whilst the harms of 
austerity, as outlined in the introduction, alone should ethically discredit it, austerity 
has also been widely discredited as a mechanism for resolving economic crisis, even 
before its poor results in this crisis. “The intellectual case” is “bankrupt” (Krugman, 
2015). For Blyth (2010), austerity was “nonsense” and “dangerous”. Historical and 
contemporary evidence proved that austerity was an illogical response (Blyth, 2013a).  
 
Evidence shows that if the private sector and the public are deleveraging, the 
government should leverage up to compensate. Keynes called it “the paradox of thrift”: 
when the people spend less, the government has to spend more” (Hari, 2011). Whilst 
there may be too much public debt because of the bailout and regressive taxation, 
cutting public spending whilst the private sector and public are cutting back causes the 
economy to suffer. It contributes to a lack of demand and therefore growth, which is 
detrimental to levels of tax revenues and the public finances (Chu, 2016; Hari, 2011). 
Increased public spending can increase demand, including by encouraging investor 
and public confidence, and consequently growth  (Krugman, 2010; Skidelsky and 
Kennedy, 2010). Fiscal contraction overwhelmingly results in growth contraction as 
opposed to expansion (see Clarke and Newman, 2012).  
 
                                                     
51  In May 2010, amid international concern over Greece’s debt given the interconnected 
international economy, Troika agreed a €110billion bailout in exchange for an austerity 
package (Wearden, 2010). In February 2012 Greece was provided with a second Troika bailout 
of €130billion traded for even deeper austerity (Wearden and Smith, 2012), which included 
public sector redundancies, holiday entitlement cuts, an increase in the pension age, reduction 
in pension payments, an increase in privatisation (Albo and Evans, 2010) and a reduction in 
its health sector funding as well as, typically of neoliberalism, a rollback of its labour rights 
(Stiglitz, 2012). Following the Irish government setting up a bank guarantee making the public 
responsible for bank debt, Ireland needed to turn to the IMF for a loan (Carney et al, 2014). 
Despite Ireland having a surplus budget prior to the crisis, the IMF required an austerity 
package in return (Stiglitz, 2012). 
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“When you have national debt and you try to cut it you are actually 
reducing demand in the economy, which then reduces the output 
because firms cannot sell enough and your GDP might be shrinking, 
at least shrinking faster then your debt is shrinking” (Chang, 2016).  
 
Consequently, austerity can increase the debt-GDP ratio (ibid). The response of the 
UK economy to the Coalition’s response of austerity gave impetus to this argument. 
Over the parliamentary term the Coalition missed its own debt and deficit targets. Low 
tax revenues, caused by low business, government, and public spending were not 
conducive to reducing the deficit (Mason and Allen, 2014). Whilst Westminster 
definers argued austerity was necessary to protect Britain’s fiscal credibility, in 2013 
following a programme of severe austerity the UK’s credit rating was downgraded due 
to concerns about growth (BBC, 2013).  
 
“The average growth rate from 1950 to 2010 was close to 2.25 
percent. Even under the last Labour government, average growth 
was 1.5 percent, and that period included the global financial crisis. 
The past few years…should have been a time of above-average, not 
below-average growth…all academic macroeconomists would 
argue that the cuts in public investment that occurred in 2010 were 
a grave mistake” (Wren-Lewis, 2015).  
 
 
To reduce the debt to GDP ratio, Osborne sold off UK assets including bank shares 
(Stewart, 2015). Whilst these boost finances in the short term they are costly in the 
long term because of loss of income from repayments and dividends (ibid). As the UK 
had the freedom to engage in quantitative easing and adjust interest rates the UK fared 
better than some Eurozone countries subjected to austerity (see Blyth, 2013a; Gamble, 
2015). Also a large portion of UK debt is in long-term bonds whereas the debts of the 
Eurozone countries are mainly in short term bonds and therefore when debt is renewed 
interests rates are increased (Gamble, 2015). The key point for this thesis is that there 
were clear, logical and less harmful alternatives but Westminster parties chose 
austerity and continued to support it despite it making extremely difficult.  
 
Given the irrationality of austerity the ‘resolution’ has been widely critiqued for being 
part of a class-based project (see Albo and Evans, 2010; Blyth, 2010). This is given 
further impetus by the fact that Westminster continued to commit to austerity despite 
its failings in this crisis. Class inequality was a key cause of the crisis (Burley, 2014), 
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it determined responses, and has been deepened by the intensification of neoliberal 
conditions (see Bourke et al, 2011; Carney et al, 2014; Shannon, 2014a; Stiglitz, 2012). 
Austerity has been used to rollback harm reduction systems created under social 
democratic capitalism, most notably the welfare state, and to further privatise the NHS.  
 
“Balancing the books was not really was what behind this austerity 
policy. It was an attempt to undermine the welfare state, rewrite the 
social contract and re-engineer the economy in the image of 
the…free market system” (Chang, 2016).  
 
For Hall (2011: 718), “ideology is in the driving seat, though vigorously denied”.  
 
Narrating the Crisis to Prevent a Crisis of Neoliberalism  
Westminster held a consensus around neoliberalism and definers constructed a 
narrative for protecting and intensifying the project to ensure the crisis was only in 
neoliberalism and the interests of the powerful continued to be served (Curtis, 2013). 
Westminster definers engaged in “intensive ideological work…to find the alchemy 
that might turn disaster into triumph – the triumph being a new neo-liberal settlement 
(Clarke and Newman, 2012: 300).  
“At each moment…[constructions of crisis has] required intense 
political-cultural labour to capture the future and to control the 
meanings of crisis in the midst of profoundly contradictory 
tendencies, forces and possibilities” (ibid: 303).  
Wiggan (2012: 385) described neoliberalism as being resold to the public and 
Oosterlynck and González (2013: 1075) describe a ‘re-assemblage’ of demonstrably 
flawed pre-crisis discourses. Hegemony remained; whilst there was some evidence of 
active support, acquiescence dominated. As Gilbert (2013: 18) stated, there was not “a 
major crisis of consent of neoliberalism” as one may have expected.  
Crucially, when the crisis began and for several years afterwards, in Massey’s (2012b: 
75) terminology, there were “no ‘forces’ at the ready” to seize the opportunity to 
challenge neoliberalism. There was an: 
 
 “absence of a widely circulating and aggressively pushed alternative 
paradigm. While the long wave of neoliberalism has spawned a 
diverse array of contending social movements, these have yet to 
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articulate a coherent and broadly shared economic philosophy – 
either in the shape of a utopian counter-vision, or as a workable 
political compromise” (Peck, 2010: 275).  
 
Groups such as UK Uncut and Occupy physically protested against a particular 
response and shared a counter-hegemonic message. But, there was not a powerful 
oppositional movement seeking to gain support for an alternative resolution that had 
legitimacy in the system and was able to engage in a discursive struggle with 
Westminster to widely influence sense-making at the national level. As Fraser (2013: 
121), suggests social movements did not form a “unite[d]” “coherent counter-project 
to neoliberalism”. Supporting this analysis, Interoccupy (cited in Chomsky, 2012: 69), 
a group providing communication across the Occupy movement, stated that one of 
Occupy’s goals was “to occupy the mainstream and transition from the tents and into 
the hearts and minds of the masses”. Consequently, whilst Westminster definers 
sought to counter perceptions of major inequality and an absence of meritocracy and 
social justice, which Occupy’s resistance sought to highlight, they did not need to 
discursively counter the Occupy narrative per se. Rather, in the UK at least the coercive 
state apparatus has taken lead in countering Occupy (see Ball and Quinn, 2012). There 
was also an absence, as the primary research explores, of political parties offering real 
alternatives to neoliberalism.   
 
For years, the absence of challenges both within and outside the period of crisis 
facilitated neoliberalism’s dominance. Neoliberal definers dominated ‘debate’ and 
voices of the left did not have the necessary power and platform. After the financial 
crisis, there was a lack of serious rivals and, an astonishing paucity of new thinking or 
policies (Harvey 2014: xi). Later in the neoliberal crisis this changed with challenges 
belatedly emerging52 that may have the potential to achieve major change and achieve 
a somewhat delayed crisis of neoliberalism. Consequently, as the primary research 
also explores, as the crisis progressed Westminster definers had to narrate challenges.  
Positioning this Research within the Existing Literature  
                                                     
52  Elsewhere in Europe there were challenges much earlier, for example in Iceland (see 
Stoddard, 2009).  
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The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to identifying existing literature in the area 
of elite narration of the neoliberal crisis in a British context and locating this research’s 
position. Existing literature on Westminster narration either comparatively focuses on 
limited topics, themes or elite definers, uses limited data, provides a snapshot analysis 
of one moment, or a combination of these, and there are not comprehensive analyses 
of challenges of the three moments analysed in this thesis. Therefore, this thesis 
addresses lacunae in the existing literature in the following ways. It contributes a 
longitudinal analysis of Westminster narration of the crisis between 2010 and 2015. It 
analyses a comprehensive data set and is concerned with the comparatively broad 
scope of narration of crisis causes, responses and proposed responses, and challenges. 
It contributes analyses of narration of challenges that began to emerge over the period. 
It also contributes comprehensive analyses of narration in the moments of GE10, 
SIR14, and GE15. The existing literature does not collectively provide this. For a 
summary of the most pertinent items of literature analysing British political elite 
narration of the neoliberal crisis see Appendix A.  
 
As Appendix A shows, existing research on elite narration of neoliberal crisis in a 
British context has overwhelmingly focused on comparatively brief moments, for 
example Pritchard’s (2009) work. Whilst Walsh (2016) and Dorey’s (2009) studies 
were longitudinal, the periods under analysis, the topics of focus, and the size of the 
corpuses are different from this research. This research project’s combination of 
comprehensive data sets and longitudinal analysis has enabled the contribution of an 
analysis of which discourses emerged, became prominent and dominated and which 
faded and were marginalised, the gradual dissemination of ideas and arguments, the 
timing of definers’ ‘news’, the shifts in the terrain of the debate, and a reflection on 
continuities and differences.  
 
Whilst there is research that has conducted analyses of large data sets, for example 
Wiggan (2012) and Tombs (2016a), the data sets are smaller than the one for this 
research, and like most of the existing literature, the analysis of the data was concerned 
with a narrower topic, shorter time period (Wiggan) and different time period (Tombs), 
and the studies were not explicitly concerned with developments in the narrative over 
time. Other research has focussed on a couple of texts or even just one (for example 
Hargie et al, 2010; Mackay, 2015; Wiggan, 2012). Whilst there have been analyses 
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concerned with the wider notion of securing public consent (for example, Clarke and 
Newman, 2012) this has been limited in its time period and size of data set. This 
research’s longitudinal analysis had a comprehensive data set that was analysed with 
a concern for the comparatively wider topic of crisis causes, responses, proposed 
responses, and challenges allowed the thesis to contribute a comprehensive analysis of 
Westminster narration of crisis that did not exist in the literature.  
 
There are a number of key moments where narration of crisis has been intense, which 
are captured in this thesis as ‘intense narration moments’ (see chapter four) that have 
not been subjected to focussed critical discourse analysis. This thesis contributes a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of narration in three of them – GE10, SIR14, and 
GE15 - enabling the thesis to contribute to the literature case studies of the moments 
and to capture elite strategies in particular key moments and to contribute comparative 
analyses to understand changes and continuities within and between the moments.   
 
The thesis also contributes a critical analysis of elites’ discursive countering of 
challenges. Whilst these have major significance there is not yet a comprehensive 
analysis of Westminster’s strategies for discursively countering the challenges, which 
is to be expected, given that they are recent developments.  
 
There have also been analyses of financial elite narratives of the financial crisis. Hargie 
et al (2010) analysed the testimonies of four banking CEOs to the 2009 Banking Crisis 
Inquiry of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons concerned with public 
apologies. Tourish and Hargie (2012) also analysed this text but were concerned with 
the use of metaphors to explain banking failures. Mueller and Whittle (2012) again 
analysed the same text but focussed on identity positioning in blame attribution 
discourses. Whittle and Mueller (2012) analysed it concerned with strategies for 
justifying actions and positioning through storytelling. Whittle and Mueller (2016) 
also presented an analysis of the text concerned with discourses of agency and 
structure in the financial crisis. Datz (2012) analysed a selection of texts by Bernanke, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve 2006-2014, and Haldane, Chief Economist at the 
Bank of England, and the US Financial Crisis Inquiry, giving focus to the complexity 
of systems discourse.  
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There have also been analyses of elite narration of the crisis in different countries. 
Allen (2012) analysed a selection of Bank of Ireland reports, quarterly economic 
commentaries, an IMF report, Irish Business and Employers Confederation budget 
proposals published between 2007 and 2011 concerned with the narration of austerity 
in Ireland.  Phelan (2011) analysed discourses for maintaining neoliberal hegemony in 
Ireland. Hansen and Movahedi (2010) analysed what they perceived to be a myth of 
universal greed used to explain the crisis in a US context. Love and Mattern (2011) 
analysed official and mainstream US Conservative and Liberal explanations of the 
crisis and responses. Pludwin (2011) analysed the identification of blameworthy 
subjects of the economic crisis in US political discourse between 2009 and 2011. 
Wilson and Anderson (2011), conducted critical discourse analysis of Obama’s 
discourse on poverty. ‘t Hart and Tindall (2009) contribute a summary of the themes 
of narration across different countries identified by authors of chapters in their edited 
collection. Furthermore, there have been analyses of international bodies’ narration of 
the crisis. Oosterlynck and González (2013) conducted an analysis of the 
representation of crisis and responses in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Local Economic and Employment Development and URBACT’s, a 
EU funded exchange and learning programme, policies.  
 
There have also been a number of insightful analyses of media narration of the 
conjuncture. Stanley (2012) analysed stigmatisation of investment bankers in The Sun 
newspaper articles and Robert Peston’s blogs of 2008 and 2009 as well as bankers’ 
narratives of financial crisis. Berry (2013) analysed six weeks of coverage of the 
financial crisis on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme, concerned with how limited 
sources restricted the range of debate. Berry (2015) analysed six national newspapers’ 
coverage of austerity in 14 weekdays in 2009 and their role in legitimising the shift of 
the crisis from finance to public spending.  Berry (2016) analysed 25 days of the BBC 
News at Ten in 2009 concerned with the coverage of the UK public deficit debate. 
Berry et al (2016) undertook quantitative content analysis of 2000 news stories from 
across Britain, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Germany reporting the migrant crisis and 
contributed a comprehensive analysis of the different themes of the reporting. Kelsey 
(2014) analysed the representations of bankers in the Mail Online at the time of the 
financial crisis. Todd (2014) analysed media framings of the ‘Better Together’ and 
‘pro-independence’ campaigns in the Scottish Independence Referendum, 2014. Kay 
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et al (2014) analysed the BBC’s framing of the Coalition’s cuts. Schifferes and Roberts 
(2015) present a collection of chapters on international media reporting of financial 
crises. Fairclough (2016) analysed two months of five newspapers coverage following 
the 2010 budget concerned with the reporting of Osborne’s arguments for austerity. 
Others have contributed analyses of other country’s media narration of their version 
of neoliberal crisis. von Scheve et al (2016) analysed 46 articles published by the 
German newspaper Der Spiegel between September 2008–2009 that were most 
pertinent to the financial crisis. There have also been analyses of representations of a 
particular nation’s crisis in other nations’ media narration. Antoniades (2013) analysed 
the representation of the Greek crisis in international newspapers. Bickes et al (2014) 
conducted an analysis of the representation of the Greek crisis in a US, a German, and 
a UK news magazine. Tracy (2012) analysed the representation of the Greek crisis in 
US media.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the neoliberal crisis and positioned this research within 
the existing literature. It has explained that despite neoliberalism causing a major 
capitalist crisis the opportunity it presented was seized by neoliberal elites to intensify 
neoliberalism. Notwithstanding the harms, injustices, and seeming irrationalism of 
responses there was not a crisis of hegemony and acquiescence dominated in the 
period. This chapter has also summarised the existing literature analysing narration of 
the crisis and the lacunae this research addresses. Chapter four details the decision 




































This chapter presents an open and detailed explanation of the decisions made when 
designing this research. Following an outline of the research questions, I justify why I 
have predominantly utilised Fairclough’s framework of critical discourse analysis, 
highlight its key concepts and discuss some additional concepts that I developed 
during the analysis. I explain the criteria for the parent sample and the process I 
undertook for distilling the data. I then discuss the analysis process and the structuring 
of the findings and analysis chapters. Finally, I justify taking the approach of objective 
partisanship.  
 
Research Questions  
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1. How did Westminster definers narrate the crises of the conjuncture to the 
British public between 2010 and 2015?   
 
2. How did Westminster definers narrate crises responses and proposed responses 
to the British public between 2010 and 2015?   
 
3. How did Westminster definers narrate challenges by political definers who 
identified alternative causes, and advocated alternative responses and 
‘resolutions’ between 2010 and 2015?  
 
4. How did Westminster definers’ narration of the conjuncture to the British 
public develop between 2010 and 2015?  
 
Question one was concerned with discursive techniques for creating a sense of crisis, 
identifying causes, the naming of crises, and therefore attribution of blame. Question 
two required an analysis of discursive techniques for promoting and legitimising some 
responses, and delegitimising and excluding other responses. It is closely connected to 
question one because blame frames have concomitant responses and take off or move 
down the agenda other responses. Question three reflects developments in the period. 
As countering challenges became an important element of the narration of the crisis 
that grew in significance as the crisis developed, their narration became a key focus of 
the research. Challenges in the period of analysis included: the SNP’s anti-austerity, 
pro-social justice challenge in SIR14; the SNP, Green Party, and Plaid Cymru’s anti-
austerity, pro-social justice challenge in GE15; and UKIP’s nationalist pursuit of UK 
‘independence’ from the EU seeking to restrain the movement of people in GE15. 
Question four gave focus to the process and development of narration over the period 
considering continuities, shifts, and changes when narrating causes, responses and 
proposed responses, and challenges. It required discussion of which discourses became 
prominent and dominated and which faded and were marginalised, what new 
discourses emerged and which left or returned. It was concerned with what Fairclough 
(2000: 12) terms “preparing the ground”, the gradual dissemination of ideas and 
arguments to attain consent for major changes. It also gave attention to the timing of 
definers’ ‘news’ and the shifting of the terrain of debates. It necessitated reflection on 
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continuities and differences between narration in 2010 and 2015 and how the narrative 
contributed to the form of ‘resolution’ Britain was experiencing and moving towards. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis  
As the central concern of this research is official discourse, and a critical perspective 
underpins it, it follows that I undertook critical discourse analysis (CDA).  CDA is a 
collection of theoretical and methodological approaches concerned with analysing 
texts, including images, that transmit ideological knowledge and exercise power 
(Cameron and Panović, 2014; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). It recognises that semiosis is 
a key part of social processes that produce and reproduce domination, injustice, and 
inequality. Analysing texts illuminates ideological policing; the role of language in 
legitimising structures and relations of inequality that inflict harm (Fairclough, 2003, 
2009, 2010). It is “fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as 
manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10).  
 
CDA analyses the ways “a society constitutes and maintains itself and the 
consciousness of its members” (Fowler, 1981: 25). It is concerned with the ways that 
definers construct and narrate objects, actions, moments, power relations, social 
groups, and identities in particular contexts to manage sense-making (Fairclough, 
2010). Strategies used in the encoding process are analysed (Phillips and Jørgensen, 
2002). It allows for an understanding of representations of reality and the way some 
actions are framed as necessary or desirable and others as undesirable (ibid).  
 
CDA is concerned with the relationship between language and “issues, problems, 
changes” (Fairclough, 2009: 166). Importantly, it is “not interested in investigating a 
linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 2). 
It is “socially orientated” as opposed to linguistically orientated (Fairclough, 2003). 
CDA analyses “what happens when people talk and write” (Fairclough, 2010: 3), “the 
social consequences of different discursive representations of reality” (Phillips and 
Jørgensen, 2002: 21). It recognises that ideologies and discourses “play an active role 
in creating and changing” the “world, identities, and social relations” (ibid: 1).  
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Critical discourse analysts “are socio-politically committed to social equality and 
justice” (van Dijk, 2009: 63) seeking “to contribute to” addressing “the social ‘wrongs’ 
of the day” (Fairclough, 2009: 163). Social wrongs are defined as “aspects of social 
systems, forms or orders which are detrimental to human well-being and which could 
in principle be ameliorated if not eliminated, though perhaps only through major 
changes in these systems, forms, or orders” (ibid: 167-168). CDA allows the 
exploration of relationships between texts and events, social structures and power 
relations (Fairclough, 2010). For Fairclough (2010: 21), it can contribute to tackling 
the fundamental problems that “neo-liberal capitalism has either failed adequately to 
address or contributed to exacerbating: poverty, gross inequality, injustice, insecurity, 
ecological hazard”. It can contrast official claims with empirical evidence revealing 
official narratives’ service to powerful interests.  
 
Different theoretical and methodological approaches to CDA have different 
“philosophical premises” and “specific techniques for analysis” (Phillips and 
Jørgensen, 2002: 4). I chose to predominantly draw upon Fairclough’s framework 
because it aligned with the research questions, but I was open to drawing upon other 
frameworks to facilitate the analysis. A corpus linguistics approach to CDA is largely 
a quantitative approach involving large corpora, generally analysed through computer 
software, and its primary purpose is to identify the frequency of words (Cameron and 
Panović, 2014). It can be used to identify the key terms for representing an issue and 
to draw comparisons, between use of words and word use over time (Cameron and 
Panović, 2014; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). This approach does not facilitate a thorough 
and detailed qualitative analysis of texts necessary for answering the research 
questions, therefore I did not widely utilise it. However, I did draw upon it to facilitate 
an analysis of the extent of ‘embattled language’ (a concept of Fairclough’s 
framework) in the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014. I compared the frequency 
of the use of the word change in Cameron’s early text of the campaign to the frequency 
it was used in his text the week of the vote. Whilst there are tensions between Foucault 
and postmodernism, and the theoretical framework underpinning this research, I was 
open to drawing upon the concepts that formed his CDA framework. For example, 
‘regimes of truth’ and ‘subjugated knowledge’ could have been used to explain that 
Westminster definers operated to ensure their discourses dominated, and unfavourable 
knowledge, information, and evidence was excluded and discredited. However, I 
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found the concepts of Fairclough’s framework most useful for undertaking a detailed 
analysis of the texts and answering the research questions, given that his framework 
has been developed to analyse political elites’ narration of capitalism. It is also 
important to note that there are some similar concepts within different frameworks, for 
example Fairclough’s (2003, 2010) use of ‘order of discourse’ and Foucault’s concept 
of ‘regimes of truth’.  
 
Norman Fairclough’s framework is grounded in Marxism and he designed it 
specifically for analysing in detail political elites’ language in capitalist societies (see 
Fairclough, 2010). His approach was explicitly constructed for analysing 
“legitimisation of…social orders” and “hegemonic struggles” (Fairclough’s, 2003: 7). 
He recognises that neoliberalism was driven, implemented and continues to be 
sustained by discourses, and that narration has been crucial to its legitimisation during 
the capitalist crisis (see Fairclough, 2010). For Fairclough (2010: 15), the neoliberal 
capitalist crisis is the “the primary factor shaping the agenda for critical discourse 
analysis for some time to come” and analysts should be concerned with neoliberal 
discursive strategies for managing the crisis.  In his manifesto for CDA, Fairclough 
(2010: 19) states that the agenda should be for analysts to: 
 
 “identify the range of discourses that emerge and their link to 
emerging strategies. Show how the range of discourses changes over 
time as the crisis develops. Identify differences and commonalities 
between discourses…how they represent events and actions and the 
social agents, objects, institutions…how they narrate past and 
present events and actions…how they justify actions and policy 
proposals and legitimise…changed practices”.  
 
He suggests that this might include “analysis of explanations of the crisis and 
attributions of blame” and strategies for legitimising particular responses and affecting 
the development of crisis” (ibid: 6). Fairclough (2010: 18) asserts that focus should 
also be given to analysing the strategies of groups engaging in struggles and 
contestation, in particular those that attain the power to shape “structures and systems” 
and perhaps even transform them. He also suggested that analyses should “show how 
particular discourses gain dominance or become marginalised over time” (ibid: 19). 
Clear alignment between this research’s theoretical framework, research questions, 
and planned contribution, and Fairclough’s framework and attached manifesto meant 
his framework for CDA was the most appropriate for this research. As the following 
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chapters illustrate it effectively facilitated a detailed analysis of texts answering the 
research questions.  
 
Fairclough’s Framework 
Echoing the definitions of discourse provided in chapter one, Fairclough uses the term 
‘discourse’ in three ways: the social practice of language use; the language used in a 
particular field, for example political discourse, and thirdly, “a way of speaking which 
gives meaning to experiences from a particular perspective” for example, a neoliberal 
discourse of power relations or a Marxist discourse of power relations (Phillips and 
Jørgensen, 2002: 66-67). He uses the term text to refer to written, spoken, or illustrated 
items, for example a speech, poster, or debate transcript (Fairclough, 2010). For 
Fairclough (2010: 94) “each discursive event has three dimensions or facets: it is a 
spoken or written language text, it is an instance of discourse practice involving the 
production and interpretation of text, and it is a piece of social practice”, the latter 
referring to its effects in the social world.  
 
Two concepts of Fairclough’s framework are interdiscursivity and intertextuality. 
Interdiscursivity is concerned with analysing which “discourses, genres and styles are 
drawn upon in a text and how they are articulated together” (Fairclough, 2010: 7). 
Definers may draw upon an historical contextualisation document (genre) data from 
interviews (genre), recommendations from a report (genre), present themselves as 
authoritative (style) or as ‘one of us’ (style), incorporate business friendly arguments 
(discourse) with traditional Labour discourse of social justice (discourse). 
Intertextuality refers to “the presence of actual elements of other texts within a text”, 
either directly through quotations or indirectly through paraphrasing (Fairclough, 
2003: 39). Others’ texts or voices “may be specifically attributed to particular people 
or non-specifically (vaguely) attributed”, an example of the latter is “some say” (ibid: 
48).  
 
Fairclough’s (2003: 164) concepts of modality and evaluation are concerned with 
“what authors commit themselves to, with respect to what is true and what is necessary 
(modality), and with respect to what is desirable or undesirable, good or bad 
(evaluation)” or important. There are “implicit and explicit ways in which authors 
commit themselves to values” (ibid: 171). “Assumptions about what is good or 
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desirable” may underpin texts, for example neoliberal discourses assume efficiency is 
desirable (ibid: 55). There may be: “existential assumptions: assumptions about what 
exists” and “propositional assumptions: assumptions about what is or can be or will be 
the case” (ibid: 55). As the findings and analysis chapters evidence, modality and 
evaluation commitments permeated Westminster’s narration of the crisis.  
 
Fairclough (2003: 105) differentiates between “knowledge exchange” dialogue and 
“activity exchange” dialogue. Knowledge exchange “may be relatively explicit or 
implicit” (ibid: 71). Implicit knowledge comes in two forms: knowledge that is 
assumed to already be known and therefore not explicitly stated, and “the strategic 
avoidance of explicitness” (ibid: 60). Definers may choose to imply knowledge as 
opposed to making an explicit statement in order to avoid or minimise criticism. Texts 
in elections and referendums are by definition activity exchange texts because their 
purpose is to encourage the public to vote a particular way but they are also knowledge 
exchange texts. In some cases definers may strategically present their texts as 
knowledge exchange texts but they also seek to encourage a particular activity (ibid). 
The text’s role in making people act in a particular way may be “implicitly” 
“persuasive”, more subtle, less obvious, a “soft sell” rather than a “hard sell” (ibid: 
111) it may “covertly invite action” (ibid: 112). For example, constructions of the other 
may encourage coldness but also reinforce the importance of ‘us’ upholding ‘our’ 
‘non-deviant’ behaviour.  
 
Laclau and Mouffee (cited in Fairclough, 2003: 100) write of a “logic of ‘difference” 
and “a logic of ‘equivalence”. The former refers to the creation and proliferation of 
“differences between objects entities, groups of people, etc.” and the latter refers to 
“collapsing or ‘subverting’ differences by representing objects, entities, groups of 
people, etc. as equivalent to each other” (Fairclough, 2003: 88). Classifications, both 
what individuals, groups, and actions are classified with and separated from, shape 
how people think about them (ibid). Fairclough (2003: 88) applies this idea to words 
stating that “the ‘work’ of classification is constantly going on in texts, with entities 
being either differentiated from one another, put in opposition to one another, or being 
set up as equivalent to one another”. Some words are combined in ways that suggest 
accommodations whereas other words are constructed as opposing (ibid). Words 
become hyponyms of other words, for example, under neoliberalism “‘globalisation’ 
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became a hyponym of ‘economic progress’” (ibid: 130). Classifications that have 
attained the status of common sense are “naturalised preconstructions…that are 
ignored as such and which can function as unconscious instruments of construction” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 241). They are “pre-constructed and taken for granted 
‘di-visions’ through which people continuously generate ‘visions’ of the world” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 130).  
 
 “Mythopoesis” may be utilised to argue for particular actions and take off the agenda 
other actions (Fairclough, 2003: 99). A definer’s story may suggest that good things 
will happen if a particular action is taken, but bad things will happen if it is not taken. 
Activity exchange discourses, logics of difference and equivalence, and mythopoesis 
are particularly useful concepts for analysing elections and a referendum because 
politicians present options, frame their options as desirable and counter support of 
others in order to invoke particular actions. As Fairclough’s work and the findings and 
analysis chapters here demonstrate, they are key strategies for advocating a set of 
responses for the ‘resolution’ of crisis whilst excluding others.  
 
“Nominalisation, is a type of grammatical metaphor which represents processes as 
entities by transforming clauses (including verbs) into a type of noun” (Fairclough, 
2003: 220). For example, the phrase ‘bankers mis-sold mortgages’ is what Fairclough 
(ibid: 220) terms a “non-metaphorical representation of a process” whereas ‘mortgage 
mis-selling’ is what he calls “a metaphorical nominalised representation”. The removal 
of social actors from sentences can be undertaken in attempt to obscure “agency and 
responsibility” (ibid: 13). Mortgage mis-selling becomes framed as something that just 
happens as opposed to something that is consciously executed and someone or some 
group’s fault (ibid). Also, removing social actors who are victims from texts can 
depersonalise issues in attempt to hide victimisation and obscure human impact of 
actions. Rather than deaths of ill benefit claimants, Westminster’s phrase of choice is 
‘benefit-related death’.  
 
Some discursive techniques are used to obscure the relationship between the powerful 
and the less powerful (Fairclough, 2003).  It is commonplace for leaders of political 
parties to say ‘I’ in their speeches to simulate “person-to-person communication”, and 
construct a sense of direct relationship between the leader and the individual (ibid: 76). 
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Political texts may include an “inclusive ‘we’” in attempt to reduce perceptions of 
“hierarchy and distance by implying that all of ‘us’ are in the same boat” (ibid: 76). 
Politicians may talk about ‘our’ experiences, feelings and desires, making “strong truth 
claims about the mental processes of others” (ibid:  171). “The power of making 
statements on behalf of others, or indeed on behalf of ‘all of us’…is a power which 
has an uneven social distribution” (ibid: 171). As chapter six evidences this was a 
discursive technique of Better Together definers in SIR14.    
 
Whilst analysing the data I developed analytical concepts to identify discursive 
techniques that could not be explained using either concepts from Fairclough’s 
framework or concepts in the other literature that I had reviewed. One of these was 
explicit attachment. This concept can be used to identify when definers insert names 
of subjects into the name they give the phenomena. It attaches subjects to issues to 
more explicitly attribute blame and direct consequences towards the subject. 
Fairclough (2003: 145) recognised that social actors can be “activated” or “passivated” 
(ibid: 145). In explicit attachment they are activated. As chapters five and seven 
discuss, this was a key strategy for Conservatives blaming the crisis on Labour.   
 
A second analytical concept was darkness to lightness comparisons or alternatively 
lightness to darkness comparisons. The former encourage a perception of success and 
the latter encourage a perception of failure and decline. Such comparisons were used 
to argue that an approach and wider ‘resolution’ were successful. Challengers can use 
lightness to darkness comparisons to highlight the harm and other negative outcomes 
of approaches and ‘resolutions’.  
 
Data Distillation 
The data was ‘naturally occurring’ (see Lewis and Nicholls, 2014). It existed 
independently of the research as opposed to being specifically generated for it. 
However, no data is “untouched by human hands” (Silverman, 2011: 274). Given that 
definers engaged in “intensive ideological work” (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 300), 




The research questions determined the criteria for inclusion in the parent sample, 
which was:  
 Oral or written text or images disseminated to the British public between 2010 
and 2015  
 Constructed by a Westminster definer 
 Concerned with crisis, causes, responses and proposed responses, and 
challenges 
 
A British Case Study  
The research is a case study of political elite narration of the neoliberal crisis in a 
British context. As Whyte (2007: 113) states “the struggle for hegemony is a process 
of political rule located at the level of the nation state”. Although the crisis was 
experienced across a range of places, its causes, responses, and challenges were 
nationally varied (see Clarke, 2010a). Also discourses are historically and spatially 
significant (Fairclough, 2010). Crises, even global ones, are narrated differently in 
different places and at different times.  
I chose to analyse narration in Britain as opposed to the UK because Northern Irish 
politics was distinct from British politics. Key definers in Northern Ireland were 
different from the key definers in Britain 53  and they had separate texts. As The 
Guardian (2017) state, “Northern Ireland has its own narrative”. Whilst Scotland and 
Wales had some separate texts, Westminster definers were key definers for Scottish 
and Welsh residents during the period of 2010-2015 and, as the period progressed, 
SNP and Plaid Cymru definers attained a platform to widely narrate the crisis across 
Britain, in a way Northern Irish definers had not by 2015. This is evident in the seven 
way election debates of GE15. In summary, although there were variations and local 
differences, there was trans-nation narration between England, Wales, and Scotland 
whereas Northern Ireland narration differed and was separate to a significantly greater 
degree.   
 
Westminster Narration  
                                                     
53 This is reflected in Northern Irish constituencies election of DUP, Sinn Féin, SDLP and 
Ulster Union candidates and one independent (see BBC News, 2015a).  
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Berry (2013, 2015, 2016) undertook source content analysis of key media outlets’ 
reporting of the crisis. He identified political elites, particularly Conservatives, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats, as dominating narration, City elites as key narrators, and the 
Bank of England as a prominent source. SNP narrators were key contributors to the 
narrative in Scotland and from 2013 UKIP became key narrators across Britain, and 
in GE15 Green Party and Plaid Cymru attained a platform to narrate the crisis to 
Britain.  
 
However, it was not feasible to analyse the texts of all definers that contributed to 
official discourse given time and word count restraints. Westminster definers were the 
key narrators of the crisis, responses and proposed responses, and challenges, and 
possessed the power to determine Britain’s ‘resolution’ to crisis. Therefore, I decided 
to undertake a detailed analysis of Westminster narration, rather than a less thorough 
analysis of texts by all contributors to official discourse. This meant analysing Labour, 
Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats’ texts. I also conducted a comparatively brief 
analysis of key texts by the SNP, Green Party, Plaid Cymru, UKIP, and Jeremy Corbyn 
and John McDonnell to summarise their narratives in order to contextualise 
Westminster’s narration of challenges.  
A Longitudinal Study  
This research contributes a longitudinal analysis of crisis narration. I examined the 
specificity of discourse in different key moments over the crisis and the development 
of narration. The design of this research recognises that attaining and maintaining 
hegemony is a process that whilst continuous has particular moments when narration 
intensifies. Chilton’s (1987: 2) concept of “critical discourse moments” captures when 
a particular topic is most visible and narration gives particular focus to it (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989). In this thesis I refer to intense narration moments (INMs) to capture 
moments when the public sphere becomes saturated with texts about a particular topic 
and public debate gives intensified focus to it. Intense narration moments can be 
created for a diverse range of issues but they include when a major action needs to be 
legitimised, a proposed ‘resolution’ mandated, or a challenge, to a key response or the 
wider project, countered.  
 
Initially I selected the time period of 2007-2015 because the crisis began to emerge in 
2007 and I chose to determine the end of the period of focus at 2015 because it would 
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be the year of a General Election, therefore allowing the incorporation of a key 
moment and still allowing for the research to be feasible within the allocated 
timeframe. It was not possible to analyse the challenges that developed after GE15 in 
this research project due to time and word restraints. Consequently, the Corbyn-led 
movement had to lie outside of the remit of this research. It requires the attention of a 
further research project and consideration is given to this in the thesis conclusion.  
 
I identified five intense narration moments on the topics of crisis, responses, and 
challenges within the period of 2007-2015, these were: the October banking crisis and 
bailout 2008, the General Election 2010, the ‘riots’ of 2011, the Scottish Independence 
Referendum 2014, the General Election 2015. It was not possible to conduct a 
systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and detailed analysis of all five moments, 
therefore I had to decide which to include and exclude from this research. I began the 
analysis of one moment and then once I had determined the time it would take and the 
space in the thesis that would be required to present a detailed analysis of a moment I 
decided to analyse three moments. 
 
I chose to analyse the two General Elections because they are always moments when 
the public sphere is saturated with political elites’ texts identifying ‘key’ issues and 
suggesting responses, and for GE10 and GE15 the crisis, responses and proposed 
responses were central topics. GE15 was also a moment in which challenges were 
presented and discursively countered by Westminster. Analysing these moments also 
allowed a comparative analysis of two similar moments, which offered insights into 
the development of Westminster narration over the period. Notwithstanding the 
intensity of narration in these two moments or their significance in the narration of the 
neoliberal crisis, there were not comprehensive analyses of narration of these moments 
in the literature (as shown in Appendix A).  
 
I decided to analyse the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 intense narration 
moment. Although the referendum was to determine the constitution of the UK, it was 
a moment in which the SNP presented a challenge to Westminster’s crisis ‘resolution’. 
In retrospect it can be understood as the first of a number of challenges to the neoliberal 
‘resolution’ that belatedly emerged and gained momentum and significance in the 
following years. Although only Scottish residents could vote, the moment was narrated 
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across Britain. It was the first moment in which Westminster discursively countered a 
challenge. There is also an absence of a comprehensive analysis of Westminster’s 
narration of the SNP challenge in SIR14 in the existing literature (again as shown in 
Appendix A).  
 
Whilst the 2011 ‘riots’ presented resistance to inequality, particularly the 
consequences of the crisis response of austerity, the character of the resistance was 
clearly different to the SNP, Green party, Plaid Cymru’s, and UKIP’s challenges. 
There have been numerous analyses of Westminster definers’ narration of the ‘riots’ 
(see Bennett, 2013; Cooper, 2012; Heap and Smithson, 2012) and this was a key reason 
why the moment was not selected. As the review of the literature in chapter three 
shows, focus has been given to narration of the financial crisis and the couple of years 
following its aftermath. Significantly less attention has been given to the elections and 
the Scottish Independence Referendum. In summary, the three moments were chosen 
to aid comparison, to reflect the developing significance of challenges, and to 
contribute a comprehensive analysis of key moments given less attention in the 
existing literature.   
Determining the Text Selection Process  
It was not possible to analyse all the texts that fitted within the criteria of the parent 
sample. I identified three possible processes for producing a feasible data set. One 
option was to read all of the available texts within the parameters that my decisions so 
far had set and then select which to include using my own judgements of most 
interesting and most insightful discourses of Westminster crisis narration. A second 
option was to determine the most high profile texts that were key to Westminster 
narration of the crisis, responses and proposed responses, and challenges disseminated 
directly to the public and widely shared through the media, for example a budget 
statement, and the most pertinent texts produced through Westminster definer direct 
engagement with the media, for example a radio interview. The former would be 
determined by academic judgement of importance and significance, and the latter by 
the highest audience figures, which meant they had been subjected to the widest public 
decoding. Stanley (2012) took this approach. She analysed the texts of the sources that 
were on the topics her research was concerned with and most widely read by her 
audience of concern. A third option was to list and number all the items of the texts 
within the chosen parameters and then randomly select them.  
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There were advantages and disadvantages to all three processes. Whilst the first option 
offered freedom to wander through all the available data it had a number of 
disadvantages. It would be very time consuming and the large data set would have 
been too much to analyse given the time restrictions on the research. Also I could have 
left myself open to accusations of sampling bias, as data selection would not be 
systematic.  
 
Option two would not allow the freedom to wander through the data, perhaps resulting 
in the exclusion of interesting and important aspects of Westminster narration. 
However, academic judgement could be used to include texts outside of the 
boundaries. A key advantage of this option was that it was more rigorous. It was 
systematic in its approach; there was a methodical plan and the decisions were more 
transparent. Consequently, the research would be less open to accusations of bias and 
questions about the quality of the conclusions. Subjective decisions would be made 
but they would be informed by academic judgment of most significant texts for 
narration to the British public and information on the prominence of texts and public 
interaction with texts. Fundamentally, this option ensured that analysis was focussed 
upon high profile texts that the public were most likely to have been decoded. It also 
facilitated constructing a manageable sample as texts could be placed in a hierarchy of 
significance and public interaction with a line drawn at the point where time limits of 
the research and space in the thesis dictated.  
 
A key advantage of option three was that accusations of bias were less likely but a 
major disadvantage was that key texts could be excluded. It would have been difficult 
to claim that the thesis contributed an analysis of Westminster narration of the crisis 
in GE15 and not include a General Election televised debate.  
 
When deciding between the processes I focussed on two matters. Firstly, the 
overarching concerns of the research and secondly, the importance of rigorous and 
systematic data collection and analysis for quality research. As the overarching 
concern was Westminster narration to the public, I had to make a distinction between 
publicly available texts and the texts that are widely decoded by the public. Option 
two focussed on texts that the public were most likely to have decoded. If the question 
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was: ‘what did I find most interesting from a critical criminological perspective in 
Westminster definers’ texts narrating the crisis, responses and proposed responses, and 
challenges then option one would have been most appropriate. If it were ‘what are 
some of the ways the crisis and responses were discussed in the publicly available 
data?’ then option three would have been suitable. For research to be of a high quality, 
data selection and analysis must be rigorous and systematic (see Fairclough, 2010; 
Spencer et al, 2014a; Wahidin and Moore, 2011). Options two and three were most 
methodical and ordered by a rigorous system but option three did not ensure the 
inclusion of key texts that the public were most likely to have decoded. Consequently, 
option two was most appropriate. Therefore the criteria for selecting the texts from 
within the parent sample was: 
 
 The key types of texts (determined by academic judgement) produced by 
Westminster definers to narrate the crisis, responses and proposed responses, 
and challenges, directly disseminated to the public. Given their importance, 
these texts are widely shared through the media. Therefore there are direct and, 
what Fairclough (2000: 13) terms, indirect54 readers, or more accurately there 
are indirect decoders.  
 Westminster definers key texts produced by their engagement with the media 
that had high audience figures  
 
Many of the texts that I analysed were key types of texts determined by academic 
judgment and the justification for their selection was simply that they were of crucial 
importance to an analysis of the INM. For example, narration of a General Election 
cannot be rigorously analysed without examining manifestos.  
 
However, some text selections were not as straightforward. I analysed all of The 
Andrew Marr Show interviews of key Westminster definers on the topics of crisis, 
responses and proposed responses, and challenges disseminated for GE15 and SIR14. 
I considered but excluded other political television programmes. The Andrew Marr 
Show usually has viewing figures of 1.8million but it increases significantly when the 
                                                     
54 Indirect readers may watch a video clip of a Chancellor’s speech shown on the news or read 
quotes from a Prime Minister’s speech in a newspaper.   
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interviewee is talking about something particularly topical. For example, three million 
viewers watched Hilary Benn’s interview when Corbyn removed him from his cabinet 
(see Plunkett, 2016). Several programmes were excluded because of their low viewing 
figures 55 . However, Question Time has higher regular viewing figures than The 
Andrew Marr Show at 2.7 million viewers so, arguably, this could have been included 
in the sample. However, it was not, for several reasons. Firstly, The Andrew Marr 
Show claims to be (and is) the place: “top politicians make news” and “the UK’s most 
influential commentators share their analysis and insights” (BBC, 2015). “The Prime 
Minister, Leader of the Opposition and other senior figures in public life frequently 
appear on the agenda-setting interview programme” (ibid), whereas those appearing 
on Question Time tend to have a lower profile and had a lesser role in narrating the 
crisis to the public. The Andrew Marr Show is a place of important and “memorable 
moments” (BBC, 2015). High profile interviews happen and key political 
announcements are made. Key comments from these texts are shared through other 
media outlets. For example, on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme excerpts of The 
Andrew Marr Show interviews are shared or comments are starting points for 
interviews with other Westminster definers and ‘experts’. Question Time does not have 
these characteristics, or has them to a lesser degree. Not only are the audience figures 
for The Andrew Marr Show comparatively high, there are also many indirect decoders. 
Additionally, transcripts are available for the show on the BBC’s website, which 
significantly aided the analysis process. However, only transcripts from 2011 were 
available for analysis therefore this source was utilised for analysing SIR14 INM and 
GE15 INM but not GE10 INM.  
 
For the GE15 INM I analysed interviews of key Westminster definers on the topics of 
crisis, responses and proposed responses, and challenges from the BBC Radio 4 Today 
programme. The programme has 6.97 million listeners (BBC News, 2013b). This is 
second to BBC Radio 2 Breakfast Show, which has the highest figure at 10.97 million 
                                                     
55 Daily Politics and Sunday Politics were also considered. Daily Politics had its ‘highest 
audience in years and twice its usual viewers” at “over half a million” when Jeremy Corbyn 
featured (Stone, 2015a), but this is comparatively low therefore less people decode the 
programme than The Andrew Marr Show. Similarly, News night was excluded because its 
viewing figures were 549 000 – 606 000 viewers (see Plunkett, 2014). Neither are ‘agenda 
setting’ to the degree of The Andrew Marr Show.  
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listeners (ibid). However, unlike the BBC Radio 4 Today programmes, the BBC Radio 
2 Breakfast Show does not have the status as a key platform for political elite narration. 
The Today programme is a “flagship news and current affairs programme” that has 
access to political elites and “major players in the [financial] industry” (Berry, 2013: 
253, 267). In 2005 in response to a survey MPs voted the Today programme “the most 
influential programme in setting the political agenda” and it ranked highly in 
influencing voters (BBC News, 2005). Like The Andrew Marr Show, the content of 
the interviews also sets the news “in other parts of the media” (Berry, 2013: 267). The 
BBC does not produce transcripts of the Today programme interviews and each 
episode can only be listened to on the BBC’s website for 4 weeks after it has been 
aired. There are some clips available on Box of Broadcasts, an off-air recording service 
that I had access to, but they are not comprehensive enough for the requirements of 
this research. From January 2015 until September 2015 I recorded each Radio 4 Today 
interview of a Westminster definer that discussed this research’s topics of concern. 
Therefore this source was only available for the GE15 INM analysis.  
 
On occasion I analysed data outside of the selected INMs in order to further explore 
issues that arose from analysing texts within the sample. For example, I analysed each 
of Osborne’s budgets between 2010 and 2015, some of which were disseminated 
outside of the INMs. In GE10 Conservatives were arguing the necessity of austerity 
and in SIR14 and GE15 despite economic failings, they were constructing it as a 
successful strategy that needed to be continued. However, in 2012 failure led to 
Osborne materially, and somewhat clandestinely, changing direction. I chose to 
analyse his budgets to examine his narration of this shift and its continuities and 
changes. A full list of the texts selected for analysis is provided in Appendix B.  
 
The Data Analysis Process and Structuring the Findings and Analysis Chapters 
I analysed the data in moments (rather than by data type, for example all television 
debates at once, or by definer) in order to immerse myself in the moment and to 
facilitate an understanding of how the texts collectively functioned in the moment. I 
analysed each text in date order within the INM to track changes within the moment. 
I made notes, including pertinent quotes, of all the elements of the texts that answered 
the research questions. I organised them into themes as I analysed the texts and noted 
relevant concepts from Fairclough’s framework and the wider literature as I did this.  
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I decided to structure my findings and analysis chapters, not by research questions, but 
by INMs in chronological order. I reasoned that as narration of the causes of crisis is 
so closely linked to narration of responses and proposed responses, it would be 
awkward for their analysis to be separate. I also reasoned that the public make sense 
of crisis, responses, and challenges informed by the range Westminster narrators and 
their texts within particular moments, whilst also incorporating previously attained 
knowledge, and that this should be reflected in the structuring of the findings and 
analysis chapters. This structure also allows the chapters to be stand-alone case studies 
of the moments that can be read separately if interests require them to be. 
Consequently, several or all of the findings and analysis chapters and the conclusion 





Table One: Structure of the Findings and Analysis Chapters  
Chapter Research Questions Answered 
5: critical analysis of the GE10 INM 1, 2, 4 
6: critical analysis of the SIR14 INM 2, 3, 4 
7: critical analysis of the GE15 INM  1, 2, 3, 4 
conclusion  1, 2, 3, 4 
 
For Objective Partisanship  
Positivist theorists claim the ability to apply natural science’s ideals of value-neutrality 
to social science (Hammersley, 2000). However, value-neutrality in social research is 
an “illusion” (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 230). For Gramsci, meaning and 
consciousness cannot be understood through the adoption of the principles of natural 
scientific study (Femia, 1981). It is, on this view, impossible to undertake social 
research “uncontaminated by personal and political sympathies” (Becker, 1967: 239). 
Our values inform the issues we study, the standpoint we take, and the theories and 
concepts we select to make sense of the issues (see Becker, 1967; C Wright Mills, 
2000 [1959]; Gouldner, 1973, 1962; Power, 2003). A researcher tends to select their 
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research topic because of an “intense interest” or “passionate concern” (Moustakas, 
1990: 27), or personal experiences (Finlay, 2002; Moustakas, 1990). As explained in 
the thesis introduction, the idea for the research developed from an intense concern 
about the harms of crisis responses on vulnerable groups and a desire to understand 
how primary definers were seeking to justify what empirical evidence showed was not 
only harmful and unjust but unnecessary. My perspective led me to utilise a neo-
Marxist theoretical framework.  
 
Notwithstanding the inherence of values, some research students are advised to 
support the façade of value-neutrality, to occupy the ‘middle ground’, and create 
‘balanced’ arguments” in order to be ‘good scholars’ (Hall and Winlow, 2012: 5). They 
are told to see both sides, sit on the fence, and to not be too political that they alienate 
others (ibid). However, by taking the middle ground we do not extract ourselves from 
the realm of values and politics; the middle ground is still a political position (ibid: 5). 
As Gouldner (1973: 56) states, “all standpoints are partisan: and, granted no one 
escapes a partisan standpoint”. Claiming to take a value-neutral approach leaves 
researchers open to conducting research that supports non-progressive and harmful 
activities because it is indifferent to the moral consequences of research (Gouldner, 
1962). From a ‘value free’ standpoint “there is no reason why one cannot sell his 
knowledge to spread a disease just as freely as he can to fight it” (ibid: 204). Morally 
and ethically we must be aware of the political and moral meaning and consequences 
of our research (C Wright Mills, 2000 [1959]).  
 
Undertaking research openly informed by a political standpoint does not mean that the 
research is not objective. Partisan research should not be viewed as necessarily 
producing biased and problematic conclusions. A partisan researcher can take an 
objective approach and therefore produce trustworthy conclusions about important 
social and political issue they are deeply concerned about (see Gouldner, 1973; Tombs 
and Whyte, 2003).  
 
Hammersley (2000) argues that truth should be the only value that informs the research 
and the researcher should strive for value-neutrality beyond a commitment to truth to 
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prevent bias56 and contamination of research conclusions. He assumes that there is a 
conflict between truth and the researcher’s values, and the partisan researcher will 
prioritise the latter. However, those truly committed to justice and equality recognise 
the value of truth. They identify areas of real injustice and inequality and struggle for 
the truth that the powerful may seek to obscure. They know that their arguments are 
more powerful when they cannot be accused of deviating from truth.  
 
Hammersley (2006: 16) defines objectivity as pursuing “research in the way that 
‘anyone’ would pursue it who was committed to discovering the truth, whatever their 
personal characteristics or social position appealing only to data that are observable by 
‘anyone’”. However, as the social research process is intrinsically linked to our 
positions, our position will influence our conclusions. Observing the same reality from 
different epistemological perspectives will result in different arguments being 
constructed. A neo-Marxist analysing Osborne’s texts is likely to produce a different 
analysis to Osborne’s analysis of them.  
“Being objective, then, cannot be a question of ‘ridding oneself of 
preconceptions’ (we cannot look at the world and see ‘facts’ without 
prior concepts), but is a matter of not cheating – not refusing to see 
what one’s own (pre)conceptions suggest reality is like; and 
certainly, seeing if other people’s conceptions make better sense of 
it” (Leys, 1989: 5).  
 
Tombs and Whyte (2003) conceptualise objectivity as open and honest research that 
is rigorous in its approach and where decisions can be explained to show that political 
commitments did not negatively bias the research and therefore the findings are 
trustworthy. As partisan researchers our values and political commitment may very 
well guide our choices over what to research but we can still attain what Hammersley 
(2000: 125) calls “methodological purism”, which is “high methodological standards, 
and a resistance to deviation from those standards for reasons of personal preference, 
expediency, social pressure”. Indeed a critical stance is more likely to raise our 
sensitivity to the more insidious and structural ‘social pressures’ to which Hammersley 
refers. Research that systematically, comprehensively and transparently analyses 
representative data can produce strong and trustworthy explanations and arguments 
(Ormston et al, 2014). Arguments are more powerful when they cannot be discredited 
                                                     
56 Hammersley and Gomm (2000: 165) define bias as “culpable systematic error”.  
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for poor research quality. Therefore prioritising rigour is key for ensuring strength of 
arguments emanating from the analyses. As the data naturally exists and is all publicly 
available those assessing the quality of the research can easily see my interpretation 
and assess its representativeness.  
 
Gouldner (1973) suggests there are three types of sociological objectivity. “Normative 
objectification” is the application of values that we explicitly identify as our own (ibid: 
57). “Personal authenticity” ensures that we do not deceive ourselves by pretending 
that the bases of our judgements are different from what they are (ibid: 59). For 
example, we do not decide to exclude a piece of data because it does not support our 
arguments but falsely claim that it is not a key text.  The third type is “transpersonal 
replicability”, which is when we are so clear in describing key parts of the research 
process that others could repeat the research from the same standpoint and arrive at 
the same conclusions (ibid: 57). This chapter has aimed to clearly describe the research 
process.  
 
In summary, we must engage in overt partisanship (Becker, 1967; C Wright Mills, 
2000 [1959]; Tombs and Whyte, 2003), abandon “pretensions to value-neutrality” 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 232), and be self-aware (C Wright Mills, 2000 [1959]). 
Given that one perspective or another underpins all social research and that 
transparency is a key marker of research quality, the quality of the research is higher 
when “researchers recognise, describe, and are open about the perspective from which 
their research commitments, questions, and modes of analysis and dissemination 
originate” (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 230). This thesis has been open about my 
perspective and the research design decisions. “We take sides as our personal and 
political commitments dictate, use our theoretical and technical resources to 
avoid…distortions…[and] limit our conclusions carefully” (Becker, 1967: 247).  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explained and justified the design of the research. It has presented the 
research questions, justified the methodology and explained the concepts of the 
framework for analysis. It has discussed the criteria for the parent sample and 
transparently explained the data distillation process to show it was systematic and 
rigorous. It has justified the decision to present the findings and analysis chapters as 
 104 
case studies of moments and to take an approach of overt partisanship whilst ensuring 
objectivity.  The following chapters present the findings and analysis in three case 














A Critical Analysis of Westminster’s Narration of the General Election 2010 
 
Introduction   
This chapter contributes an analysis of Westminster’s narration of the General Election 
of 2010, including the campaign, results, and aftermath. It examines the discursive 
strategies for legitimising the continuation and intensification, rather than the logical 
replacement, of neoliberal crisis causing conditions. It is argued that definers sought 
to deflect blame for financial crisis from the neoliberal project, relocate the origins of 
economic crisis in the public sector and immorality, position private capital as the 
public’s saviour, and frame individual responsibility as the key to halting Britain’s 
‘decline’.  
 
‘Competing’ to Implement a Neoliberal ‘Resolution’ to the Crisis  
The economy was the central concern of the election. The UK had just emerged from 
a five-quarter-long recession (BBC News, 2015b). Unemployment had risen from 5 
percent in 2007 to 8 percent (BBC News, 2010a). Growth remained fragile; one reason 
was that the public were spending less because they were concerned about job security 
(Press Association, 2010). The interest rate remained at the historic low of 0.5 percent 
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and quantitative easing continued (Kollewe, 2009). Opening the final televised debate 
of the election, David Dimbleby (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) stated, 
“tonight, a large part of the debate will be on the state of the country's economy - the 
recession, the national debt, unemployment, the issues that many people believe will 
decide this election”.  
 
Dominating official discourse, Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat definers 
confined debate within neoliberal boundaries, identified ideologically advantageous 
‘causes’, and competed to present their variation of neoliberal responses as the route 
to ‘resolution’. They presented a powerful consensus that directed Britain to a new 
normality of enhanced neoliberalism. Collectively the three parties attained 88.1 
percent of votes, Conservatives were most successful but were required to form a 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats (BBC News, 2010b). There was an absence of 
challenges, which, in contrast to SIR14 and GE15, meant Westminster did not have to 
engage in discursive countering of them.   
Dislocating the Financial Crisis From Neoliberalism: Blaming Bankers’ 
Immorality 
In major divergence from pre-crisis constructions of finance operating according to 
‘natural forces’ and bankers undertaking useful economic functions (Froud et al, 
2010b), in 2008 the mainstream media constructed bankers as immorally taking risks 
to serve their own interests (Stanley, 2012). Investment bankers were unequivocally 
positioned as key blameworthy subjects, portrayed as “incompetent fools, greedy, 
arrogant failures and mischievous children”, “fat cats…gamblers and criminals”, 
“pirates, pick pockets and cowboys” (ibid: 21, 98, 118). There was also strong public 
hostility towards bankers (Glover, 2008), centred on excessive recklessness and 
excessive reward (Froud et al, 2010b). The Prime Minister and regulators were 
positioned as guilty subjects in media discourse (Stanley, 2012) and the public blamed 
political elites for failing to prevent bankers’ behaviour (Glover, 2008). Media 
narratives and public perceptions made it necessary for Westminster to condemn 
bankers’ behaviour and commit to preventative measures if they wanted to maintain, 
or in some cases regain, credibility. However, Westminster’s narrative operated to 
deflect blame from neoliberalism.  
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Liberal Democrats presented the strongest condemnation of bankers’ criticising their 
greed and arrogance. For Cable (in Ask the Chancellors 2010) there had to be less 
dependency on “a few prima donnas in financial speculation”, and for Clegg (in First 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) “greedy bankers” held the country “hostage”. Whilst 
the party recognised that bankers needed to have less power, its narrative did not 
contextualise greed in terms of neoliberalism, its promotion of consumerism, its 
knotting together of personal identity and consumption, and its commodification of 
money and labour. Nor did it contextualise it within neoliberalism’s resolute 
prioritisation of profit accumulation and corporate externalisation of harm. Bankers’ 
‘arrogance’ was fundamentally a moral criticism and was not discussed in the context 
of the state’s facilitation of finance’s extraordinary power.  
 
Paul Myners, (2010) the Financial Services Secretary, explicitly dislocated bankers’ 
behaviour from neoliberal conditions:  
 
“the failures have not been failures of the market economy. They 
have been failures of men and women who forgot that market 
discipline meant they had to be disciplined in order to get results out 
of the marketplace. Too many people got complacent and lazy – and 
the market responded as we should have predicted…the market did 
not fail. People failed. Like an overconfident swimmer caught in a 
rip tide, they disrespected the power of the market and were pulled 
out to sea”.  
 
Aligning with the neoliberal fundamentalist perspective, the calamity was apparently 
a market ‘success’; it had responded, as it should to human indiscipline. In the early 
stages of the crisis popular narratives emphasised this greed of a “few ‘bad apples’” 
(Thompson, 2009: 521). Newspapers listed individual financial and political elites to 
blame for the crisis (see Elliott, 2012; TIME Magazine, 2009). In 2009 the UK 
Treasury Select Committee hearings condemned the immorality of four elite bankers 
(Tombs, 2016a). Blame was also attributed more widely to ‘the bankers’ as a class 
(see Stanley, 2012; Tombs, 2016a). Blaming dysfunctional moral compasses for the 
crisis sought to protect neoliberalism and prevent expectations of major structural 
changes. “The message [was]…simple: if individual men and women have erred, this 
should not prevent the key engines of neoliberal capitalism from doing what they do 
best” (Tombs, 2016c: 34). The framing of the financial crisis as the consequence of a 
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few people’s immoral compasses was a key strategy for rescuing definers’ credibility 
and protecting the neoliberal project.  
 
However, reflecting Westminster’s ‘finance friendly’ approach, definers limited their 
vilification of bankers. Labour and Liberal Democrats attributed blame to 
irresponsible bankers and banks (see Labour, 2010; Liberal Democrats, 2010) and 
Conservatives attributed blame to an irresponsible Britain that included irresponsible 
banks and bankers. This constructed them as foolishly taking risks as opposed to 
intentionally committing harm either directly, or obliquely out of operating according 
to standard practices or out of personal greed and indifference to others. It excluded 
evidence that some bankers at least, had in fact intentionally, repeatedly, and 
systematically defrauded clients aware of the risks for their client but the reward for 
them (see Davies and McGoey, 2012). It disregarded that financial elites’, in line with 
their ‘expert’ status, did, should, and could have reasonably foreseen that such 
practices would cause potentially disastrous instability (see Rajan, 2010). For 
Westminster definers, bankers were immorally irresponsible. They were, on this view 
acting out of ignorance, not malice or in accord with organisationally psychopathic 
motivation, and should not therefore be held criminally responsible. This evidences a 
continuation, and the dominance, of what Tombs (2016a: 65) called Gordon Brown’s 
2008 tone of “moral re-energisation” and not regulation or criminalisation.  
 
Indeed by January 2011, bankers were making explicit calls for Britain to move on 
from banker blaming (see Werdigier, 2011). Most notably, Bob Diamond, CEO of 
Barclays, told a parliamentary committee that he believed “there was a period of 
remorse and apology for banks and…that period need[ed] to be over”. As this thesis 
evidences, Westminster definers granted Diamond’s wishes. Blame for crisis, and 
therefore the harshest responses, were directed away from financial elites and banks 
towards the neoliberal and neoconservative targets of the public sector and those at the 
opposite end of the class hierarchy. Even as early as GE10, Conservatives (2010a) 
construction of Britain as suffering from an “age of irresponsibility”, directed blame 
to a wide range of ‘causes’ most notably Labour’s public spending, ‘broken families’, 
and the ‘workless’. Finance then, did not require a criminal investigation or a 
fundamental removal of power because many others and perhaps even everyone were 
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at fault. It just had to make its contribution to recovery, and the finance levy was 
constructed as an adequate means to ensure this (see Osborne, 2010a).  
 
Over the crisis Westminster narration operated to shift concerns about bankers’ 
behaviour and deregulation down the political agenda and selected framings ensured 
that ‘causes’ that had concomitant neoliberal responses were placed at the top of the 
agenda. To appear credible, it was unavoidable for Westminster to blame bankers. 
However, shifting attention away from neoliberal conditions and to ideologically 
advantageous ‘causes’ was from very early, key to preventing the crisis becoming a 






Financial Reform: Relatively Radical Departures from, and Returns to, 
Neoliberal Theory 
 “The crisis produced a reform moment, one when the style of 
market government built up over the preceding decades was 
subjected to potentially seismic forces…The enforced extension of 
public ownership on a huge and rapid scale made it impossible to 
avoid new questions about the banking industry” (Froud et al, 2010b: 
29, emphasis added).  
Whilst definers sought to deflect blame from the neoliberal project including its key 
tenet of deregulation, media blaming and public awareness pressured definers to 
portray their respective parties as committed to financial reform in order to appear 
credible (see Cameron in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Labour, 2010). They 
made relatively radical claims about the position of finance and its regulation that 
departed from the neoliberal orthodoxy that had come to prevail in Britain. 
Westminster definers argued that the economy needed to be less dependent on finance 
and that manufacturing needed to take a central position (see Cable in Ask the 
Chancellors, 2010). There were calls for less dependence on debt and the financial 
industry, more savings and investment, rebuilding the manufacturing industry, 
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ensuring the financial industry lent to British manufacturers 57 , investing in 
infrastructure, and developing more diverse forms of investment and industrial 
policies (see Cameron in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Clegg in Final Prime 
Ministerial Debate, 2010; Labour, 2010; Osborne in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010).  
Cameron (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) stated Labour “hitch[ed] the whole 
fortunes of the economy to the City of London and we got into a situation where we 
ended up with the whole economy having to serve the banks rather than the other way 
around”.  His critique recognised the power of finance to manipulate conditions to 
serve its interests. It detached finance’s interests from public interests, departing from 
neoliberalism’s usual rhetoric of trickle down and market self-regulation. Rather than 
a ‘free’ financial industry delivering optimum results, definers asserted that state 
intervention in finance was necessary to prevent it threatening (Labour, 2010), and 
“wreck[ing]” (Cameron in Hansard, 2010a) the economy as a whole. However, this 
radical impetus had a short lifespan, did not become a dominant frame of the crisis, 
and there was no radical departure from neoliberalism in the responses taken toward 
the financial industry. This suggests the claims were perfunctory or disingenuous; they 
were things that ‘had’ to be said as opposed to being reflections of true perceptions 
and intentions.  
Predominantly, Westminster narration of responses to finance sought to exclude and 
delegitimise major changes and prevent a radical material departure. Whilst Liberal 
Democrats fully committed to a national financial levy, Conservatives and Labour 
invoked the well-rehearsed claims about the ‘importance’ of competition arguing the 
levy would have a detrimental effect on British business competitiveness and therefore 
the British public. Whilst Conservatives (2010) expressed a preference for a levy to be 
global, Brown (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) asserted that he would only 
support a levy if it were global. Seemingly without considering permanent 
nationalisation, and with an absence of public debate, the three party leaders all 
                                                     
57 Reinforcing the immorality of bankers, Clegg (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) 
highlighted the consequences for British jobs as a result of RBS’s funding of Kraft’s takeover 
of Cadbury. He emphasised the need for banks to lend to British manufacturers to fund 
expansion and job creation, describing banks not lending as a “body without blood 
circulating”. This statement also reinforced the continued centrality of the financial industry 
to the economy.  
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insisted nationalised banks had to be re-privatised. Cameron (in Hansard, 2010b) 
asserted the private sector was “where they belong”, positioning it as their natural 
habitat. Re-privatisation was framed as being in the public interest. In response to an 
MP suggesting Conservatives would sell banks to “friends in the city”, Cameron (in 
Hansard, 2010b) asserted that he believed in “popular capitalism”. Despite the bailout 
translating into each household possessing £3000 worth of shares in RBS and Lloyds 
(see Froud et al, 2012), in the spirit of Thatcher, reprivatisation was framed as an 
opportunity for ‘ordinary people’ to become financial investors and entrepreneurs. 
Brown (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) argued it would not only repay but 
also produce a profit for the taxpayer. Cameron was more reserved in his claims about 
public repayment than Labour. He argued that attaining the “maximum amount…for 
the taxpayer” had to be balanced against “a fully competitive banking system that 
serves business in this country” (Cameron in Hansard, 2010b. This laid the discursive 
foundations for Osborne’s narration of the sale of RBS shares at a loss in 2015.  
To deflect attention from structural causes, Westminster definers constructed their 
response of a ring fence between investment banking and retail banking as protecting 
the public. A logic of difference, and a “moralistic dichotomy” (Tombs, 2016a: 57), 
was constructed that portrayed investment bankers as recklessly gambling the public’s 
money and retail bankers as sensible. For Clegg (in Second Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010) “investment banking” was “high-risk, free-wheeling casino” style whereas 
“high street banking” was “conservative, sober”. There was an attempt to limit public 
perceptions of banks undertaking harmful actions to investment banking only and 
ignoring that retail banking also inflicted financial harms. This portrayed the ring fence 
as the response necessary to protect the public. Whilst the ‘investment’ banking 
sector’s speculation with other people’s money produced the public calamity, as 
Tombs (2013) recognises there has also been “systematic theft and fraud” in retail 
banking. The problems of both sectors being rooted in joint stock corporate structures, 
limited liability and banks being too big to fail, the omnipresence of fraud in finance, 
and consequently continued public vulnerability to banks’ actions, were left 
unexamined (Kay, 2015).  
In sum, whilst Westminster definers made strong claims about challenging the power 
of finance, “in the UK there had been no thoroughgoing attempt to confront or 
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undermine the power of the financial services sector” and there has been no 
fundamentally industry-changing reform (Tombs, 2016a: 185). Rather, “more of the 
same poison was to prove the necessary cure” (ibid: 185). State responses to finance 
were marginal not fundamental (Harvey, 2012). As Tombs (2016a: 184) states, “one 
would not notice” that deregulation of finance was a key cause of the crisis “from state 
responses to it. As the crisis developed, the radical divergences from neoliberal theory 
and economic reality were not advanced. There has been an absence of “sustained, 
critical consideration of” the role state deregulation played in the crisis (ibid: 185). 
Lacklustre calls for the development of manufacturing and repositioning of finance 
were made but there was a lack of real commitment or change. The importance of 
business competitiveness and the need to restrain reforms for this purpose, already 
present in GE10, dominated debate and were used to legitimise the continuation of 
neoliberal conditions for finance and private capital more widely.  
 
Private Capital to the Public’s Rescue   
Somewhat ironically given that the crisis was caused by private capital and responses 
were continuing to serve private capital’s interests whilst placing the burden of 
sacrifices on the public, Westminster definers utilised ‘trickle down’ discourse to 
rationalise the continuation and intensification of business friendly conditions. 
Westminster definers argued that it was necessary for the government to maintain and 
implement ‘business friendly’ conditions so that the public could be saved from the 
perils of crisis. Responses in sectional interests were constructed as “for all our sakes” 
(Tombs, 2016a: 71, emphasis in original). With unbelievable chutzpah, the public were 
told private capital liberated by the state was not the cause of crisis but the ‘resolution’ 
to rationalise intensifying neoliberal conditions.  
 
Using mythopoesis, definers stipulated that if Britain provided low tax and regulation, 
opened up markets, limited labour rights, and invested in infrastructure, business 
would provide employment, tax revenues, and growth.  
 
“With the next Conservative government, our tax system…will help 
British firms out-compete their global rivals, not hold them back… 
Our competitiveness rating has fallen, while the burden of regulation 
and the impact of taxation have risen. We can only make a 
sustainable economic recovery if we send a clear signal that Britain 
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is open for business again. That means…lowering corporate tax 
rates, reducing the regulatory burden…” (Conservatives, 2010). 
 
The corporate ‘offer’ was accompanied by a corporate threat to leave the country if 
‘business friendly’ conditions were not delivered (Stiglitz, 2012). As Tombs and 
Hillyard (2004: 38) recognise, corporations hold “leverage over nation states” 
threatening re-domiciliation58 if conditions are not sufficiently ‘business friendly’.  
 
Despite the financial crisis being “in part-the result of a failure of regulation” (Tombs, 
2016a: 76), and in contrast with Labour and Conservative’s claims to ‘manage’ finance 
to prevent it threatening and wrecking the economy, definers simultaneously called for 
further deregulation of the private sector. Rather than renewing regulation, 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats criticised the ‘burden’ of ‘red tape’ and 
proposed that new elements of regulation must replace existing elements (see 
Conservatives, 2010; Liberal Democrats, 2010). “Increasing ‘freedom’ for capital was 
prescribed as the solution to the problems created in the first place by the excessive 
freedoms of capital” (Tombs, 2016a: 71). Also notwithstanding the private sector 
crisis, Conservatives (2010) proposed further private sector access to the public sector 
as part of the ‘resolution’. Whereas Labour (2010) expressed commitment to enforcing 
employment rights59, Conservatives (2010), for their part expressed they were “proud 
of the last Conservative government’s industrial relations reforms, which helped bring 
about our economic revival in the 1980s, and…[would] always be prepared to build 
on them if necessary”.   
 
Constructing private capital as the ‘saviour’ to crisis was used to exclude major 
increases in corporation tax from the agenda and actually legitimise cuts to the rate 
(see Osborne, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 2015a). In the same moment as 
constructing deficit and debt hysteria and inflicting austerity on the public, lower 
corporation taxes were framed as being in the public interest despite their implications 
for social justice. Whilst investment in public sector employment, health and welfare 
were unaffordable, definers committed to state investment in infrastructure in business 
                                                     
58 Corporations threaten capital flight and the transfer of their production systems to other 
countries (Chomsky, 1999). 
59 This was despite their own actions undermining labour rights and contributing to the high 
levels of inequality that were a key cause of the financial crisis.  
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interests and therefore public interests (see Conservatives, 2010; Labour, 2010). 
Although as discussed in chapter two, this tends to be at the public’s expense, both in 
terms of state spending and consumer costs.  
 
Westminster’s argument that Britain had to ensure ‘friendly’ conditions in order to 
compete with other nations for the gifts of private capital, supports Davies’s (2016b: 
6) argument that the state “comes to justify its decisions, policies and rules in terms 
that are commensurable with the logic of markets”. In sum, discourses rationalised 
intensifying real crisis causing conditions and excluded alternative paths of state 
borrowing, investment and money creation for ordinary people. It ignored the evidence 
and that ‘business friendly’ conditions facilitate poor worker conditions, lower tax 
revenues, and foster crisis, connecting private and public interests to justify responses 
that are actually detrimental to the public.  
 
 
Laying the Discursive Foundations for Austerity  
To gain support, or acceptance, of austerity Westminster definers emphasised the 
severity of crisis and fuelled debt and “deficit hysteria” (Jessop, 2013: 252). The public 
were encouraged “to hate and fear the deficit” (Chomsky, 2010: 315). They used 
superlatives to stress its size and abnormality (see Darling in Ask the Chancellors 
2010; Labour, 2010). Brown (in First Ministerial Debate 2010), for example, 
highlighted, “these are no ordinary times, and this is no ordinary election. We've just 
been going through the biggest global financial crisis in our lives”. Definers 
communicated enormous proportions of the “seismic” crisis (see Labour, 2010), for 
example Brown (in Labour, 2010) characterised it as an earthquake. Osborne asserted 
that it was necessary to protect UK credibility and give the financial markets 
confidence in Britain to protect reasonable interest rates for borrowing (Gamble, 
2015). They emphasised uncertainty, urgency and ‘peril’ by repeatedly referencing the 
immediacy of threat (see Brown, 2010a; Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010). Although there were occasional dissenting views, in the media voices “warning 
of the danger of the deficit were much more heavily featured and directly endorsed” 
(Berry, 2015: 12). Newspaper reporting was “characterised by fear appeals, the 
presentation of misleading data and false comparisons”, “apocalyptic language”, 
“substantial disinformation and incorrect accounts of the UK’s fiscal position” (ibid: 
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1, 10, 15). Westminster definers, supported by the mainstream media, sought to create, 
in Agamben’s (2005: 1) terminology a “state of exception” to justify exceptional 
responses.  
 
Misleading comparisons and inaccurate accounts of the UK’s fiscal position were 
prominent Conservative strategies for generating hysteria and therefore acceptance of 
austerity. Whilst it was claimed Britain’s debt was high, by historic standards in 2010 
it was low, even lower than when Labour were elected in 1997 (Gamble, 2015). To 
emphasise the size of the deficit Cameron (in First Ministerial Debate 2010) made 
international comparisons. Gordon Brown, he argued, had “given this country the 
biggest budget deficit of any developed country in the world”. These comparisons 
invoked fear about ‘our’ country being in the worst financial position and acceptance 
of the need to repair ‘our’ nation to improve its international standing. Cameron (in 
Second Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; in Final Prime Ministerial Debate 2010) 
misleadingly framed the UK as in a similar position to Greece. As Greece had been 
positioned as ‘bad’ in the dichotomy of good surplus and bad deficit countries of the 
Eurozone (see Harvey, 2011; Spannos, 2014) and had been constructed as the epitome 
of national fiscal irresponsibility60, the comparison sought to generate anxiety. Whilst 
Britain had debt as a proportion of GDP that was higher than a number of Eurozone 
countries, the comparison ignored a several important differences, specifically the 
powers that the UK had that Eurozone countries did not (Gamble, 2015). In countries 
that have their own central bank, governments have much greater control over their 
fiscal policies. Crucially, “the UK still had the ability to let sterling depreciate”, reduce 
interest rates, and could repeatedly engage in quantitative easing (ibid: 46). “The 
British government could still borrow on very favourable rates in international 
financial markets. Its credit rating was high, and the debt was funded through long-
term dated bonds, which meant the interest rates were locked in”. In contrast, 
“Eurozone debtor states” had “much of their debt…in short term bonds. When the 
loans needed extending, the markets kept demanding higher rates of interest” (ibid: 
47). “Although Britain’s financial situation was stable in 2010”, it was in the 
                                                     
60 Elite definers and the media across various nations subjected Greece to disproportionate 
critique (Antoniades, 2012). It was constructed as the “(corrupted) other” and used as a 
“negative reference point” (ibid: 12). For example, the New York Times suggested tax evasion 
was a “national pastime” (ibid: 14). 
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Conservatives and the neoliberal project’s interests to claim otherwise and to try and 
reclaim the title as the party of economic competence (ibid: 47). Major differences 
between the UK and Greek case were disingenuously ignored. 
  
Conservatives also claimed the country had “run out of money” (see Cameron in 
Hansard, 2010a); Osborne (in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010), it had met its 
borrowing and spending limits, and therefore austerity was necessary. This supports 
Davies’s (2016b: 7) argument that politicians draw upon “the authority of 
economics…to dictate legitimate courses of action”. This falsehood was presented as 
‘an economic fact’. Yet, the UK had the freedom to increase the money supply to 
generate demand and tackle recession or to redistribute wealth and reduce the 
inequality that underlay low growth (see Wren-Lewis, 2015). Inflation was not near 
problematic levels and at that moment encouraging demand and inflation to rise would 
have been a more logical response.   
 
In sum, Conservatives constructed the ‘extraordinary’ UK debt and deficit as a very 
dangerous threat to Britain’s credit rating (Conservatives, 2010), investor confidence, 
and potentially calamitous for growth and employment (Blyth, 2013a; Wolf, 2010; 
Krugman, 2010a). Misleading comparisons, inaccurate claims, and exclusions of 
evidence and information were key to generating fear that the UK was in peril and had 
to urgently implement major a response. Excluding corporate tax rises from the 
agenda, portraying the debt and deficit as threateningly high, and asserting the UK 
could not borrow tax or spend positioned austerity as unavoidable. Conservatives 
(2010) announcement of their plans for “an emergency budget” to eradicate the deficit 
reinforced the urgency of a dramatic response to deal with the threat of disaster and 
the budget cemented Conservatives commitment to austerity.  
 
Framing Austerity as a Rational and Necessary Response 
When a capitalist crisis strikes the current government is likely to be discredited61 
(Gamble, 2009), particularly if they have been in government for a while (‘t Hart and 
Tindall, 2009). A recently elected party may more easily be able to claim that the 
                                                     
61 In Iceland in response to the financial crisis there were public protests calling for Prime 
Minister Geir Haarade’ resignation that Haarade adhered to (Gamble, 2009).  
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‘mess’ is not their doing but they can ‘clean it up’ (ibid). Conservatives presented a 
powerful discourse attributing blame for the ‘threatening’ debt and deficit to the 
ideologically advantageous ‘cause’ of Labour’s irresponsible public spending (see 
Conservatives, 2010). Public deficit and debt significantly increased as a result of bank 
bailouts and the economic damage the crisis brought (see Gamble, 2015; Rogers, 2009; 
Scruton, 2010). However, “government debt [was] re-cast as state over-spending 
rather than the socialisation of the effects of…capitalist profit taking” (Tombs, 2016c: 
39). The “dominant image of its locus…moved” the crisis from the private to the 
public sector” shifting focus to public spending (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 300).  
 
Conservatives ignored the real causes of debt and deficit and the fact that “the UK had 
entered the 2008 recession with an internationally and historically low public debt 
burden” (Berry, 2010: 10) and portrayed public spending as being the cause rather than 
consequence of financial crisis. Despite Conservatives playing a key role in supporting 
neoliberal conditions, and committing to Labour’s level of public spending before the 
financial crisis, they then blamed the crisis on Labour and presented the election of 
Conservatives as the route to crisis ‘resolution’.  
Conservatives engaged in explicit attachment of Labour and economic problems to 
attribute blame and responsibility to the party and frame Conservatives’ desired 
responses as rational. They repeatedly made reference to “Labour’s debt crisis”, stated 
“Gordon Brown’s debt, waste and taxes” had “wrecked the economy” and the deficit 
was labelled “Gordon Brown’s legacy” (see Conservatives, 2010). Their campaign 
posters featured an image of Brown laughing with statements such as: “I doubled the 
national debt vote for me” (see Guardian, 2010). This was reinforced with wider 
critiques of Labour’s economic competence and credibility. Cameron (in Hansard, 
2010a) stated, “they told us they had abolished boom and bust but they gave us the 
longest and deepest recession on record”. He highlighted that Labour commended Fred 
Goodwin, who caused serious damage in the economy (Cameron in Final Prime 
Ministerial Debate, 2010).  
Crucially, blaming public spending served a greater purpose than discrediting Labour. 
Conservatives could have blamed Labour’s deregulation of finance if discrediting 
them was their only purpose. However, they avoided blaming and critiquing neoliberal 
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principles, blamed Labour and attacked neoliberal targets including public spending 
and specifically the welfare state. This allowed them to frame responses that did not 
address a real cause but actually intensified it as logical. Cuts to welfare benefits could 
be framed as a ‘resolution’ for a crisis where austerity perpetuated it. They directed 
blame away from the neoliberal project and set the foundation for its re-intensification, 
as ‘resolution’. 
 
A logic of equivalence was constructed between Labour and fiscal recklessness, 
borrowing, and over-spending. In the aftermath of the election Cameron (in Hansard, 
2010a), referring to Liam Byrne’s (the Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Brown’s 
government) note62, stated “thirteen words that sum up thirteen years of complete 
cavalier arrogance with the taxpayers’ money”. He continued “it stops now–no more 
spending beyond our means, no more reckless borrowing”.  Drawing upon public 
anger at elite excess, they argued that ‘fiscally reckless Labour’ had wasted public 
money, particularly on excess and bureaucracy providing examples of MPs spending 
on taxis, stationery, and meals (see Cameron in First Ministerial Debate 2010; 
Cameron in Hansard, 2010a; Cameron in Second Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Cameron, 2010a; Conservatives, 2010). Conservatives also argued that high spending 
does not necessarily deliver better outcomes (see Cameron in First Ministerial Debate, 
2010) and reiterated the neoliberal rhetoric of the need of public sector reforms to 
attain value for money (see Conservatives, 2010). 
 
In contrast, Conservatives (2010a) constructed a logic of equivalence between their 
own party, fiscal responsibility, and limited public spending. They claimed Labour 
offered “big government”, “big spending” and “recklessness”, whereas Conservatives 
offered “good government”, “good housekeeping” and “responsibility” (see Cameron 
in Hansard, 2010a). Liberal Democrats supported Conservative linking of austerity 
and fiscal discipline, and attacked Labour ‘borrow and spend’ and fiscal indiscipline 
(see Cable in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010; Liberal Democrats, 2010). The logic of 
equivalences formed a logic of difference that constructed the parties’ approaches as 
fundamentally distinct and constructed Labour’s approach as the problem and the 
                                                     
62 The infamous note stated, “Dear Chief Secretary, I'm afraid to tell you that there's no money 
left”.  
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Conservatives approach as the solution. This was a strategy for obscuring the fact that 
both major parties supported the neoliberal project and that a deepening of the very 
conditions that caused the crisis was being framed as the solution. The logic of 
equivalence between fiscal responsibility and austerity, repeated consistently by 
Conservatives throughout the narration of crisis was key to framing austerity as the 
necessary response. As Davies, (2016a: 122) states, “no amount of empirical evidence 
of austerity’s failings seems adequate to derail those who pronounce its necessity”.  
 
Whilst Labour attempted to defend their level of public spending, arguing that they 
had responsibly used the strength of the economy to fund publicly valued projects (see 
Labour, 2010; Brown, 2010b), they failed to present a powerful challenge to 
Conservative’s accusatory discourse and crucially they did not truly contest the 
response of austerity. Whilst Brown was reluctant to support cuts, Darling, his 
Chancellor, argued their necessity (Gamble, 2015). Labour could have presented a 
narrative that blamed neoliberalism and advocated a radical change, perhaps a return 
to Keynesianism. However, they too supported austerity even though they did not 
blame public spending for the crisis. Anxious to rebuild its economic ‘credibility’ 
given Conservatives had constructed austerity as common sense, or because they 
desired to exploit the crisis to deepen neoliberalism, or because they lacked an 
alternative plan, Labour failed to confront the crisis for what it was, a neoliberal 
failure, and supported the necessity of austerity. Thus elite consensus was that austerity 
was necessary (Clarke, 2010a; Froud et al, 2010a; Levitas, 2012).  
 
Alternatives became excluded from definers’ discourses across the mainstream 
spectrum (Albo and Evans, 2010; Allen, 2012). The public were told there was no 
alternative (Radice, 2010). Within newspaper debates there was an “almost complete 
lack of any left-wing or even Keynesian alternatives to the neoliberal consensus” 
(Berry, 2015: 8). ‘There is no alternative’ acted as what Davies (2016a: 133) terms a 
“performative utterance”, seeking to “preserve the status quo and to occupy the 
discursive space that might otherwise be filled by empirical or critical questions about 
the nature of reality”. The insistence of the necessity of austerity, the exclusion of 
alternatives and their merits, and crucially the absence of a powerful oppositional 
movement challenging this consensus, ensured that austerity dominated the agenda. 
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Austerity then, despite the evidence, came to be presented as a necessary ‘technical’ 
‘solution’ to economic problems as opposed to a political ‘solution’ (Allen, 2012). 
Also in attempt to obscure the ideological basis for making the choice and position it 
firmly as common sense Clegg (in First Ministerial Debate, 2010) declared “we all 
know we've got this great black hole in our public finances. That's obvious. We all 
know we're going to have to save money; we all know we're going to have to make 
cuts”. Cuts were referred to as tough choices and difficult decisions (see Cameron, 
2010b, c; Darling in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010), as undesirable but unfortunately 
unavoidable.  
 
In summary, a crisis caused by “finance capital and capitalist speculation” was 
powerfully framed (without challenge) as a crisis caused by “state over-spending” 
(Tombs, 2016a: 69). The passing of blame from the private sector and its debt to the 
public sector and its debt was key to legitimising austerity (ibid). Emphasis on severity, 
misleading comparisons, and inaccurate statements, including those for blame 
attribution, and the exclusion of information and evidence framed the crisis in a way 
that supported neoliberal responses and excluded anti-neoliberal responses. As a 
consequence of the successful framing:  
“the ease with which…politicians…attacked civil servants and the 
social benefits that have been the birth right of UK citizens since the 
Second World War contrast[ed] markedly with an almost non-
existent approach…to financial sector reform” (Simms and 
Greenham, 2010: 53).  
 
Conservative blaming of Labour’s public spending was used to legitimise years of cuts 
that rolled back post-WW2 working class gains, deepening inequality, and protecting 
the freedoms the financial industry had been granted by neoliberalism. This blame 
attribution discourse was fundamental to rationalising the unjust response.  
 
Debating Variations of Neoliberal ‘Resolutions’ 
Westminster definers presented a consensus around neoliberal ‘resolution’ and 
narrated the crisis within narrow boundaries of the political spectrum sharing concerns 
for the interests of capital. In contrast to the UK’s claim to be a ‘liberal democracy’ 
providing real debate, transparency, and real choice, for McChesney (1999: 9) under 
neoliberalism there has been “trivial debate over minor issues by parties that basically 
pursue the same pro-business policies”. However, whilst limiting debate, definers 
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sought to construct a façade of real debate and choice. This thesis provides further 
evidence supporting Noam Chomsky’s (2002: 43) assertion that: 
 
“the smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit 
the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate 
within that spectrum – even encourage the more critical and 
dissident views. That gives people the sense that there’s free thinking 
going on, while all the time the prepositions of the system are being 
reinforced by the limits put on the range of debate!”  
 
Ideologically unified elites do not necessarily produce the same narrative rather there 
is difference within boundaries (Coleman et al, 2009: 64; Hall et al, 1978). Also whilst 
ideologies are shared mental frameworks they comprise various strands, and 
individuals’ views may differ within boundaries (Geoghegan, 1996; Stafford, 1998).  
 
Elite consensus “close(s) down space for rational debate about alternatives” 
(Shorthose, 2011: 110) and an absence of challenges facilitates the consensus. Limited 
debates can “cripple our imaginations” (Giroux, 2014: 24); they seek to prevent 
awareness of alternatives and imagining outside boundaries. They can act as a 
“straitjacket” restricting ideas, language and behaviour (Massey, 2013: 13). For 
Giroux (2014: 27), “the disimagination machine”, operated by elites and the 
ideological state apparatus: 
 
“functions primarily to short-circuit the ability of individuals to think 
critically, imagine the unimaginable, and engage in thoughtful and 
critical dialogue, or put simply, to become critically engaged citizens 
of the world”.  
Given that Westminster plays a key role in influencing public sense-making in Femia’s 
(1987: 44) terminology Westminster narration may have acted as a  “barrier” to 
“alternative images of society”, restraining, “mental horizons” (45).  
 
Once they had established the necessity of austerity, Westminster elites debated its 
timing (Wolf, 2010) and whether tax changes should form part of deficit reduction. 
Labour and Conservatives narrowed the debate to the comparatively minor difference 
of whether austerity should begin in 2010 or 2011. They competed against each other 
to construct their response as leading to a good ending, arguing their respective party’s 
timing would deliver ‘resolution’ and the ‘oppositions’ would risk/ forfeit recovery. 
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This intended to give the perception of real debate and choice and obscure ideological 
consensus. They presented a lively debate but fundamentally the spectrum was limited.  
 
 In line with their construction that the nation faced immediate threat from deficit, and 
in support of a neoliberal preference for a tight budget and low tax, Conservatives 
advocated immediate cuts to public sector pay, increases in retirement ages (essentially 
cutting future pension packages), and avoidance of tax rises (see Cameron in Final 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Conservatives, 2010; Osborne in The Chancellors’ 
Debate, 2010; Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 2010). They argued that Labour’s 
approach, which to date had involved increased leveraging to support the economy, 
was ineffective in delivering sustainable resolution and gave particular focus to 
relatively high unemployment (see Conservatives, 2010a; Osborne in The 
Chancellors’ Debate, 2010; Cable in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010). They claimed 
Labour’s ‘jobs tax’63 would increase unemployment framing it as further evidence of 
Labour’s economic incompetence. Cameron (in Hansard, 2010a) promised to “stop 
one of the most stupid, reckless and irresponsible tax rises ever dreamt up in the middle 
of a recession”, he stated  “if you put a tax on jobs, that I think is a jobs killer, it is a 
recovery killer, it's an economy killer” (Cameron in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010). Conservatives also presented a moral critique of the tax, arguing it would 
contravene meritocratic principles by punishing ‘hard-workers’ (see Cameron in First 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Cameron in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Osborne in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010; Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 2010).  
 
Labour argued it was necessary for the state to continue to spend in the “defining year” 
of 2010-2011 (see Brown in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010), to support the 
economy and deliver recovery (see Darling in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010). 
However, from 2011 the economy would be stable enough to cut public spending and 
increase taxes (see Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Brown in Final 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Darling in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010). 
 
 “From the autumn of 2008, big calls had to be made. We 
nationalised Northern Rock, protected people’s savings, cut VAT to 
stimulate our economy, put in place job guarantees to get people 
                                                     
63 Brown (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) proposed the increase in national insurance 
would be used to contribute to funding police, health services, and education.  
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back to work, and stepped in to stop repossessions. It is working. 
The banking system has been stabilised. Our economy is showing 
signs of returning to growth…The question at this election is 
whether people think the choice we made was the right one and 
whether we use the power of government to help sustain recovery” 
(Labour, 2010).  
 
Notwithstanding their recognition that state spending supports an economy in crisis, 
Labour did not advocate the continuation of fiscal stimulus beyond 2011 or even 
discuss its merits.  
 
Labour claimed that Conservatives’ immediate cuts and withdrawal of state support of 
the economy at a critical moment would risk economic depression64 (Albo and Evans, 
2010; Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). They committed to offering protection of 
social achievements, jobs and living standards, and framed Conservatives as making a 
political choice to risk them by advocating immediate austerity (see Brown in Final 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Brown, 2010c). Labour constructed a logic of 
difference between their party and Conservatives, but the purpose of theirs was to 
construct Conservatives austerity plan as ideological and Labour’s austerity plan as 
limited to the ‘necessary’ (see Brown in Second Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010). Labour’s message was their austerity 
was lighter and friendlier and whilst unfortunately there was no alternative to cutting 
public spending they would protect social justice measures where possible.  
Liberal Democrats (2010) stated they would “base the timing of cuts on an objective 
assessment of economic conditions, not political dogma” framing the other parties’ 
plans as political. Clegg (in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) supported Labour’s 
construction of Conservatives’ austerity plan as ideological by criticising 
Conservatives for proposing to cut inheritance tax, serving the rich, whilst cutting 
public sector spending, harming the poor. Liberal Democrats committed to ensuring 
the wealthiest pay their taxes to allow ‘the ordinary’ and the poorest to have lower 
taxes (see Liberal Democrats, 2010). They repeatedly used an example of a banker and 
cleaner, which harnessed public hostility towards bankers’ excess and arrogance and 
presented the party as on the side of the ‘ordinary worker’:  
                                                     
64 For an example see Brown (in First Ministerial Debate 2010).  
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“we would, for instance, stop this grotesque spectacle of this unfair 
tax system…where right now, a greedy banker in the City of London 
pays a lower rate of tax on their capital gains than their cleaner does 
on their wages” (Clegg in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010).  
Cameron’s response to Liberal Democrats tax proposals supported the latter’s 
construction of Conservatives as being led by the interests of the wealthy when 
determining their responses to crisis. Cameron (in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010) stated that whilst tax cuts for the poorest were desirable they were unaffordable 
(even though he had determined inheritance tax and lower corporate tax as affordable); 
“I would love to take everyone out of their first £10,000 of income tax, Nick. It's a 
beautiful idea, a lovely idea. We cannot afford it”. He sought to prevent his tax policies 
appearing political by claiming he could not choose reductions for low earners. In 
conflict Liberal Democrats argued that they were affordable if the tax system was 
“switch[ed]” to support ‘ordinary workers’ rather than the wealthy (Clegg in Final 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010), by ending loopholes and reforming non-domiciled 
status (see Clegg in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Liberal Democrats, 2010). 
Notably, when seeking to form a Coalition with the Liberal Democrats, Cameron 
(2010a) committed to finding a way to making them affordable. Here, whilst there was 
consensus around austerity there was a struggle over which end of the class spectrum 
tax policies should serve. When in a coalition Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
increased the tax-free allowance and cut corporation tax and inheritance tax whilst 
inflicting austerity. The Liberal Democrats pressured Conservatives into a tax policy 
that helped workers but it did not negate the economic harms inflicted on them by the 
Coalition.  
In sum, the public had to choose between three parties advocating austerity as the path 
to ‘resolution’. Whilst there was variation over tax policies, there was unity over the 
necessity of austerity and the greatest point of variation was whether cuts should begin 
in 2010 or 2011. Whilst Conservatives argued for immediate cuts Labour was 
marginally different effectively saying, “yes, we will cut too, only not so much, not so 
fast, not so soon and not all at once” (Hall, 2011: 724). The debate contributed to the 
façade of real debate and sought to obscure the reality that parties were ideologically 
unified. An absence of a powerful oppositional movement advocating an alternative 
facilitated Westminster elites’ restraint of debate and the enactment of a neoliberal 
‘resolution’ to a neoliberal crisis.  
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Framing Responses as Mechanisms for Fairness and Equality  
A key strategy for legitimising responses is framing them as informed by shared values 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). Constructing responses as fair and just frame them 
as necessary for society to be moral (ibid). After WW2 Labour called for movement 
towards equality and social justice, a commitment enacted in their creation of the 
welfare benefits system, the NHS, and the support of workers’ rights. Labour’s (2009) 
millennium constitution also stated that its “principles and objectives” are “equality, 
social and economic justice, community solidarity and freedom”. As discussed in 
chapter two, for New Labour, social justice no longer entailed equality rather the 
emphasis was on fairness. In GE10 Labour committed to fairness. Its manifesto was 
titled “a fair future for all”. ‘Fairness’ was invoked throughout to justify advocated 
responses. In contrast, however equality was used only in reference to the Equality Act 
and the role of trade unions. Fairness was used conservatively to argue that rewards 
could not come without responsibility, welfare cuts were necessary, and all needed to 
pay their share for the recovery. Fairness used this way supports individual 
responsibilisation whereas the value of social justice engenders collectivism. Labour’s 
shift to the moral value of ‘fairness’ reflects the change in the responses they were 
seeking to legitimise and the party’s ideological shift. The moral value of equality was 
used to argue for the creation and development of the welfare state but the moral value 
of fairness was used to legitimise its rollback.    
 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats recognised high levels of inequality and 
unfairness. For Liberal Democrats (2010) “Britain, for all its many strengths, is still 
too unequal and unfair, a country where the circumstances of your birth and the income 
of your parents still profoundly affect your chances in life”. Cameron (in Hansard, 
2010a) complained, “after 13 years of a Labour government inequality is wider, social 
mobility has stalled, severe poverty is rising and social justice is falling. Liberal 
Democrats (2010) presented further relatively progressive arguments stating “greed 
and self-interest have held sway over the government and parts of the economy in 
recent decades. They have forgotten that growth must be shared and sustainable if it is 
to last”; 
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“at the root of Britain’s problems today is the failure to distribute 
power fairly between people. Politicians and civil servants have 
hoarded political power; economic power has been hoarded by big 
businesses. Both kinds of power have been stripped from ordinary 
citizens, leaving us with a fragile society marked by inequality, 
environmental degradation and boom bust economics” (ibid).  
 
Promises were made to share prosperity and develop social mobility to address 
inequality (see Conservatives, 2010). The coalition government’s material actions 
suggest they were disingenuous. Both parties were committed to austerity and for the 
following five years implemented an economic approach that increased inequality and 
reduced social mobility (see Stewart and Lupton, 2015) unfairly placing the greatest 
burden on the poorest (see Lupton et al, 2015). The distance between suggestions that 
inequality and injustice would be addressed and the actions that were taken in 
government, suggest the discursive claims were examples of what Mathiesen (2004: 
9) terms “absorption” whereby powerful definers draw progressive messages into their 
narrative to achieve acquiescence.  
 
Clegg (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) recognised that cuts needed to appear 
fair to be accepted: 
“people aren't going to accept these difficult decisions unless we do 
it fairly…If you don't have fairness at the heart of everything we do, 
it's going to be very, very difficult to see us through these difficult 
decisions in the years to come”.  
He made several explicit references to maintaining consent when implementing 
responses. It was important that “people feel that whilst difficult decisions are being 
made, at least the tax system is on their side” (Clegg in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010). Clegg (2010) also argued that bankers’ bonus reforms were necessary for 
quelling public “despair at the greed and excess” and healing the public’s perception 
of finance. Claiming to uphold the moral value of fairness and framing responses as 
fair were key strategies for justifying neoliberal ‘resolution’. 
Broken Britain: Justifying the Targeting of the Welfare State  
Conservatives constructed Britain as trapped in a myriad of crises and spiral of decline 
repeatedly referring to the economic crisis alongside a political crisis and a series of 
social crises. Some constructions of crisis were more truthful than others.  
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“Our national finances are mired in massive debt. Millions are living 
the misery of unemployment. Communities are shattered by crime 
and abuse. People in the public services are trapped in a web of rules 
and regulations. People have lost faith that politics can fix our 
problems, or that politicians can lead us into a better future. There is 
a feeling of helplessness. Once again, there is a mood afoot that the 
decline of Britain is inevitable” (Conservatives, 2010).  
 
A key Conservative construction was ‘Broken Britain’ 65 , a dependent and 
irresponsible society lacking discipline and individual responsibility because the 
government allowed it to (Hancock et al, 2012). However, bankers and politicians 
were not the target of the moral panic here. Rather, blame was directed down the class 
hierarchy towards neo-conservative folk devils or neoliberal targets. Burglars, youths, 
‘broken families’, and ‘the workless’ were constructed as threatening ‘ordinary 
people’s’ lives. Key folk devils were quickly identified: workless welfare claimants, 
“shifty, feckless, irresponsible, bad (and single) parents, with disorganised lives” 
(Hall, 2011: 721).  
In the 1970s “the law and order campaign groomed the society for the extensive 
exercise of the repressive side of the state” (Hall et al, 2013 [1978]: 273). Similarly, 
‘Broken Britain’ manipulated society into perceiving Britain as suffering a crisis of 
irresponsibility to legitimise “moral authoritarianism” (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 
311). The problem came to be “dependency-inducing statism and welfarism” (ibid: 
310).  
“We need to put everything we do through a simple test: if it 
encourages irresponsibility, we shouldn’t do it, if it encourages 
responsibility we should. We should remember that basic rule that 
when you give people responsibility they behave responsibly. So 
instead of governments undermining families with a benefits system 
that pays couples to live apart lets use government to help bring 
people together…Instead of allowing people to choose a life on 
benefits when they could work, say to people if you can work and 
turn down work, you will not go on getting your benefits…we have 
got to end this culture of entitlement and build a new culture of 
responsibility” (Cameron, 2010b).  
                                                     
65 Labour supported elements of the construction. It refuted Conservatives construction of 
‘Broken Britain’. However, it argued that responses needed to ensure greater individual 
responsibility (see Brown, 2010b; Brown in First Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Labour, 
2010).  
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In 2011 the Broken Britain discourse was used to frame the ‘riots’. Rather than 
explaining the uprising through discourses of poverty, social injustice, and 
discriminatory policing Cameron (2011) spoke of a:  
“slow-motion moral collapse that has taken place in parts of our 
country these past few generations? Irresponsibility.  Selfishness. 
Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. Children without 
fathers.  Schools without discipline.  Reward without effort. Crime 
without punishment.  Rights without responsibilities.  Communities 
without control. Some of the worst aspects of human nature 
tolerated, indulged - sometimes even incentivised - by a state and its 
agencies that in parts have become literally de-moralised”.  
They were caused by “‘pure’ or ‘sheer’ criminality and needed to be met by the full 
force of the law” (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 310). In accordance with neo-
conservative values, marriage, school discipline, work, and a small welfare state were 
constructed as solutions to Britain’s decline (Slater, 2012), as opposed to a responsible 
and disentitled financial sector or policies for social justice.  
 
Exceptionally punitive responses to the ‘immoral threat’ appeared. Conservatives 
(2010) asserted that they would be “cracking down” on burglars to address the threat 
and “mend our broken society” in the interests of “responsible citizens”. Teachers 
would have “tough new powers of discipline” to ensure order (ibid).  Irresponsible 
parents and their ‘broken families’66, causing crime and high public spending, would 
be penalised rather than rewarded with changes to the tax and benefit systems (ibid). 
This was repetition of a strategy used in narration of the 1970s capitalist crisis. Hall et 
al’s (1978: 148) state that “fears and panics about the breakdown of social 
discipline…centre[d] on the indiscipline of ‘youth’, ‘the young’ and on those 
institutions whose task is to help them internalise social discipline – the school, but 
above all, the family”. 
                                                     
66  The ‘problem’ of  ‘family breakdown’ was communicated through discourses about 
‘dysfunctional’ families, ‘troubled families’, the plight of teenage pregnancies, and 
‘dadlessness’ (Slater, 2011). Iain Duncan Smith, the Secretary of State for the Department of 
Work and Pensions, stated that poor families should not be given money because “feckless 
parents will spend it on drugs and gambling” (ibid). Cameron wrote in the Sunday Telegraph 
that British society should stigmatise and shame ‘AWOL’ dads like “drink drivers” (ibid). The 
public were told children without male role models would grow up to be criminal or welfare 
dependent (ibid). MP and senior Conservative figure, Chris Grayling (cited in Hancock et al, 
2012: 349-350), referred to the problem of “Jeremy Kyle generation”, young and poor “failed 
families” with absent and criminal fathers.  
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The Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) gave ‘credibility’ to the ‘Broken Britain’ 
construction. The think tank identified five pathways to poverty: family breakdown, 
worklessness and dependency, educational failure, serious personal debt, and 
addiction (Silver et al, 2014). Poverty and morality became entangled (Hancock et al, 
2012). Its findings aided Conservatives in generating a moral panic, with “the ultimate 
pariah” being the young single mother dependent upon benefits (Silver et al, 2014) 
and assisted Conservatives in promoting welfare reform and manufacturing ignorance 
of alternatives to austerity (Slater, 2012). The mass media largely uncritically drew on 
CSJ reports, contributing to moral panic 67  (Silver et al, 2014). They shamed the 
‘undisciplined’ and ‘incompetent’ poor and presented the welfare state as causing 
worklessness (Clarke, 2010b; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Wiggan, 2012), which was 
constructed as generational; it was claimed people were ‘trapped’ in ‘dependency’ 
(Slater, 2012; Wiggan, 2012).  
 
There is evidence to suggest the construction of ‘Broken Britain’ was at best 
misleading. Shildrick et al (2012) and MacDonald et al (2014) found no evidence to 
support the argument that generational worklessness and irresponsible dependency 
were problems. Rather, two generations of extensive worklessness was rare, and 
moreover unemployment was not a choice. They discovered the lived experiences of 
insecurity and precariousness in a period of high unemployment, low paid and 
temporary work. In support of Davies’s (2016a) argument that the current phase of 
neoliberalism does not seek empirical evidence to inform its approaches, Slater (2011) 
suggests that ‘evidence-based decision making’ by think tanks has been “tailored to 
the needs of… elites”. Research has been “rigged” to produce data that supports 
neoliberal dogma and perpetuates social inequality (ibid).  
 
For neoliberals, the welfare state’s “utopian sentimentality enervated the nation’s 
moral fibre, eroded personal responsibility and undermined the over-riding duty of the 
poor to work” (Hall, 2011: 707). Conservatives blamed Labour’s ‘big state’ approach 
for an absence of competition and meritocracy shielding the ‘undeserving’ from 
appropriate consequences and therefore encouraging immoral behaviour (see Cameron 
                                                     
67 For examples see Chapman (2009) and Doughty (2013). 
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in Hansard, 2010a). The system was framed as working in reverse: the ‘undeserving 
workless’ were being rewarded with privileges not granted to the ‘hard-working’ 
majority, directing blame downwards (see Cameron in First Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Cameron in Second Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Cameron in Final Prime 
Ministerial Debate, 2010). As a consequence of an absence of meritocracy, rising 
worklessness and welfare dependence were threatening Britain (see Osborne in The 
Chancellors’ Debate, 2010). Conservatives (2010) blamed poverty, in particular child 
poverty, on worklessness failing to recognise in-work poverty68. The ‘threat’ was 
workshy parents choosing not to work (see Cameron in First Ministerial Debate, 
2010). A lack of hard work was the reason the poor were poor (Littler, 2013; Silver et 
al, 2014). Poverty was positioned as the outcome of an individual’s immorality as 
opposed to being structurally generated; in C Wright Mills’ (2000 [1959]: 8) 
terminology “public issues” were constructed as “personal troubles”. Again, 
responsibility was deflected from neoliberal conditions.  
In this way, a moralistic dichotomy was established between the discursive figures of 
the ‘hard-working taxpayer’ and that of the welfare benefit claimant. The former was 
constructed as the example of British morality and the latter as defying the moral 
values of Britain. A notable contribution to this depiction came in 2011 with Clegg’s 
(2011) “alarm clock Britain” which emphasised the importance of people who “get up 
every morning” and undertake “hard graft” for their country rather than relying “on 
state hand-outs”. The moral were hard-working, responsible, self-sacrificing, and 
patriotic. The dichotomy constructed them as morally distinct groups excluding 
complexities, and inaccurately and misleadingly simplifying conditions.  
‘The ordinary’ were constructed as working not only to support themselves but the 
workless too, framing ‘us’ as victims of exploitation by the ‘immoral other’. 
Constructions of the welfare state as there for ‘all of us’ if ‘economic conditions turned 
against ‘us’ were replaced with constructions that it were a vehicle for ‘them’ to exploit 
‘us’, eroding collectivism in favour of individualism. Drawing upon Quinney (1972: 
                                                     
68 In 2011-2012 “around 6.7 million people, over half of all those in poverty, lived in a family 
with at least one adult who was working” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013). Figures 
released in December 2016 showed “7.4 million people, including 2.6 million children are in 
poverty despite being in a working family…a record high of 55 per cent of people in poverty 
are in working households” (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016).  
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316), the victim was “held up” by the powerful to legitimise neoliberal responses, most 
notably the rolling back of the welfare state. Cuts became ‘necessary’ to discipline and 
responsibilise immoral individuals in the interests of the rest of ‘us’. This was a clear 
example of victim blaming. The case for the economic ‘necessity’ of austerity was to 
be reinforced by a systematic proclamation of its moral necessity.  
Once the immorality of the voluntarily workless and perception of undeserved state 
support was established, Cameron (in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) asserted 
that this group should be primary targets of cuts. For Conservatives, the remedy for 
the social ill of worklessness was ‘tough but fair’ welfare changes to re-moralise the 
individual and responsibilise and discipline through the re-establishment of a 
‘meritocracy’. Westminster definers advocated a more coercive welfare state: 
conditionality would increase, work would be incentivised and those still unmotivated 
to work would be forced to engage in work schemes, or face sanctioning (see Brown, 
2010b; Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Cameron, 2010b; Cameron in 
First Ministerial Debate, 2010; Clegg in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Conservatives, 2010). Echoing Thatcher, emphasis was placed on responsibility in 
exchange for rights (see Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Labour, 
2010). Conservatives (2010) framed their welfare benefit proposals for the 
unemployed as “a hand up, not a hand out” ensuring responsibility not dependency. 
Those who did not work or develop their employability to earn their benefits were 
punished for their immorality, a marked difference from benefits being a right to those 
who could not work because of circumstances outside of their control and therefore 
responsibility.  
Conservatives (2010) and Labour (2010) made commitments to stringent checks of 
Employment and Support Allowance claimants. Private companies would be paid by 
results to identify those unwilling to work and cheating the system (Conservatives, 
2010). This, as well as pressures to achieve targets in job centres, motivated unethical 
decisions that inflicted severe personal harm (see O’Hara, 2015). It also reinforced the 
construction of welfare claimants as morally distinct, immorally exploiting ‘us’ and 
not to be trusted. An absence of a powerful oppositional movement facilitated the 
campaign against welfare claimants and the passing of the burden of crisis onto them.   
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On their parts, Labour and Liberal Democrats framed welfare cuts as for the benefit of 
claimants themselves, arguing they would develop their “self-respect” (Clegg in Final 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) and “self-esteem” (Brown in Final Prime Ministerial 
Debate, 2010). This framed not rolling back welfare as immoral because unconditional 
welfare encouraged dependency (see Clegg in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; 
Labour, 2010). Labour (2010) framed withdrawing incapacity benefit for people with 
disabilities and health conditions through “tough but fair” tests as helping them live 
independently and with dignity. This reinforced the message that being dependent 
even when ill or disabled is undignified in the neoliberal world.  
 
Despite “the hard edge of cuts, work-fare and the gospel of self-reliance” 
Conservatives tried to construct themselves as providing “Compassionate 
Conservatism” (Hall, 2011: 710). As recognised earlier, they claimed to be concerned 
with tackling inequality and poverty, but rather than calling for a change in structural 
conditions, they argued that the solution was coerced work and withdrawing immoral 
individuals’ protections from the consequences of their actions  (see Cameron, 2010b). 
This was a resolutely neoliberal approach used to erode compassion towards the 
vulnerable. In GE15, despite five years of coalition policies harming the vulnerable 
(to the extent that downward trends in mortality were reversed) Cameron (2015a) re-
stated the claim that he was a “compassionate Conservative”. He evidenced his 
commitment to a growing economy, the benefits of which were apparently trickling 
down.  
In sum, Conservatives constructed a crisis of law and order fostered by Labour’s ‘big 
state’ to legitimise the reassertion of public responsibility and the rollback of state 
social support. Neoliberal theory advocates a withdrawal of state management and 
Conservative framing of their approach as a shift away from ‘big government’ 
suggested that the state would take a more limited role in intervening in, and managing, 
people’s lives. However, reduced support for welfare claimants (this in sharp contrast 
to their response to finance) was accompanied by regulation, surveillance, discipline, 
and punishment in the form of a coercive and punitive ‘welfare’ system.  
Big Society: Legitimising the Rollback of Wider State Social Responsibility  
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Conservatives asserted that they had the solution to repair “the torn fabric of society” 
(Conservatives, 2010), and reject “the path of decline” (Cameron, 2010a, b). In 
addition to the rollback of the welfare state there needed to be a “fundamental change: 
from big government…to the Big Society…from state action to social action”, from 
“state control” to “social responsibility” (Conservatives, 2010), “more people power” 
not “more state power” (Cameron, 2010b). Cameron (2010b) asserted, “these are 
social problems, they need a social response, so it’s not time for more big government, 
it’s time for the Big Society”.  
 
Big Society provided what Hall et al (2013 [1978]: 273) term a “positive face”, for the 
withdrawal of state support and provision69. Decentralisation of responsibility for care 
and welfare” (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 303) was framed using claims of “collective 
action”, “solidarity”, community empowerment and mutual reliance (Hancock et al, 
2012; Sage, 2012: 370). Further demonstrating Westminster audacity, rather than the 
government being the big spender, the public would be ‘morally good’ giving more of 
their money and time to their community:  
 
“we will introduce new ways to increase philanthropy, and use the 
latest insights from behavioural economics to encourage people to 
make volunteering and community participation something they do 
on a regular basis” (Conservatives, 2010).  
 
The Big Society would encourage “public-spirited service” where all volunteer for the 
good of the community (ibid).  It was a vision of wholesale volunteerism and 
privatisation of social support and social services. By implication labour for social 
ends should be unpaid and ‘charitable’ in marked contrast to the ‘productive’ labour 
of the ‘real’ ‘wealth producing’ economy.  
Conservatives repeatedly reinforced that the public had to be active in a “collective 
endeavour” to mend Britain (Conservatives, 2010). It required a “national effort”, 
everyone to “unite” and “pull together” and to remember “we are all in this together” 
(ibid). Cameron (in First Ministerial Debate, 2010) emphasised “we can only do this 
if we recognise we need join together, we need to come together, we need to recognise 
                                                     
69  Brown (2010c) recognised that the Conservatives’ “‘Big Society’ programme…[was] 
merely a cover for a major scaling back of public services, affecting those on modest and 
middle incomes”. 
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we're all in this together”, “there's no doubt the country's going to have to come 
together to deal with this really big problem of the deficit”, “we're all in this together 
and real change comes when we come together and work together”. Conservatives 
tried to create “the collective imagery… of a nation united in the face of 
adversity”(Clarke and Newman, 2012: 304). However, as Lupton et al’s (2015) 
research shows sacrifice was heavily weighted on the shoulders of the poorest. The 
working classes carried the greatest burden (Albo and Evans, 2010; Allen, 2012; 
Carney et al, 2014; Hancock et al, 2012; Levitas, 2012). 
The Conservative manifesto framed passing social responsibility onto the public as the 
government privileging the public, and trusting them, with a high level of power and 
therefore control, as breaking the monopoly on political power and democratically 
devolving it. It was titled: “Invitation to Join the Government of Britain” and Cameron 
(2010b) stated:  
"it is an invitation to the whole nation: we'll give you the power, so 
you can take control...Let's make this the biggest call to arms the 
country has seen in a generation…this great invitation, this big 
opening up of government and public services and our whole 
political system”.   
 
Conservatives informed the public they could be little politicians able to “be…[their] 
own boss, sack…[their] MP, choose…[their] own school, own…[their] own home, 
veto council tax rises, vote for police commissioners, save…[their] local post office, 
see how the government spends…[their] money” (Cameron, 2010b). Conservatives 
framed their approach as empowering the public and “set[ting] free” (Cameron, 2010c) 
and “enabl[ing] social enterprises, charities and voluntary groups” (Conservatives, 
2010). The private sector would also play a key role in the social resolution (see 
Cameron, 2010b). This framing sought to appeal to anti-establishment desires for a 
relinquishing of power from the Westminster elite to legitimise the withdrawal of state 
social protection.   
 
Cameron (2010b) stated, “my fundamental belief - there is such thing as society, it’s 
just not the same thing as the state”. There was an implicit reference to Thatcher’s 
statement that there was no such thing as society. Arguably he sought to distance his 
brand of Conservatism from Thatcherism (Levitas, 2012; Sage, 2012; Wiggan, 2011). 
 134 
However, Cameron’s concern with society was also distinctly underpinned by 
neoliberalism and neo-conservatism and also used to legitimise rolling back state 





Westminster definers constructed a misleading and disingenuous narrative to 
legitimise responses that deepened neoliberalism. Definers’ focus on bankers’ 
immorality and their refusal to locate such behaviour within its structural context, 
sought to manufacture ignorance towards neoliberalism’s causal role in the crisis. 
Directing focus from the neoliberal project and to neoliberal targets framed neoliberal 
responses that continued and intensified causes of the crisis as logical.  Conservatives 
constructed a powerful narrative inaccurately blaming the crisis on Labour’s public 
spending, particularly on the welfare state, to position austerity as the only logical 
response. Constructions of welfare claimants sought to erode empathy and 
collectivism to legitimise the rollback of state welfare support and the development of 
a punitive ‘welfare’ system for ‘re-moralising individuals’. The Big Society discourse 
sought to obscure state relinquishing of social responsibility with collectivism and 
solidarity, which in the past had been used to legitimise socially just, as opposed to 
socially unjust, responses. 
 
Private capital on the other hand was constructed as the saviour from crisis and 
‘business friendly’ conditions were therefore not causes of crisis but the route to 
‘resolution’. This framing sought to justify neoliberal responses, including corporation 
tax cuts, deregulation of private capital, re-privatisation of banks, and further opening 
up of the public sector. Blame was misleadingly directed to the public sector and the 
‘immorality’ of those lower down the class hierarchy, and this intensified as the crisis 
developed. Finance capital and its reform by contrast were pushed down the agenda.  
 
Westminster definers operated to generate misunderstanding of Britain’s fiscal 
position. In this moment, to legitimise austerity and exclude alternative responses they 
inaccurately claimed that the UK could not tax, borrow or spend anymore and that 
Britain had no alternative to austerity. This excluded the truth that the UK had 
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economic freedoms that meant austerity was a government choice. The necessity for 
fiscal stimulus, was denied with misleading comparisons between the UK and Greece, 
and bolstered by elite consensus around these constructions.  
 
An absence of challenges facilitated Westminster’s dissemination of a narrative that 
inaccurately represented reality and the ‘resolving’ of neoliberal crisis with further 
neoliberal conditions. The following chapter presents an analysis of Westminster’s 





































This chapter presents an analysis of Westminster’s narration of the Scottish 
Independence Referendum 2014, including the campaign, results, and aftermath. 
Better Together Definers’ (BTD) discursive strategies in this moment were significant 
in terms of Westminster’s crisis narrative because definers were countering the first 
discursive challenge to austerity in the crisis. The Scottish National Party claimed to 
offer an alternative and ‘socially just’ approach for ‘resolution’ that contested 
Westminster’s discourses for justifying austerity. Here, it is argued that BTD sought 
to undermine the credibility of the SNP to discredit their alternative by framing their 
narrative as a façade to hide their true nationalist agenda. It is shown that Westminster 
definers narrated a referendum on Scotland’s political freedom on classically 
neoliberal terrain. The chapter also demonstrates that BTD inaccurately portrayed the 
Labour party as supporting social justice and the protection of harm reduction systems 
in order to encourage remain votes, constructed remaining as the moral choice, 
encouraged emotional sense-making by portraying supporting Westminster as being 
in the interests of family and country, and generated fear and anxiety about the 
alternative. 
 
The SNP’s Challenge  
The Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 legislated for a referendum on 
Scottish Independence from the United Kingdom held on the 18th September 2014. 
For Westminster, it presented a constitutional crisis, potentially a further loss for UK 
international power, and harm to the valuable ‘British capitalist brand’. In David 
Cameron’s (2014a) first speech of the campaign he stated: “centuries of history hang 
in the balance”, “a question mark hangs over the future of our Great Britain”, “we 
matter more as a United Kingdom politically, militarily diplomatically and culturally 
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too”. Reducing centuries of history and unionist tradition to a modern day marketing 
imperative, he proclaimed, “we come as a brand”. “Our reputation” in the capitalist 
world, and therefore investment, trade and borrowing, were threatened70.   
 
SIR14 was not only a major constitutional moment but also a major moment for 
Westminster’s crisis ‘resolution’ plan. In 2011 the SNP had achieved the first majority 
government in Holyrood, committing to serving Scotland’s interests, achieving a 
referendum on independence, protecting public services, and reducing inequality (see 
SNP, 2011). The party was in government in Scotland and simultaneously in 
opposition to the UK government. Thus, SNP definers were key narrators in Scotland. 
The SNP’s challenge to the austerity project was central to the referendum. The party’s 
support in SIR14 was certainly not hindered by its argument for a socially just 
alternative to austerity and arguably it strengthened support. Independence, patriotism 
and freedom from the perceived undemocratic domination of Westminster were key 
to arguments for independence. However, a ‘socially just’ alternative to austerity was 
central to the argument for independence. The SNP constructed a logic of equivalence 
between independence, anti-austerity and social justice, which formed part of a wider 
logic of difference between the UK and social injustice on the one hand, and an 
independent Scotland and social justice on the other.  
 
Alex Salmond, the First Minister of Scotland, and Nicola Sturgeon, the deputy First 
Minister, argued that governments not chosen by Scottish voters ruled 
undemocratically over Scotland inflicting unjust and unnecessary austerity. Indeed, 
Sturgeon (in Carrell, 2012) asserted that her “conviction that Scotland should be 
independent” stemmed “from the principles, not of identity or nationality, but of 
democracy and social justice”. Salmond (in Scotland Decides: Salmond versus 
Darling, 2014) complained: “we couldn’t stop the bedroom tax…we can’t stop the 
poor and disabled bearing the brunt of welfare cuts. We can’t stop the spread of food 
banks in this prosperous country”. Challenging Westminster’s construction of ‘there 
is no alternative’ and their claims that the UK had ‘run out of money’, the SNP argued 
                                                     
70 Arguably whilst losing Scotland would increase the likelihood of Conservatives maintaining 
power for numerous elections to come as they perform the weakest in Scotland, Conservatives 
would not want to have a even greater financial system (mainly a re-domiciled RBS) on fewer 
taxpayers shoulders, lose a large percentage of oil revenues or lose more power and influence 
both within Scotland and internationally.  
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that an independent Scotland would increase social spending. The IMF and Deutsche 
Bank questioned whether the SNP’s anti-austerity discourse reflected the party’s 
actual plan (see Eaton, 2015; Nelson, 2014), but discursively the party certainly 
offered an alternative. Consequently, Westminster definers seeking to defend the 
neoliberal ‘resolution’ had to counter the SNP’s discursive challenge.  
 
Uniting with the Opposition: Better Together  
Notwithstanding the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, Scottish 
Labour MPs were selected to lead the Better Together campaign. Conservative elites 
gave the leading roles on a historic political and economic issue to their opposition 
knowing that if they failed it would be the Conservative government that lost Scotland. 
This contrasted with Conservatives’ previous assaults on Brown and Darling’s 
credibility and can be attributed to the extent of Scottish enmity towards the ‘Tories’.  
 
Scottish Labour MPs were able to more convincingly construct themselves as 
personally invested in Scotland’s future. Concern for Scotland was enhanced by 
emphasis on family heritage and education. Leaders were explicit in their personal 
value assumptions. Darling (2012) declared, “I care deeply about the future of my 
country. This is my home. Its history, its rich culture, its social ties, are mine: they 
made me”. They highlighted Labour’s establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 
1997. They used plural pronouns, such as ‘us’ and ‘we’ to remove perceptions of 
distance between Scottish voters and Westminster elites and positioned themselves as 
‘insiders’, which strengthened their truth claims about Scottish people’s interests. This 
strategy was key to engender trust in BTD’ narrative.  
 
Struggling Over Logics of Equivalence  
BTD challenged the SNP’s logics of equivalence between the UK and social injustice, 
and an independent Scotland and social justice, and the wider logic of difference these 
formed. Labour definers redrew the classifications, constructing logics of equivalence 
between Labour and social justice, Conservatives and social injustice, and the SNP 
and a social justice façade to hide a nationalist agenda, in order to portray remaining 




Redrawing lines required Labour recognition and critique of socially unjust 
Conservative policies, despite Labour committing to many certainly similar policies. 
Alexander (2013a) acknowledged “the deep and enduring unpopularity of the 
Coalition Government” and critiqued the need for food banks, high unemployment, 
low wages, and cuts to welfare. BTD emphasised the transiency of a Conservative 
government arguing Britain could be socially just but an independent Scotland would 
not be (see Alexander, 2013a, b; Alexander, 2014a; Darling, 2012).  
 
To position Labour as the party of social justice Alexander (2014a) claimed that the 
SNP had constructed an inaccurate stereotype of non-Scottish Britons as “austerity 
loving Tories”. They then argued it ignored Britain’s key values of compassion and 
solidarity demonstrated in Britain’s care for the ill, the unemployed, and the old 
through the welfare state and NHS created under Labour. BTD disseminated a 
discourse of British and Labour struggle for social justice demonstrated in anti-
Thatcher protests (see Alexander, 2013a), shared conflicts, and through the creation of 
harm reduction systems.  
 
“We fought two world wars together…there is not a cemetery in 
Europe that does not have Scots, English, Welsh, and Irish lying 
side-by-side…and we not only won these wars together, we built the 
peace together, we built the health service together, we built the 
welfare state together, we will build the future together” (Brown, 
2014a).  
 
“We have achieved so much together, in times of peace and war. We 
created and then dismantled an empire together. We fought fascism 
together. We built the Welfare State together. The BBC and the Bank 
of England were founded by Scots. The NHS was founded by a 
Welshman. The welfare state was founded by an Englishman. And 
we would not have achieved half as much if we had not been a 
United Kingdom, advancing together” (Darling, 2012).  
 
‘Sacrificed’ altruistic soldiers are symbols of pride in Britain’s achievement and 
reference to them is a strong tool for invoking patriotism. In this context, with great 
irony, references to sacrificed soldiers and progressive social achievements were being 
used to gain public support for Westminster elites who were exploiting the crisis by 
undertaking a rollback of Britain’s post war social achievements. Seeking to emote 
pride in both creating and dismantling the empire is of course odd. But the reference 
served a dual purpose: dismantling the empire portrayed Britain as concerned with 
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social justice but imperialist achievements cultivated patriotism. Drawing upon an 
“imperialist nostalgia” (Hall and Jacques, 1983: 100) is a key strategy for attaining 
consensus (Hall et al, 1978). Britain is at once both powerful and progressive.  
 
BTD’ reference to Labour’s progressive past and its achievements to counter the 
SNP’s challenge contrasted with Labour’s contemporary crisis discourses in the other 
two INMs that focused on ‘fairness’ not equality or social justice, and which advocated 
cuts to welfare and privatisation of the NHS. An inaccurate ‘progressive’ 
representation of a Labour party that had moved decisively to the right over the last 
two decades was constructed to portray remaining as the progressive option.   
 
Moreover, for BTD, the SNP’s concern for social justice was a façade to mask its 
nationalist agenda (see Alexander, 2013a). Lamont, (2013), leader of the Scottish 
Labour party, stated that Labour needed to work to defeat “the politics of nationalism”. 
Alexander (2013b) described an “obsession with separation” as “the lodestar of the 
present Nationalist Government at Holyrood”, contrasting this with his claim that he 
was motivated by challenging welfare reform that punished the poor. The SNP was 
constructed as offering ‘narrow’ nationalism that was a threat to British social justice 
achievements. As Brown (2014a) put it “what we have built together by sacrificing 
and sharing, let no narrow nationalism split asunder ever”. To portray the SNP’s 
economic plan as detrimental to social justice, BTD proclaimed it unviable. They 
reasserted that borrowing and spending could not increase and that in an independent 
Scotland taxes would have to dramatically increase and there would have to be greater 
cuts in an economic downturn (see Scotland Office71, 2014a; Scotland Office and 
Campbell, 2014). BTD argued that SNP ‘falsehoods’ disputing the necessity of 
austerity were constructed to serve their nationalist agenda. They sought to undermine 
the SNP’s claimed agenda and therefore their contestation of the necessity of austerity. 
For their part, the SNP maintained their logic of equivalence between Westminster and 
social injustice with Salmond (in Salmond versus Darling: The Debate, 2014) painting 
Darling as leading austerity and as “in bed with” the ‘Tories’72. 
                                                     
71 The Scotland Office is the UK government department for Scotland.  
72 Bernard Ponsonby (in Salmond versus Darling: The Debate 2014), a presenter of one of the 




Best of Both Worlds?  
To manage a growing desire for change, which polls suggested the SNP were 
successfully exploiting 73 , and to counter the SNP’s argument that Westminster 
undemocratically dominated Scotland, BTD eventually offered Scotland a change 
from the status quo. At first, BTD argued that Scotland already had ‘the best of both 
worlds’ – the advantages of decision-making in the Scottish Parliament with the 
security and strength of Britain therefore, change was not required (see Alexander, 
2014b). However, as support for the SNP alternative grew, BTD pledged change and 
greater power for Scottish Parliament so it could have the ‘best of both worlds’. An 
embattled language developed. To demonstrate the shift, in Cameron’s (2014a) 
February 2014 speech ‘change’ was used only twice, neither time positively, for 
example, “if the UK changed, we would rip the rug from our own reputation”. In 
contrast, in Cameron’s speech in the week preceding the referendum, ‘change’ had its 
own section, the word featured fifteen times and all but one of those uses were to 
advocate change in Britain. “Yes, we need change” he asserted “and we will deliver 
it” (Cameron, 2014b). He elaborated: 
 
“you can get real, concrete change on Thursday: if you vote No. 
‘Business as usual’ is not on the ballot paper. The status quo is gone. 
This campaign has swept it away. There is no going back to the way 
things were. A vote for No means real change. And we have spelled 
that change out in practical terms, with a plan and a process. If we 
get a No vote on Thursday, that will trigger a major, unprecedented 
programme of devolution with additional powers for the Scottish 
Parliament. Major new powers over tax, spending, and welfare 
services”.   
 
BTD then, offered Scottish voters an alternative to the status quo so that a desire for 
change did not require independence and unlike the SNP ‘alternative’ they portrayed 
                                                     
“can you actually look this audience straight in the eye on the issue of 
poorer when you were Chancellor of the Exchequer that resided over a 
banking crisis, which has ushered in austerity and which is currently 
leading to the prospect of parents queuing up at food banks in order to feed 
their children?” 
 
73 The SNP’s yes campaign gained significant momentum and attained 44.65 per cent of the 
vote share (see Electoral Management Board for Scotland, 2014), compared to poll results in 
May 2013 of 26 to 30 per cent (see Economic and Social Research Council, 2015). Moreover, 
84.6 per cent of eligible voters voted (Electoral Management Board for Scotland, 2014), which 
is a high rate of voter turnout and significantly higher than the GE15 turnout.  
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it as economically viable and coupled with security. The SNP’s discourse of 
Westminster domination and a public desire for change had proved powerful 
influences on Westminster’s narrative.  
 
To gain public trust towards its commitment, BTD used language that connoted real 
action and a sense of urgency. Brown (2014b, emphasis added) claimed that “a ‘no’ 
vote on 18 September will not be an end point, but the starting gun for action on 19 
September, when straight away we will kick off a plan to deliver the enhanced 
devolution that we want”. In marked contrast, once the referendum result was 
announced, Hague (in Hansard, 2014a), acting in place of the Prime Minister, used the 
term “renewal” as opposed to change when discussing Scottish powers, and English 
votes for English laws was announced. The Labour party delivered the referendum for 
Westminster; the Conservatives did not fully honour commitments to Scotland. Not 
sharing information about real plans and Labour’s response to this is returned to in the 
final section of this chapter.   
 
Happily Ever After or Damaging Divorce  
Key to BTD’ narrative was a metaphor of a personal relationship. In accordance with 
Lakoff’s (2016) theorisation that conceptual metaphors encourage the public to make 
sense of an issue in accordance with the common sense understanding of another issue, 
the metaphor encouraged decoders to make sense of the referendum choices through 
their understanding of personal relationships to frame rejection of the SNP path as the 
moral act.  
 
BTD constructed Scottish people and others in Britain as “neighbours”, “friends”  
(Alexander, 2013a, b), “a family of nations” (Cameron, 2014b; Hague in Hansard, 
2014), a “marriage of nations” (Cameron, 2014a) and a “community” (Darling, 2012). 
The referendum, Alexander (2013b) stated, was “not just about the politics and power 
tied up in constitutional arrangements”. Rather it was “about 
neighbours…families…friendships…solidarity…what it means to share our lives 
together on these islands”. In sharp contrast to narration of the other intense narration 
moments where Westminster definers emphasised difference and separated groups, 
British people were spoken of as a collective and collectivism was praised and used to 
emote pride. Definers sought to counter the SNP’s construction of difference and 
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distance and cultivate a sense of connection and shared responsibility for one another 
(see Alexander, 2013a).  
 
After constructing a perception of a close relationship, BTD framed the SNP’s claims 
of social justice and also independence as contradictory because they simultaneously 
advocated compassion and solidarity on the one hand, and on the other walking away 
from a neighbour/ friend/ family member during a difficult time. Alexander (2013a) 
asked, “how do we help each other be the neighbours we would want to be rather than 
conclude that we should just walk away and leave our neighbours to struggle on their 
own?”; 
 
 “The surest foundation on which to build that progressive future is 
instead determined by how we uphold an ethic of neighbourliness– 
both within Scottish society and beyond it, towards our neighbours 
across the rest of the UK” (Alexander, 2013b). 
 
BTD constructed the referendum as “a test of” (Alexander, 2013b), and “chance to 
reaffirm” Scotland’s moral values (Darling, 2012) and “ethic of neighbourliness” 
(Alexander, 2013b). Those advocating independence were framed as not truly valuing 
social justice. Alexander (2014a) asserted, “for Scottish nationalists… loyalty and 
solidarity cease to exist” beyond Scotland’s border. Somewhat ironically, Westminster 
framed supporting a more socially just alternative to austerity as an ‘injustice’ to their 
neighbours.  
 
Whilst BTD’ earlier texts positively emphasised togetherness and mentioned 
separation, as support for the SNP’s alternative grew, BTD’ emphasis shifted to the 
potentially imminent divorce. In one speech alone in the week preceding the 
referendum Cameron (2014b) stated: “independence would not be a trial separation it 
would be a painful divorce”; “split”; “the end of a country that all of us call home and 
we built this home together”; “for the people of Scotland to walk away now would be 
like painstakingly building a home–and then walking out the door and throwing away 
the keys”; “I ask you to vote no to walking away”; “split up forever”; “ripping your 
country apart”; “breaking ties”; “going it alone” “put up walls, score new lines on the 
map”; “dividing people, closing doors, making foreigners of our friends and family” 
ask yourself “do I really want to turn my back on the rest of Britain”, “don’t turn your 
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back on what is the best family of nations in the world and the best hope for your 
family in this world”; “Please – do not break this family apart”. Continuing the 
metaphor and choosing an intensely emotional style, Cameron (2014b) made a truth 
claim on behalf of Britain and a personal value commitment as he pleaded with 
Scotland not to ‘walk away’: “we want you to stay. Head and heart and soul, we want 
you to stay”, “so please from all of us: Vote to stick together, vote to stay”. Similarly, 
Gove (cited in Riley-Smith and Furness, 2014) stated "Please Scotland, we want you, 
we need you, we love you, let's stay together". 
 
Furthermore, BTD emphasised the enormity, seriousness and permanency of the 
decision and the consequences for children, and these discourses also intensified, as 
the referendum grew closer. The referendum, Cameron (2014b) stated, “could change 
the United Kingdom forever” and “end the United Kingdom as we know it”; “the 
future of our country is at stake”; “there is no going back from this”; “no re-run”; “a 
once and for all decision”; “the end of the country we love”; “the United Kingdom 
would be no more”; “ending-for good, for ever”; “once-and-for-all decision”; “the 
stakes couldn’t be higher - there is no going back if we decide to go”. Statements 
warning of the consequences for children included: “to warn of the consequences…is 
like warning a friend about a decision they might take that will affect the rest of their 
lives – and the lives of their children”. Brown (2014a) stated, “now tomorrow the vote 
I will cast is not for me. It is for my children. It is for all of Scotland’s children. It is 
for our children’s future”, and the actress in Better Together UK (2014a) stated, “I’m 
voting for my children’s future and all Scottish children’s future and that’s why I’m 
voting no”.  
 
The metaphor of a personal relationship framed voting for independence as a parent 
walking away from their marriage and their family home, leaving their children to an 
uncertain future. Portraying the relationship as personal, as opposed to constitutional, 
and the deeply moralised discourse encouraged emotional sense-making and sense-
making through the neo-conservative moral value of ‘committed families’, ironically 
to generate support for a project that harmed many families.  
 
Staying Together versus Going it Alone  
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A pivotal construction of BTD’ narration was a logic of difference between ‘staying 
together’ and ‘going it alone’. When othering a group, positive ‘information’ is 
expressed about ‘us’ and negative about them – the threat. Applying this theory to 
scenarios, BTD expressed positives about staying together and emphasised ‘negatives’ 
of independence positioning it as a threat to Scotland. They classified positive against 
negative nouns and used antonyms of words in the opposing group (see table two), 
creating logics of equivalence between the words in each column, to explicate 
differences between the two scenarios. Utilising mythopoesis, the logics stipulated to 
the public that if Scotland remained good things would happen but if they chose 
independence bad things would happen in order to generate fear and anxiety about the 
alternative. 
 
Table Two: The Nouns and Antonyms of Better Together Definers’ Logic of 
Difference 
‘Staying Together’ ‘Going It Alone’ 
security, certainty, and shared burden  insecurity, uncertainty, risk, and unaffordability  
power and influence  no power and influence  
the great British brand  new unproven brand or even a negative financial 
record  
ability to support a large financial 
industry  
inability to support a large financial industry  
 
(In)Security, (Un)Certainty and a (Un)shared Burden  
‘Staying together’ was constructed as providing security and certainty because Britain, 
bigger, more powerful, and possessing international credibility, could provide 
protection, both military and economically, from an uncertain world and share the 
burden of challenges. Darling (in Scotland Decides: Salmond versus Darling, 2014) 
stated that “being part of the United Kingdom” meant Scotland had the “strength and 
security” required to fund the NHS alongside growing “pressures of an ageing 
population”.   
 
In contrast, ‘going it alone’ was constructed as taking an insecure and uncertain path, 
which presented risks that Scotland would be vulnerable to without the protection of 
the UK. Darling (2012) stated, “times are really tough at home and really 
uncertain…the last things we need are the new areas of uncertainty, instability, and 
division that separation will involve”. The message was that if people thought times 
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were hard now, the alternative path would be harder. A key technique of constructing 
a perception of insecurity, uncertainty, and vulnerability was to describe 
independence, as a path of known and unknown hazards from which there was no 
return using fear-generating language. For Brown (2014a), it was “an economic 
minefield where problems could implode at any time” and for Osborne (2014b), “a 
high-risk experiment that may not work at all”.   
 
“An economic trapdoor down which we go from which we might 
never escape…a massive financial hole that cannot be made up, even 
a fraction of it, by oil revenues. A massive financial hole that means 
the risk to the National Health Service does not come from us, it 
comes from the policies of the Scottish National Party” (Brown, 
2014c).  
 
Independence was constructed as a threat to existing social justice measures, which 
contrasted with the SNP’s construction of it as a means for greater social justice 
measures. The centrality of risk to BTD’ narration, and their shift in emphasis to 
potential negatives and the risks and uncertainty of independence (see Darling, 2014a), 
were evident in the changing of their campaign slogan in June 2014 from ‘Better 
Together’, reflecting the construction of a personal relationship, to ‘No Thanks’ (see 
Darling in Salmond versus Darling: The Debate’ 2014; Darling in Scotland Decides: 
Salmond versus Darling, 2014).  
  
Reinforcing their logic of equivalence between Britain and social justice, BTD 
constructed Britain as sharing fiscal risks and pooling resources to ensure basic rights, 
wellbeing, and decent standards of living across the nations. They claimed ‘going it 
alone’ was risky as Scotland would endure its own burdens (see Alexander, 2014a; 
Better Together UK, 2014b, c).  
 
“I ask you to look ahead to the longer-term challenges we face as a 
country: competing for jobs and business in the global 
race…providing good careers for our children, supporting an ageing 
population, managing with lower North Sea oil revenues and 
consider: to which of these great challenges is dividing up the United 
Kingdom the right solution?”  (Osborne, 2014b). 
 
BTD argued that the challenges facing Scotland were best shared on the shoulders of 
63 million people rather than 5 million, or 30 million taxpayers instead of 2.7 million 
(see Better Together UK, 2014b; Darling in Scotland Decides: Salmond versus 
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Darling, 2014). No emphasis was given to Scotland having to share the burden of 
England and Wales’ challenges in exchange. Scotland sharing the burden with Britain, 
Osborne (2014b) stated, would mean “the full force of any adjustment to an economic 
shock would have to be borne in full by Scottish taxpayers”. He argued that fiscal risk 
sharing could smooth out a shock or threat in one part of the shared currency area, for 
example a severe drop in the price of oil or a major bank failing, but was only viable 
if Scotland remained part of the UK. If it went alone it could use the currency, but as 
the UK would reject a currency union, there would be no motivation for Britain to aid 
Scotland. Scotland would have to shoulder its own economic problems.   
The SNP’s desire for a currency union was a key focus of BTD’ critique of the 
challenge and a major problem in the case for independence. If an ‘independent’ 
Scotland had a currency union with the UK it would not attain real independence 
because it could not adjust the value of its currency, choose to engage in quantitative 
easing, its borrowing and spending would be limited, it would not have the fiscal 
freedoms the UK has. Drawing upon the relationship metaphor, Osborne (2014c) 
described it as “a couple getting divorced but saying we’re going to keep the current 
account and we’re going to keep the joint mortgage”. Whilst BTD did not want to draw 
attention to the UK’s economic freedom, which would contradict its claims about 
austerity, it argued that Scotland would not be independent if it used sterling because 
power would be held in the UK (see Darling in Scotland Decides: Salmond versus 
Darling, 2014). BTD framed a non-currency union as exposure to risk and a currency 
union as not providing Scotland true independence and control over its economy. The 
story was that independence would definitely lead to a bad ending whether there was 
a currency union or not.  
To generate concern about affordability of social costs in an independent Scotland, 
BTD focused upon Scotland’s reliance on oil tax revenues to fund schools, hospitals, 
but mainly the pensions of an ageing population, which was constructed as risky given 
volatile oil prices and declining oil stocks (see Better Together UK, 2014b; Darling in 
Salmond versus Darling: The Debate, 2014; Scotland Office, 2014). Better Together 
UK (2014b) presented a graph of “north sea oil taxes as a % of UK economy” and the 
“number of pensioners per 1000 working people in Scotland”. Presenting the 
information in a graph constructs the perception of mathematical fact.  
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Image One: Graph from Better Together (2014b)  
 
 
The graph is alarmist: the term “rocket” suggests it will be rapid, sudden and 
uncontrollable and the large gap between the ends of the red and blue lines indicates 
an unaffordable expense. However, it is misleading. It uses the percentage of UK tax 
revenues but if Scotland voted yes to independence, and Scotland successfully won 
the struggle over oil resources and a median line was drawn (see Macalister, 2012) 
Scotland would have 90 percent of North Sea oil therefore North Sea oil taxes as a 
percentage of the Scottish economy would be higher than the graph suggests. Also, 
there are different ‘expert’ views on the durability of Scottish oil. For example, the 
expert that informed the BBC News (2014a) facts and figures estimated there could be 
“thirty-forty years of production remaining”. The graph claims there are only twenty, 
using a low estimation rather than a median estimation. Furthermore, the axis for 
percentage of tax revenue starts at zero but the axis for number of pensioners per 1000 
working people starts at 260, which makes the gap on the right axis much wider to 
support the construction of ‘rocket’.  
 
BTD sought to also cultivate concern about household affordability of independence. 
They suggested average increases in household costs (see Better Together, 2014b) and 
framed independence as taking a “gamble” not only with tax revenues, business 
investment, schools, pensions, hospitals, but also jobs, borrowing rates, savings, and 
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mortgages (see Better Together UK, 2014d; Darling, 2014a; Darling in Salmond 
versus Darling: The Debate, 2014; Scotland Office and Campbell, 2014). BTD 
engaged in intertextuality, incorporating into their texts quotations from members of 
the public to authenticate their claims (see Better Together UK, 2014c). Close to the 
referendum several major corporations and their CEOs reinforced the construction by 
also invoking concern about national and household affordability of independence 
including Sir Michael Cheshire (see Ruddick, 2014) and Sir Charlie Mayfield 
(Johnson, 2014). Royal Bank of Scotland (2014a) threatened re-domiciliation to 
cultivate fear about jobs and tax revenues. Given the alignment of private and public 
interests, again the message was that households would suffer if corporations were not 
gifted the conditions they desired to deliver growth, employment, and tax revenues. 
Founders and CEOs of oil industry corporations and a financial elite made large 
donations to the BT campaign74.  
 
A Mighty and Influential Superpower  
BTD constructed Britain as having international power and influence that allowed it 
to protect its citizens and their interests and to globally struggle for others’ rights. They 
claimed British power would be compromised without Scotland, and an independent 
Scotland would have to start building its own institutions and power for protection and 
influence (see Cameron, 2014a; Darling, 2012). BTD emphasised Britain’s “clout” 
(Cameron, 2014a; Darling, 2012), “military might” (Cameron, 2014a), “economic 
might”, “military prowess” (Cameron, 2014b), and “major military force” (Scotland 
Office, 2014b). In contrast to his calls in the UK referendum on European Union 
membership 2016 for the UK to leave Europe, Gove (cited in Riley-Smith and Furness, 
2014) argued that if Scotland left the UK, both would be more vulnerable to attack 
because they would appear unstable and weak and this would make some other 
countries stronger in comparison.  
 
                                                     
74 Ian Taylor, CEO of Vitriol a oil and gas company and a regular Conservative donor, donated 
£500,000 (Gordon, 2013). Alan Savage, founder of Orion Group a Scottish and “leading 
recruitment provider to the Oil & Gas, Automotive, Power & Utilities, Renewables and 
Mining industries” (Orion, 2015), donated £100,000 (Gordon, 2013). Charles Richie, founder 
of Score group a Scottish repair service for the UK oil and gas industry (Score Group, 2015), 
donated £50,000 (Gordon, 2015). Douglas Flint, Chairman of HSBC holdings Plc. donated 
£25,000 (ibid). 
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Cameron (2014a) described the UK as a “soft power superpower” and the Scotland 
Office (2014b) stated, “the UK is ranked 2nd globally by Monocle as a ‘soft power’ 
(our ability to influence thanks to our culture, education, business environment and 
values)”. The UK was constructed as able to persuade and influence international 
bodies and other nations to operate in ways that served British interests, and the 
interests of vulnerable populations across the globe. For example, “our interests are 
protected through a global network and our longstanding diplomatic relationships give 
us advantages in our dealings with other countries” (Scotland Office, 2014b); “we have 
shown them that democracy and prosperity can go hand in hand; that resolution is 
found not through the bullet but through the ballot box” (Cameron, 2014a);  
“The UK is also a respected champion of human rights, defending 
democracy and rule of law all over the world, as well as playing a 
big part in the fight against sexual violence. Together we can 
continue to act for the common good and stand up for our common 
beliefs and values” (Scotland Office, 2014b). 
This supports Wolin’s (2008: 53) argument that Britain does not overtly “seek the 
traditional form of empire”. Rather, it favourably constructs itself as a liberal 
democracy that democratically exercises its power abroad to secure democracy for 
others and trumpets “the cause of democracy worldwide” (ibid: 47). Soft power 
superpower is also useful for making sense of the state’s power and influence within 
its sovereign border. The state possesses the physical might to protect its interests and 
to enforce its ideas. However, to maintain its legitimacy it constructs itself as liberal 
democratic, as acting in accordance with the public voice and using force as a last 
resort, but uses its discursive power to ‘manage’ public sense-making, reinforced by 
its physical might. The construction of the UK as both democratic and powerful sought 
to invoke a sense of pride and perception of protection, and fear of losing these if 
Scotland voted for the alternative path.  
The Great British Brand  
BTD’ logic of difference stipulated that independence would mean walking away 
from, and harming, the Great British brand. Definers stated that the British brand75 
attracts business, facilitates free trade, including in the EU, and allows borrowing at a 
                                                     
75 Scotland Office (2014b) emphasised the brand’s international standing: “we have the third 
strongest nation brand…according to the 2013 Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index, and the 
fourth most valuable according to the 2013 Brand Finance Nation Brands report”. 
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cheaper rate, which means lower rates for British businesses and mortgages (Scotland 
Office, 2014a, c). Despite Scotland being part of Britain since 1706 they suggested 
that an independent Scotland would possess no share of its reputation and the ‘new’ 
country would have to build a new brand (see Scotland Office and Campbell, 2014), 
and would therefore have higher borrowing rates. Reinforcing the construction of a 
threat to household finances, Osborne (2014b) asserted that an independent Scotland 
“would have to pay an ‘independence premium’ to borrow from the markets that would 
be added onto households’ mortgage repayments.  
 
In response to Salmond’s assertion that an independent Scotland would only take a 
share of UK debt if there was a currency union, Osborne (2014b) argued Scotland 
would have a negative financial record and brand image and consequently the country 
and households would be punished. He warned: 
 
“international lenders would look at Scotland and see a fledgling 
country whose only credit history was one gigantic default. And they 
would demand a punitively high interest rate as a result. That would 
be crippling for every Scottish household with a mortgage or 
personal loan, for every Scottish business with credit, for the public 
finances and therefore for public services and for taxpayers, and for 
the whole economy. If an independent Scotland reneged on its debts 
it would become an outcast among the family of responsible 
economic nations” (ibid, emphasis added).  
 
He threatened Scotland with the prospect of becoming categorised as irresponsible 
alongside Greece in the dichotomy of good and bad countries. Osborne’s claim 
contributed to the generation of concern about national and household affordability of 
independence and the viability of the SNP’s plans. BTD asserted Scotland would not 
be allowed to keep the currency but would have to take a share of the debt to be 
credible, and if they did use the currency they would not have independence, again 
framing all outcomes of independence as bad.  
 
Ability to Support a Large Financial System 
BTD claimed that the size and strength of Britain’s finance infrastructure and economy 
meant it could sustain a very large banking system, much larger than the country’s 
GDP (see Better Together, 2014b; Darling, 2012; Osborne, 2014b). BTD constructed 
Britain as fortunate to be in a position to bail out its banks because it attracted ‘wealth 
 152 
creating’ corporations and suggested an independent Scotland would not be in such a 
‘fortunate’ position. Cameron (2014b) warned Scottish independence  “would mean – 
for any banks that remain in Scotland – if they ever got in trouble it would be Scottish 
taxpayers and Scottish taxpayers alone that would bear the costs”. Westminster 
implicitly committed to another bailout for banks and recognised the continued 
vulnerability of taxpayers to further major financial crisis. BTD did not apply the 
moral hazard argument to banks. Neoliberal dictates, as ever, would be only selectively 
applied.  
 
BTD also suggested an independent Scotland’s size and strength would deter major 
banks, having major consequences for jobs and tax income:  
 
 “it is extremely difficult to see how Scotland could remain a home 
to large financial institutions like RBS. RBS would have undergone 
a disorderly collapse without the support of the whole UK in 2008 – 
and even for a country of our size, it was a huge endeavor. An 
independent Scotland would have been unable to bail it out”  
(Osborne, 2014b).  
The week before the referendum the Royal Bank of Scotland (2014) stated “the vote 
on independence is a matter for the Scottish people” but informed of its contingency 
plan to re-domicile to England in the eventuality of independence. It stated its decision 
was due to “material uncertainties…which could have a bearing on the Bank’s credit 
ratings, and the fiscal, monetary, legal and regulatory landscape to which it is subject” 
but that it would “retain a significant level of its operations and employment in 
Scotland”. Seeking to protect the privileges granted by Westminster, the RBS story of 
Scottish independence also had a bad ending, major business would re-domicile and 
the nation and households would suffer.  
Banks were used as a bi-threat; they were constructed as a threat to an independent 
Scotland if they stayed because they would have to be bailed out by Scottish taxpayers 
and a threat if they left because they would take jobs and taxes. Once again the 
narrative stipulated that if independence was taken bad things would definitely happen, 
which bad things were not yet confirmed, in order to generate fear and anxiety about 
the SNP’s alternative.  
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The debate over political freedom was predominantly conducted on classically 
neoliberal financial/economic territory. A key focus was on the Great British brand, 
the cost of mortgages and debt, currency, and the ‘costs and benefits’ of the financial 
industry. In contrast, proponents of Brexit in the referendum on the UK’s membership 
of the EU British ‘sovereignty’ seemed to be placed above neoliberal economic 
‘common sense’.  
Ignorance: An Accusation, a Threat, and a Strategy  
To counter the SNP’s challenging of their austerity project BTD used ignorance in 
three ways: to undermine the SNP’s credibility, as a threat to create fear and anxiety, 
and, to encourage voters to not genuinely understand the bigger issues, alternatives, 
and consequences but be concerned about risks.  
 
BTD constructed themselves as sharing the truth (see Brown, 2014a; Darling, 2012) 
and providing facts (see Scotland Office and Campbell, 2014). Through 
intertextuality, experts’ views, including Prime Ministers, political theorists, 
philosophers and the Governor of the Bank of England (see Alexander, 2013a), were 
used to provide what Van Leeuwen (2007) calls authoritative legitimisation. They used 
terms such as “commitment”, “promises”, delivered”, “honoured” (Cameron, 2014c) 
and “set in stone” (Cameron, 2014b). Westminster party leaders collectively provided 
a vow and a timetable of dates so that their plans appeared clear, accurate and 
consequently they could, it seemed, be held to account more easily (see Cameron et 
al, 2014). Osborne (2014b) claimed that Better Together facts were informed by 
“rigorous and objective analysis”, which was contrasted with the SNP’s approach that 
Darling (in Salmond versus Darling: The Debate, 2014) captured as “guessing work, 
blind faith and crossed fingers”. For Alexander (2014b), the “SNP…[had] given up 
trying to educe evidence…[they were] simply appealing to emotion”.  
BTD accused the SNP of deliberately failing to provide answers to public questions, 
misleading the public by misquoting and using a range of figures and inaccurate 
stereotypes that misrepresented reality, re-constructing the meaning of key concepts 
for political purposes, engaging in trickery, knowingly making inaccurate claims or 
lying, withholding knowledge, information, and evidence, and keeping secrets, giving 
contradictory messages, and creating a gap between their words and their actions. For 
example: “you said something you knew was not true” (Darling in Salmond versus 
 154 
Darling: The Debate, 2014), “a secret Scottish Government document admitted…” 
(Better Together, 2014c), “a Nationalist strategy of reassurance collapsing under the 
weight of its own falsehood” (Alexander, 2014a). BTD drew direct comparisons 
between yes campaigners’ ‘production of ignorance’ and their dissemination of ‘truth’ 
and ‘facts’. Alexander (2014a) stated that the SNP’s “bluster and bluff” had come face 
to face with the BT campaign’s “brick wall of facts”. He also dedicated a whole speech 
to challenging the SNP’s “myths” (see HM Treasury, Scotland Office and Alexander, 
2014). Negative attributes were projected onto the threat – ‘they manufacture 
ignorance’, and BTD were positioned as eroding ignorance – where possible. BTD 
called for SNP definers to tell the truth and engage in real debate. Alexander (2014a, 
b) publicly asked Salmond,“what’s the truth behind the deception?”, suggested the 
SNP had “hollowed out and constrained” debate and criticised its “vitriol” and 
“shallowness”. BTD claimed that the SNP’s manufacturing of ignorance would result 
in an independent Scotland facing a hidden reality. Cameron (2014b) did not “want 
the people of Scotland to be sold a dream that disappears”. For BTD, the discourses of 
SNP could not be trusted. The SNP made similar accusations about BTD (for an 
example see Salmond, 2014). Competing accusations of ignorance manufacturing can 
cause and deepen dissatisfaction with party politics and encourage perceptions that all 
are untrustworthy leading to withdrawals from party politics.  
 
Secondly, in an attempt to cultivate fear about the alternative, BTD claimed there was 
a high level of genuine unknowingness (the knowledge could not possibly be known) 
about how an independent Scotland would work. Scotland Office and Campbell (2014) 
stated, “no one has all the answers, but [claimed] to help make sure you’re in the know 
about what we do know…” and “the fact is, no one has all the facts”. In relation to 
how much each country paid towards pensions, Darling (in Salmond versus Darling: 
The Debate, 2014) stated “the answer to that, like so much else in this debate is we 
simply do not know”. However, this and other elements of how an independent 
Scotland could and would work were not genuinely unknowable, and certainly there 
was available information that could have been shared but was not. This was not what 
Procter (2008: 3) calls “native state” ignorance, when the pursuit of knowledge has 
just not progressed that for. Rather, Westminster definers restrained the pursuit of this 
information for political reasons. In the case of pensions, Scottish and other British 
elites could have debated before the referendum how pensions would be paid and 
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explored the issue. Whilst, the SNP attempted to project a vision of an independent 
Scotland, BTD sought to blur this vision by presenting it as the great unknown, 
strategically constructing aspects of the knowable as fundamentally unobtainable.  
Thirdly, rather than using television and poster advertisements to focus on key issues, 
details, and complexities informed by evidence, BTD disseminated reductive 
statements devoid of knowledge information, evidence, and substance. Definers, 
drawing upon the social value of children and patriotism, argued independence would 
risk Scotland and children’s future. Better Together produced a television advert about 
‘the woman who made up her mind’ (see Better Together UK, 2014d). It portrayed a 
politically ignorant woman who did not know who Alex Salmond was, was more 
concerned with her family eating cereal on time than debating politics, and who did 
not have time to think about independence. The woman repeated BTD’ discourses 
about the enormity of the decision, the risks to her children’s future, and the wider 
risks of independence. Finally, she reasoned that she would do what was best for her 
family and Scotland – vote no. The message was that there was no need to genuinely 
understand the issues, engage in debate or detail, if you do not want to risk your 
children and Scotland’s future all you need to know is that you need to vote no. 
Similarly on the 1st September 2014 Darling launched a poster campaign with the 
widely repeated statements “I love Scotland, I’m Saying No Thanks’ ‘I Love my 
Family, I’m Saying No Thanks’ and ‘We Love Our Kids, We’re Saying No Thanks’ 
(see Huffington Post UK, 2014).  
BTD also withheld information or quieted discussion of some difficult areas 
preventing genuine understanding. Lamont et al (cited in Eaton, 2014) imprinted on 
their scroll: “we believe that Scotland should have a stronger Scottish Parliament while 
retaining full representation for Scotland in the UK Parliament”. ‘English votes for 
English laws’ was not mentioned during the campaign but it was a key feature of 
Cameron’s statement immediately after the result and became the focus of the House 
of Commons debate on Scottish powers (see Hansard, 2014a). If Cameron had shared 
this outcome before the referendum it would have reinforced the SNP’s argument, and 
public concerns, that Westminster limited Scotland’s power. Following this 
announcement indeed, Westminster definers’ unity fractured. Brown (in Hansard, 
2014b) argued that Scotland should not lose some of its British parliamentary powers 
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and that the Conservatives were recanting on their claim that they did not want “to 
withdraw Scottish Members of Parliament from voting on tax laws or other laws within 
the UK”. Brown (2014b) highlighted that Cameron’s English votes statement 
contrasted with his commitment’s to increase Scotland’s power: 
“in practice, the proposal turns out not to be any new English rights 
of representation, but a reduction in Scottish rights of representation 
in this House of Commons. That issue was clearly material to the 
referendum. It is the failure to tell people of the proposed change in 
Scottish representation before the vote that has fuelled the 
demonstrations, petitions and allegations of bad faith, betrayal and 
breach of promise that have dominated too much of the Scottish 
political debate since the referendum”.  
Darling (2014b) stated greater Scottish powers:  
“was promised, it’s got to be delivered, and anyone who welches on 
that will pay a very heavy price for years to come. It is simply non-
negotiable…Or put it another way: if anyone attempts to get out of 
that, how will anyone be believed on anything they’ve got to say? It 
is simply non-negotiable. I’m very, very clear about that”.  
In an accurate reading of hegemony in this moment, which was given greater impetus 
by the growing support for challenges, Darling (2014b) recognised:  
 “there’s a great deal of disillusionment, frustration, anger amongst 
the population, of which Scotland picked up the first symptom of it. 
It’s alive in the rest of the UK as well. There’s a big lesson for all 
political parties here. We need to start engaging”.  
 
Andrew Marr responded by suggesting “a quiet uprising against politics as usual in 
the Westminster elite?”, to which Darling stated “Yeah people want that power back; 
and if you ignore that, you do so at your peril”. Darling (2014c) pleaded for “every 
political party…[to] listen to” the “cry for change”. As the next chapter and the 
conclusion show Darling’s plea rang hollow with Westminster but was taken up with 
great effect by challengers.  
 
Conclusion  
The Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 INM marked the first moment in the 
crisis period in which a political party challenged Westminster’s narrative and 
‘resolution’. SNP definers sought to counter Westminster’s attempt to create an 
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inaccurate understanding of Britain’s fiscal position and argue that austerity was not 
logical or necessary. They positioned Westminster as choosing a socially unjust 
approach and their own party as committed to a socially just alternative. Consequently, 
Westminster definers, to protect their project and to encourage Scottish voters to reject 
the SNP alternative, discursively countered the challenge.  
 
BTD reasserted the falsehood that the UK could not spend anymore to protect their 
assertion that there was no alternative and to portray the SNP’s alternative as unviable. 
Westminster definers’ narration of the referendum was largely positioned on 
classically neoliberal terrain; the focus was financial costs and risks. Attempting to 
achieve it would be harmful for Scottish national and household finances. Whilst 
progress against austerity was made in this moment BTD ‘won the day’. BTD sought 
to undermine the SNP anti-austerity and pro-social justice claims as a façade to hide a 
‘narrow’ nationalist agenda. Portraying the SNP’s alternative economic approach as 
leading to economic harm reinforced this portrayal of them as ‘narrow’ nationalists.   
 
In order to prevent the SNP’s alternative as being viewed as the path to social justice, 
Labour struggled for the title of the party of social justice itself. Labour BTD presented 
progressive perspectives from within the Labour party notwithstanding that these were 
in fact marginalised within the party and contradicted by its stance in relation to the 
wider crisis. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, even in 2010 Labour focussed 
on fairness instead of equality. The party no longer supported past social achievements 
and it was actually committed to eroding the welfare benefit system and a fully 
nationalised NHS. Labour was inaccurately portrayed to encourage a 
misunderstanding of its planned crisis ‘resolution’ and to counter the SNP’s challenge.  
 
BTD framed remaining as the moral decision and encouraged sense-making through a 
moralistic metaphor of a personal relationship and patriotic stories that portrayed 
independence as immoral. They sought to generate fear and anxiety about voting for 
the alternative by preventing attainable information and not engaging in debate, 
through an alarmist graph, by constructing independence as a path of unknown 
hazards, and by presenting the alternative as always leading to a bad ending.   
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As evidence grew of a strong public desire for change and to prevent the SNP 
benefitting from this, Westminster political leaders disingenuously made 
commitments to granting Scotland greater power whilst remaining in the UK. They 
remained silent as to their true intentions on English votes for English laws until after 
the results were in.  
 
Although BTD successfully attained a no vote, they did not wholly counter the SNP’s 
challenge. Whilst Scotland remained part of the UK, GE15 results suggest that the 
SNP’s construction as the party of social justice was ultimately far more powerful than 
Labour’s attempt to attain the title. A key focus of the following chapter, which turns 
attention to the GE15 INM, is Westminster definers’ countering of the development 











Chapter Seven  
A Critical Analysis of Westminster’s Narration of the General Election 2015 
 
Introduction  
This chapter contributes an analysis of Westminster’s narration of the General Election 
2015, including the campaign, results, and aftermath. Through comparative analysis 
with GE10 it identifies the structuring of the agenda to support a ‘resolution’ that 
continued and intensified neoliberal conditions. It examines the discursive strategies 
deployed in the Westminster collective effort to position the continuation of austerity 
as economically and morally necessary as well as desirable. It considers the differential 
application of ‘meritocracy’ to justify differing responses towards the wealthy, and the 
construction of private capital as the saviour of the NHS, to prepare the public for 
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further privatisation. A key focus is Westminster’s narration of the SNP, Green Party, 
and Plaid Cymru’s challenging of austerity and social injustice, and their narration of 
UKIP’s challenge seeking to restrain the free movement of people through 
independence from the EU. 
 
‘Successful’ Narration? 
GE15 results were of particular significance for four reasons. Firstly, notwithstanding 
the harms and injustice of its tenure, and failure by its own definitions 76 , the 
Conservatives attained an unexpected majority77 . Secondly, growth in support of 
smaller parties grew and the three Westminster parties collectively had a significantly 
lower share of the vote. In GE10 they received 88.1 percent of votes but in GE15 they 
attained only 75.2 percent (see BBC News, 2010b; BBC News, 2015c). “56 percent of 
the electorate” did “not give the two main parties their vote” (Dorling, 2016b). “Only 
24 percent of the electorate voted for the Conservatives, 20 percent for Labour, 22 
percent for other parties and 34 percent didn’t vote” (ibid). Thirdly, voter turnout in 
Scotland was significantly higher than in GE10 (UK Political Info, 2015)78. The SNP 
attained 56 of 59 seats across Scotland, a 50 percent vote share (BBC News 2015c), 
and a swing of an historic magnitude79 (Macwhirter, 2015). Fourthly, UKIP attained 
the third highest vote share at 12.6 percent, a significant increase from 2010 (BBC 
News, 2015c) and its votes came from previous abstainers and defectors from all three 
Westminster parties (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Whilst the Conservatives were 
ultimately successful in attaining the power to continue implementing their ‘neoliberal 
                                                     
76 The party failed to meet their own targets on debt, deficit, and immigration, and broke their 
commitments to not raising VAT or undertaking top down reorganisation of the NHS. 
77  The official explanation provided for the inaccurate polls is that pollsters failed to 
proportionately represent Conservative voters because they did not design the research in a 
way that allowed access to hard to reach groups (Mellon and Prosser, 2017). Conservatives 
gained 331 seats, an additional 24 seats than GE10, but only attained a 0.8 per cent increase 
in vote share, which meant its total vote share was only 36.9 per cent (BBC News, 2015c). 
Consequently, the UK had a majority government that the vast majority of voters did not vote 
for. 
78 The Scottish voter turnout was 63.8 per cent in GE10 and 71.1 per cent in GE15 (UK 
Political Info, 2015). This is significantly higher than the UK average increase from 65.1 per 
cent to 66.1 per cent (ibid). Arguably the increase was due to greater diversity between parties 
(Dorling, 2016b). This argument is supported by the higher voter turnout in the General 
Election 2017 than in GE15 (see BBC News, 2017a)  
79 The SNP attained an increase of 50 seats from GE10 and an increase in vote share of 30 per 
cent from GE10 (BBC News, 2010b; BBC News, 2015c). The swing from Labour was a 30 
per cent average across Scotland and a 39.3 swing in Glasgow North East (Macwhirter, 2015).  
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resolution’, the reduction in the three Westminster parties’ vote share and support for 
challenges suggest there was a significant public desire for change and therefore 
dissatisfaction with the Westminster ‘resolution’.  
 
Façade of Major Difference: Debating Neoliberal Variations  
Westminster definers continued to construct a façade of difference, opposition between 
their parties and represented the choice between them as a major public decision 
despite conflict actually being contained within narrow ideological and discursive 
boundaries. Definers spoke of opposites and clashes (see Cameron, 2015b; Miliband, 
2015a), and described choices as “stark” (Clegg, 2015a) “clear” (Hague, 2015), 
“fundamental” (Clegg in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015), “big” 
(Miliband, in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015) and generation defining 
(see Cameron, 2015c; Miliband, 2015b). Liberal Democrats constructed Labour and 
Conservatives as at opposite ends of the political spectrum and themselves in the centre 
and therefore able to restrain, through a coalition, the other parties from their extreme 
positions and provide balance (see Clegg, 2015b). Clegg frequently used the term 
“lurch” to describe Labour and Conservatives’ political positions if his party were not 




Image Two: Scales from Liberal Democrats (2015) 
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Cameron, Miliband and Clegg all supported the Charter for Budget Responsibility, 
ensuring austerity and restrained capital investment, in the House of Commons (see 
HM Treasury, Alexander and Osborne, 2014; HM Treasury, 2015). The alternative of 
spending to encourage economic growth and reduce debt continued to be excluded. 
Again the pace and depth80 of austerity, and not its necessity or desirability, were 
debated. Danny Alexander (2015a), Chief Secretary to the Treasury, criticised Labour 
for slowly spreading “the pain across the whole Parliament” because they committed 
to eradicating the structural deficit by 2020. He criticised Conservatives for inflicting 
a “rollercoaster” with a “big dip” in the first two years because they wanted to eradicate 
it by 2017-2018. In contrast, he argued, Liberal Democrats offered “a much smoother 
transition from rescue to recovery to renewal”. Labour and Liberal Democrats framed 
Conservatives’ as ideologically going ‘beyond the necessary’. Osborne’s “big 
ideological plan” (Balls, 2015a) was “extreme and fast” (Balls, 2015b). “Cameron 
wanted “to slash and burn” (Miliband in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) with 
“massive and…unnecessary” cuts “reflect[ing] more of an ideological desire to shrink 
the state” (Alexander, 2015c).  
 
Similarly to GE10 constructions of other variations of austerity risking/ forfeiting 
recovery, they constructed a logic of difference between Conservatives and Labour’s 
variation of neoliberal ‘resolution’. 
 
Table Three: General Election 2015 Conservatives’ Logic of Difference  
Conservative led Government Labour led Government 
strong leadership and lower costs weak and unstable leadership leading to 
higher costs 
 
economic competence  economic chaos  
                                                     
80 Cameron (in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015) proposed £13billion savings 
in government departments, “£12billion in welfare and £5billion from cracking down on tax 
evasion and aggressive tax avoidance”. Labour’s plan involved: reinstatement of the 50p tax 
for those earning over £150,000; a reduction of spending outside priority areas including 
health and education; raising wages and living standards to increase tax revenues to aid in 
reducing the deficit; and no borrowing other than for investment (see Labour, 2015t; Miliband 
in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015).  Labour would not commit to reversing 
the Coalition government’s cuts (see Wood in BBC Election Debate, 2015 and Miliband in 
BBC Election Debate, 2015). Liberal Democrats informed they would cut less than 
Conservatives and borrow less than Labour.  
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financially controlled  
lower taxes, paying down debt, no deficit 
and controlled welfare  
economy reviving  
 
financial recklessness 
higher taxes, high debt, continued 
borrowing and over spending and 
uncontrolled welfare 
economy ruining  
 




Conservatives claimed: a Labour-SNP government would be “deeply unstable” 
(Osborne, 2015e) and “weak” because it would operate on a vote by vote, budget by 
budget basis” (Cameron, 2015h) and a party that wanted the UK to break up would be 
governing the UK (Cameron, 2015c). They also argued that a Labour-SNP government 
would risk the recovery, cause higher unemployment and household costs, lower 
wages, and therefore higher poverty and inequality (see Osborne, 2015e). They sought 
to provide authoritative legitimisation of these claims by drawing upon business 
leaders’ (Cameron in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) and “international investors 
and observers’” 81 statements (Osborne, 2015e). Their message was: if international 
banks are concerned then the British public should be, reinforcing the alignment of 
private and public interests. The international banks that had collapsed the global 
economy only seven years before were the ‘expert’ from whom guidance was to be 
sought.  
 
At the core of the logic of difference was the claim that Conservatives offered 
“economic competence, with David Cameron as Prime Minister following through on 
our long-term economic plan” whereas Labour offered “economic chaos…with higher 
taxes, more debt and no plan to fix our public finances, create jobs or build a more 
secure economy” (Conservatives, 2015) causing a “juddering halt” to the plan, the 
economy, and therefore the country (Cameron, 2015c). This narrative contributed to 
framing Labour’s approach as fundamentally different from Conservatives and the 
attempt to obscure what was, in effect, close ideological alignment.  
 
In GE10 the NHS was rarely on the agenda of issues that needed addressing. However, 
by GE15 it was a key issue. Concerns over the NHS’s funding, long-term affordability, 
                                                     
81The investors included CIBC, a Canadian commerce bank, Morgan Stanley, a US investment 
bank, Black Rock, and Deutsche bank, a German investment bank (see Osborne, 2015e).  
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the Health and Social Care Act 2012, waiting times, and Jeremy Hunt’s infamous 
claim of the ‘weekend effect’, which was found to misrepresent evidence and be untrue 
(see Boseley, 2016), constructed the NHS as in need of rescue. Indeed, the NHS was 
actually in crisis because of political decisions to stagnate spending (Cooper, 2014). 
As Streeck (2014) recognises underfunding facilitates corporate plunder of public 
assets and services. For those desiring its privatisation it was expedient for the service 
to be perceived as overwhelmed by a crisis that required private capital as a remedy. 
Westminster definers blamed the false, but ideologically advantageous, ‘cause’ of 
Britain running out of money and therefore not being able to fund the NHS. The 
construction of private capital as the public’s saviour, evident in 2010 and developing 
prominence over the course of crisis was applied to the NHS to justify the next step in 
the gradual opening up of the NHS to private capital82. To obscure elite enthusiasm 
for privatisation, definers portrayed it as unfortunately necessary and each sought to 
portray their respective parties as caring most about the NHS (see Balls, 2015b; 
Cameron, 2015a, b; Cameron, 2015 in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No 10, 
2015; Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015; Cameron in Seven 
Way Leaders Debate, 2015; Hunt, 2015). Despite consensus around NHS 
privatisation, Westminster definers constructed their approaches as different but 
actually only debated its extent. Miliband (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) spoke 
of a “tide of privatisation that is starting under David Cameron and is about to go much 
much further”, but supported “limited privatisation” under Labour.  
 
In sum, Westminster definers sought to limit mental horizons, focussing on the 
necessity of austerity and privatisation of the NHS by presenting debate within these 
limits. Consensus around their necessity was established and the debate was decisively 
positioned on neoliberal terrain.  
 
Debating ‘Causes’ but Maintaining the Austerity Consensus  
Conservatives’, supported by Liberal Democrats, continued to blame the ideologically 
advantageous ‘cause’ of Labour’s ‘irresponsible’ spending for the crisis (see Cameron 
in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015; Clegg in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015; 
                                                     
82 Firstly there was outsourcing of cleaning and other roles, then public-private partnerships, 
then private companies running GP surgeries and care being commissioned from private 
corporations (see El-Gingihy, 2015). 
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Conservatives, 2015). In continuation of their explicit attachment of Labour to 
economic problems Conservatives (2015) re-named the economic crisis “Labour’s 
Great Recession”. Cameron repeatedly read Byrne’s note, which became a powerful 
symbol of Labour’s financial irresponsibility and reinforced the exclusion of 
increasing public spending. Conservatives rehearsed the familiar logic of equivalence 
between Labour and financial irresponsibility, continued to subvert the reality that 
prior to the crisis Conservatives committed to Labour’s level of public spending83, and 
continued to connect ‘responsible financial behaviour’ to austerity (see Osborne, 
2015b). Conservatives operated to ensure the negative reputation of Labour continued 
to be applied under Miliband’s leadership84. Clegg (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 
2015) called on Miliband to say, “in front of the British people…I am sorry for 
crashing the British economy”.  
 
Miliband (2015b) voiced pride in Labour’s public spending on education and 
healthcare disputing claims that overspending had caused the crisis. However, in direct 
response an interviewer stated, “you seem to be about the only person standing in this 
country which believes that to be the case”, and in Question Time: Election Leaders 
Special (2015), where Miliband also voiced pride, an audience member stated:  
 
“how can you stand there and say that you didn’t overspend and end 
up bankrupting this country? That is absolutely ludicrous. You are 
frankly just lying…the fact speak for themselves. If I get to the end 
of the week and I can’t afford to buy a pint I have overspent”85.  
 
These quotes reflect the common sense status that the Conservatives’ blaming of 
Labour spending and consequently the response of austerity attained certainly for 
many in this period, or in Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1992: 241) terminology, they 
became powerful “naturalised preconstructions”. It exposed Labour’s failure to 
counter this in the years up to 2015.  
 
                                                     
83 However, Miliband (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) highlighted it, for example: 
Cameron “you backed our spending plans until 2008”. 
84 This was particularly effective because Miliband had held a Cabinet position in Brown’s 
government.  
85 This comment indicates that the construction of national budgets as operating like household 
budgets had at least some success.  
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Labour explained that higher public spending was a consequence of the “global 
finance crisis” not the cause (see Miliband in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No 
10, 2015). For Alexander (2015b), “the clue…[was] in the title, it was a global 
financial crisis”. Naming a crisis is a key political act because the name contains the 
crisis (Clarke and Newman, 2010; Gamble, 2009). Foucault’s theorisation of 
‘problematisation’ suggests that through a name the subject of concern is constructed 
in a way that limits the options for response (ibid). Labour portrayed the crisis as a 
global force that spread to Britain, which operated to obscure that the roots of the crisis 
were in a political economic order dominant in Britain, the US, and in other countries 
across the globe. Britain was not a victim only of external conditions.  
 
Labour did give some recognition to the role deregulation of the banking industry had 
played86. However, they positioned it as an innocent act, a mistake, and a result of a 
genuine belief that it was the right thing to do for the economy (see Miliband, in 
Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015). They blamed their own ignorance 
and the ignorance of other ‘experts’ around the world in an attempt to exonerate 
themselves. They effectively claimed that those whose (extraordinarily well 
remunerated) jobs it was to hold knowledge of the financial system did not adequately 
understand it.  
 
“What actually happened was, it wasn’t simply the Ministers, the 
politicians. The central bank governors, and the bank chief 
executives themselves didn’t know what was going on within their 
organisations and that caused huge problems around the world” 
(Balls in Ask the Chancellors, 2015).  
 
In accordance with von Scheve et al’s (2016) categorisation, collective actors were 
constructed as acting in accordance with the best of their knowledge, therefore not 
acting immorally but simply making mistakes. Labour asserted that their actions were 
in accordance with global standard practice; they were not deviant but normal. Their 
excuse was ‘everybody else was doing it too’. Labour also highlighted that 
Conservatives had supported the deregulation of business, including of finance87 (see 
                                                     
86 For example see Miliband (2015b), which included intertextuality of the Conservative’s 
Permanent Secretary text for authoritarian legitimisation. 
87 Following the US Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 Osborne (2006) warned that “London has 
benefited enormously from America's short-sightedness and it would be foolish of us to make 
the same mistake”; Cameron (2008) stated: 
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Balls in Ask The Chancellors, 2015; Miliband, 2015 in Question Time: Election 
Leaders Special, 2015) to counter Conservatives’ construction of Labour as 
irresponsible and Conservatives as responsible. Labour asserted that it had learnt its 
lesson and had already apologised. However, Labour were hampered by the timidity 
in their response to Conservatives’ blame attribution and the truth about the causes of 
crisis could and should have been much more powerful. That is was not, was a very 
clear indicator of the limits of Labour’s ‘progressive’ credentials.  
 
Labour’s advocated response suggests that it had not actually learnt from its 
‘mistakes’. ‘Mistakes’ continued to inform the crisis ‘resolution’ and new normality. 
As Streeck (2017a: 8) suggests, before the financial crisis ‘experts’ stated that 
regulation was not necessary to prevent bubbles and then after the crisis caused by 
deregulation the same ‘expert’ knowledge continued to inform the ‘resolution’  “as if 
nothing had” happened. The most direct concomitant response of Labour’s blame 
discourse was an intensification of regulation. However, the party failed to provide a 
detailed explanation of how ‘learning its lesson’ would translate into effective 
regulation. Instead, like the Conservatives, Labour committed to cutting debt and 
deficit through austerity. For example: “what happened in our country was that we had 
a dramatic crisis in the banks, which led to a high deficit. And the question for the 
2015 election…is how do we get that deficit down in a fair way” (Miliband, 2015b); 
“the deficit didn’t cause the financial crisis, the financial crisis 
caused the deficit, that’s why President Obama is dealing with the 
deficit too. It wasn’t because Labour invested in schools and 
hospitals in the UK, and look the question for now is getting that 
deficit down and balancing the books and that’s what we’re going to 
do” (Miliband, 2015c).  
On the first page of its manifesto, even before the contents, was a “budget 
responsibility lock”, which guaranteed:  
                                                     
 “Labour’s economic failure has been the excessive bureaucratic 
interventionism of the past decade too much tax, too much regulation, too 
little understanding of what our businesses need to compete in the modern 
world…government needs to do less taxing and regulating-we learnt that 
from the success of the 1980s...government can kill economic dynamism 
with excessive regulation and taxation”. 
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“every policy in this manifesto is paid for. Not one commitment 
requires additional borrowing…A Labour government will cut the 
deficit every year…We will get national debt falling and a surplus 
on the current budget as soon as possible in the next parliament” 
(Labour, 2015).  
In contrast to BTD’ portrayal in SIR14 of Labour as deeply protective of systems for 
social justice, and his personal expression of pride in Labour’s public spending, 
Miliband (in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015) proudly declared  “I am 
the first Labour leader…going into an election saying spending in key areas is going 
to fall that is because I am so determined…that we live within our means”. Balls 
(2015b) refused to commit to an additional £8billion investment in the NHS88, which 
Osborne had committed to (see Osborne, 2015c), because Labour did not want to make 
“unfunded commitments”.  
Yet again, Labour again failed to establish a significant difference between the 
Conservatives, and therefore was not fundamentally an opposition. Conservatives’ 
alignment of fiscal responsibility with austerity and discrediting of Labour meant that 
to appear credible Labour was again faced with the choice of countering the 
Conservatives’ narrative and committing to an anti-austerity resolution or presenting 
their party as most capable of delivering effective cuts. It again chose the latter, as 
evidenced in Ball’s (2015a) assertion that any party who was not committing to 
‘balancing the books’ through austerity was “irresponsible”.  
 
Despite conflicting over causes both parties advocated further austerity. Conservatives 
identified high public spending as a ‘cause’ to position a neoliberal response as the 
‘resolution’, and diverted attention from real causes that had concomitant anti-
neoliberal responses. Labour gave some attention to a neoliberal cause but their 
framing directed attention to a neoliberal response. Signifying the power of 
Conservatives blame attribution discourse, the parties competed to appear the most 
capable of cutting spending. In Giger and Nelson’s (2010: 1) terminology parties 
engaged in “credit claiming” for austerity to gain electoral support. Also reflecting the 
power of Conservative discourse, GE15 texts gave focus to public debt, deficit, and 
                                                     
88  This was the amount Simon Stevens, Chief Executive Officer of the NHS stated was 
required in the following Parliamentary term (see Baker et al, 2015). 
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austerity and compared to GE10 significantly even less focus was given to the 
deregulation of the private sector.  
 
Continuing Austerity as Economically Necessary  
Notwithstanding the failings of austerity and evidence that economic conditions were 
unfavourable (see Wren-Lewis, 2015), in GE15 Westminster definers, most notably 
Conservatives continued to argue that austerity was economically necessary. They 
claimed cuts were needed and had to be made (see Cameron in Cameron v Miliband: 
The Battle for No.10, 2015). Johnson (in BBC Election 2015, 2015) referred to 
austerity as a “programme of economic common sense”, and for Miliband (2015d) 
they were “common sense spending reductions”. Cameron (2015d) highlighted that 
Labour, the official ‘oppositional’ party, also voted for a further “£30billion 
adjustment”. His message was, if our ‘opposition’ agrees it is necessary then it must 
not be a political choice. Obscuring ideological alignment was used to deny that 
austerity was still, a choice.    
 
Westminster definers continued to emphasise the severity of the crisis. They used 
superlatives and metaphors of dangerous situations (see Cameron in Cameron v 
Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015; Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 2015). The 
deficit was still “one of the higher budget deficits in the world” (Osborne, 2015b), 
which was framed as an argument for continued austerity, as opposed to the more 
logical ending of austerity. The crisis had been “an economic firestorm which could 
have engulfed this country” (Clegg in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015). 
Metaphors sought to construct the crisis as a natural phenomenon and obscure elite 
agency and responsibility. Clegg (in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015) 
continued to compare Britain to Greece to cultivate concern about Britain’s fiscal 
position. Major differences between the UK and Greek case continued to be excluded.  
The comparison to a country in bad economic conditions that had been subjected to 
austerity by those advocating austerity was actually fundamentally illogical.  
 
Conservative construction of national finances as working like household finances was 
key to justifying austerity. As Konzelmann (2014: 701) suggests, over its history 
“misleading analogies drawn between government budgets and the accounts of firms 
and households” have been key to narratives justifying austerity. Westminster definers 
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engaged in interdiscursivity drawing principles used when discussing household 
finances into discourses about national finances. The Labour government had 
‘overspent’, there was no money left, so the only option was to cut back on reckless 
spending on unaffordable desirables and responsibly save. The rainy day metaphor, 
used to explain individuals and families putting aside money for an unexpected event 
or emergency, was applied to Britain’s finances. The moral of the metaphor (see 
Lakoff, 2016) is that responsible individuals save for crisis. For Conservatives, so too 
should the government (see Cameron, 2015a, e). To justify the continuation of 
austerity beyond crisis and to perhaps lay the discursive foundations for permanent 
austerity, Osborne (2014a) argued that cuts were needed in the long term to “fix the 
roof”, and produce a surplus or a rainy day pot to “protect Britain from future storm”. 
The public were told that they not only had to make sacrifices to recover Britain from 
this crisis but change had to be long term to build Britain’s “resilience” to future crisis 
(see Liberal Democrats, 2015). The origins of the crisis were inaccurately identified, 
and ‘our’ preparation for unforeseeable shocks through savings became the moralising 
focus, as opposed to the recklessness of high finance and its structural (and continuing) 
flaws. Consequently, austerity, not the transformation of financial regulation, 
corporate structure, or neoliberalism more widely, became the logical and responsible 
response. Reinforcing the irrationality of austerity as a crisis ‘resolution’, Konzelmann 
(2014: 728) argues comparing between government finances and household finances: 
“is fundamentally flawed; and it is clearly misleading to promote the 
idea that when public deficits and debts are high – analogous to when 
households and firms have accumulated too much debt – it is 
necessary to suffer the ‘pain’ of austerity to eliminate them, with 
anything less being portrayed as fiscally irresponsible.
 
This is 
because, first, unlike a private household or firm, a sovereign 
government that issues its own currency and has a floating exchange 
rate is not operationally constrained by its budget because it can both 
issue and adjust the value of its currency to manage a deficit. Second, 
whilst a household or firm can balance its budget by reducing 
spending and repaying its debts, a government cannot. During a 
slump, government deficits rise as a consequence of falling tax 
revenues and rising unemployment-related social costs, putting 
upward pressure on public debt levels at the same time as GDP 
growth is slowing. In this context, cutting public spending will not 
only deepen the slump it will also add to public debt”.  
Misleadingly, Conservatives claimed austerity was successfully delivering recovery 
and therefore needed to be continued (see Cameron, 2015f; Cameron in Question 
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Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015). They sought to manufacture ignorance, or at 
best ambiguity, to its failings, as demonstrated in Cameron’s (in Cameron v Miliband: 
The Battle for No.10, 2015) response to Paxman’s questions: 
 
Paxman: “How much money have you borrowed?” 
Cameron: “Well, we have cut the deficit in half as a share of GDP”  
Paxman: “But how much did you borrow?” 
Cameron: “The key thing is the amount of money you borrow every year. That's the 
deficit” 
Paxman: “Do you know what it is?”  
Cameron: “The deficit is down by half. We have borrowed a lot of money because the 
deficit adds to your debt every year”  
Paxman: “Do you know what the actual figure is?” 
Cameron: “You're going to tell me, Jeremy, presumably” 
Paxman: “I am. A mere £500billion” 
Cameron: “that is a lot less than previous government was borrowing”  
Paxman: “no it is more” 
Cameron: “the annual overdraft, the deficit, has come down by one half as a share of 
GDP and the debt as a share of our national income is now falling”.  
 
The latter comment was misleaidng 89 . The discussion with Paxman implicitly 
confirmed the anti-austerity case. Reducing the deficit had come at the cost of 
shrinking economic activity and consequently increasing debt as a proportion of 
national product. Despite their five-year programme resulting in a halved, not 
eradicated, deficit, and the debt to GDP ratio increasing every year from 2010-2015, 
Conservatives celebrated their success (see Conservatives, 2015). They operated to 
protect the logic of equivalence they had created between Conservatism, fiscal 
responsibility, low borrowing90, low spending, debt reduction, as well as the credibility 
of their plan for crisis ‘resolution’. Conservatives claimed they had brought ‘strength’ 
to Britain (see Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 2015) emphasising the ‘success’ of 
low unemployment (see Cameron, 2015a, g; Johnson, 2015). This sidestepped falling 
real wages and worsening employment conditions that in turn, contributed to low tax 
revenues (see Osborne, 2015d).  
 
                                                     
89 Full Fact (2015) informed that debt rose under the Coalition “from £960billion in April 
2010…to £1.5 trillion”, just over a 50 per cent increase, and as a proportion of GDP the value 
changed “from 62 per cent in April 2010 to 81 per cent in April 2015”.   
90 The framing of Labour governments as borrowing too much and not ‘fixing the roof’ 
obscures the fact that Conservative governments on average borrow more and repay back less 
(see Murphy, 2016).  
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Conservatives argued that the recovery job had been started but was incomplete and 
sought to cultivate concern about wasting sacrifices already made and forfeiting 
economic stability if austerity was not continued (see Cameron, 2015c, f; Cameron in 
Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015; Osborne, 2015b, d).   
 
“We have not finished the work. That is why I am so keen to do 
another five years…I am not saying we fixed it, it takes a long time 
to fix the mess that I was left to clear up…we are half way through 
a building job” (Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders 
Special, 2015).  
 
Conservatives used the metaphors of a building construction and a road journey91 to 
encourage the public make sense of austerity with the questions why turn back when 
you have come so far? Why not complete a building project? Why sacrifice and work 
hard and not collect the reward? They argued that if their job were not finished, and 
even if Labour’s austerity plan was implemented, Britain would be exposed to threats 
(see Conservatives, 2015; Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 2015).  
 
In January 2015 Greece elected Syriza92 a party committing to ending austerity and 
responding to its humanitarian crisis (see Henley, 2015). British media reporting of 
the election contributed to public awareness of a country suffering austerity being 
offered an alternative. A fortnight later, Sturgeon launched the SNP’s GE15 anti-
austerity campaign. Westminster definers sought to discredit the idea of alternatives 
to austerity. In contrast to previous claims of similarity, Osborne (2015f) claimed there 
was a “striking contrast” between Greece and Britain, although he continued not to 
recognise the economic power and freedom that Britain had that Greece did not. He 
drew attention to Greece’s high unemployment rate and shrinking economy to argue 
that Greece was in a different economic position from the UK and that was why it was 
seeking an alternative (ibid). Second, he stated that an alternative was only required 
when economic plans were failing and asserted Britain’s plan was not (see Osborne, 
2015f). Despite the slowest recovery from recession for over a century, throughout his 
budgets Osborne also insisted that his austerity plan was successful and needed to be 
continued. He defined austerity as working because at long last, there was some growth 
                                                     
91 A key Conservative poster of the GE15 campaign pictured a road to a stronger economy 
that Britain had already begun to travel down.  
92 Syriza formed a Coalition government with a populist right wing party called Independent 
Greeks. 
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and high employment. He excluded other measures to the contrary, such as debt and 
deficit levels, falling real wages and living standards and the harms of hunger, 
homelessness, and child poverty. He also excluded that growth was in spite of austerity 
and failed to recognise the roles other strategies, such as the sale of national assets and 
quantitative easing had played.  
 
Osborne (2011) asserted austerity was protecting UK credibility. However, Wren-
Lewis (2015) argues that the Bank of England’s buying of large amounts of UK debt 
protected credibility. Between 2010 and 2012 Osborne imposed severe austerity as his 
emergency budget set out. However, after two years, growth and tax revenues were 
dramatically lower than Osborne expected and evidence mounted that, in line with 
many predictions, austerity had severely hampered recovery (ibid). In 2012 Osborne 
deviated from his plan. “The coalition essentially stopped imposing new austerity 
measures” (Krugman, 2015). As a result the recovery began in 2013 (Krugman, 2015; 
Wren-Lewis, 2015). However, Osborne discursively supported the continuation of his 
plan obscuring what was, in effect, a dramatic U-turn. In 2013, in contrast to 
Westminster’s claims that austerity would protect Britain’s credibility, and 
notwithstanding the emphasis placed on protecting Britain’s brand through austerity, 
Moody reduced the UK’s rating because of poor growth expectations. Responding to 
this news, Osborne (BBC News, 2013a) maintained, "far from weakening our resolve 
to deliver our economic recovery plan, this decision redoubles it".  
Given the record of the Coalition’s austerity approach, it would have been rational for 
Osborne to advocate a different approach for the next parliament (Wren-Lewis, 2015). 
However, it would have been an admission of a calamitous ‘error’ and perhaps 
highlighted austerity’s ideological character. This would have undermined the pursuit 
of consent for future austerity. Unsurprisingly, therefore, in the 2015 budget Osborne 
(2015a) heavily emphasised the success of his plan providing several darkness to light 
comparisons contrasting 2010 to 2015: 
 
“five years ago, the deficit was out of control. Today, as a share of 
national income, it is down by more than a half. Five years ago, they 
were bailing out the banks. Today I can tell the House that we are 
selling more bank shares and getting taxpayers’ money back. We set 
out a plan, that plan is working, and Britain is walking tall again”.   
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In line with Proctor’s (2008) argument, definers simply reasserted false assurances and 
sought to cast doubt on emerging evidence.  
 
Austerity as Morally Imperative 
Claims of intergenerational fairness to justify austerity, which were identified by 
Burchardt (2011) in texts disseminated in 2010, were also evident in GE15. “Failing 
to control our debt”, Conservatives (2015) argued, “would be a moral 
failing…[towards] our children and grandchildren”. Cameron (2015c) stated: 
 
 “we are not trying to cut the deficit because we are demented 
accountants obsessed by numbers, we’re doing it because we want 
to come home at night, look at our children in the eye and say this 
generation did the right thing”.  
 
As in SIR14 INM, this justification powerfully harnessed the social value of children 
to a neoliberal response. Ironically, references to the next generation’s interests were 
used to gain acceptance of responses that evidence shows directly harmed the next 
generation. No deficit and low debt are not necessarily in the next generations’ 
interests because borrowing to invest is necessary for a prosperous future that provides 
for, and protects, the next generation (Burchardt, 2011). Modest inflation diminishes 
the value of debt over time.  
 
“There is little advantage to having low public debt if you will not 
be able to be treated when you are sick, housed when you are 
homeless, or, less dramatically but no less importantly, unable to 
make a living because the basic services on which the economy 
depends are dilapidated, understaffed and under-skilled” (ibid: 8). 
 
Continuing with austerity was framed as a means of rewarding ‘the moral’ and 
‘deserving’ and therefore morally imperative. Conservatives claimed that following 
sacrifice British ‘hard workers ‘would be able to bask in the ‘good life’, a construction 
underpinned by a neo-conservative moral evaluation. Those who ‘worked hard’ would 
be able to own a home of their own, have a “proper” job, good education for their 
children, and “a good and secure retirement” (Cameron, 2015f). However, if other 
variations of austerity were taken (never mind an anti-austerity alternative), the reward 
would not be forthcoming.     
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Patriotism was also invoked to legitimise continued ‘austerity’. It was argued that 
British people would fulfil their moral duty to sacrifice for their country, through hard 
work for low pay and enduring austerity, and as a result Britain would be able to stand 
tall and enjoy international glory again (see Cameron, 2015f; Cameron in Seven Way 
Leaders Debate, 2015). Clegg’s comparison of the UK to Greece portrayed British 
people as, unlike Greeks, capable of undertaking necessary austerity in the interests of 
their country. In his 2012 budget Osborne (2012) stated: 
 
“no people will strive as the British will strive. No country will adapt 
as the British will adapt. No country will value those who work, as 
we will value those who work. Together, the British people will 
share in the effort and share the rewards. This country borrowed its 
way into trouble; now we are going to earn our way out”.   
 
Reinforcing the ‘success’ of his plan, Osborne (2015a) announced “from the depths 
Britain is returning…Britain: on the rise. This is the Budget for Britain, the come-back 
country” and argued it would be a full “national recovery”.  
 “Britain has lived its long life as an exemplary country…and we are 
on the brink of being that country once again. We can be the country 
that not only lives within its means and pays its way, but that offers 
a good life to those who work hard and do the right thing…with a 
strengthening economy behind us–this buccaneering, world-
beating, can-do country–we can do it all over again...this is a great 
country and we can be greater still” (Cameron, 2015f, emphasis 
added).  
 
Buccaneering is used here to suggest boldness and enterprise, but it has another, more 
literal meaning that is perhaps more accurate - ruthless plundering! Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats drew upon the social image of Britain as a country that works hard, 
sacrifices, and is self-disciplined for national and personal goals (see Hall et al, 1978). 
This was a clear example of Mathiesen’s (2004: vi) argument that “appeals to 
patriotism and duty to the nation” are used to quell criticism and resistance to harmful 
practices.  
 
Cameron‘s pro-austerity message was: sacrifice for your country; get up, go to work, 
accept less pay; get your head down and get on with the job; workers pull together to 
get Britain through; there is not long to go now; you have done well so far but keep 
going. He promised: your struggle will be rewarded by the resurrection of Great 
Britain, being Great British – at a time when Britain will symbolise to the world 
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discipline, respect, pride, and success, and by the luxuries of the good life - your 
children’s education, your own house, and a good job. These rewards will symbolise 
the battle you have fought and when you get old you can sit back comfortable in your 
armchair, with pride and dignity, and say this is the Britain I worked hard and 
sacrificed for.  
 
Sacrifice as (Un)Fairly Shared 
Conservatives’ construction of the crisis as the result of the irresponsibility of a 
generation sought to legitimise the spreading of sacrifice beyond a few into a 
supposedly ‘universal’ punishment and shared burden. In Nils Christie’s (1981) words, 
the public were ‘non-ideal victims’. They were not wholly innocent rather their 
behaviour had played a key role in their victimisation. As Tombs (2016a: 58) suggests 
“we were all somehow personally responsible for borrowing too much”. The message 
was that if someone bought what was mis-sold to them, they played their part in the 
deviancy and would have to share the punishment with the fraudster. “The ubiquity of 
blame” was key to legitimising austerity (ibid: 59). Sharing austerity amongst the 
generation then, became the fair response to crisis, as opposed to an injustice.  
 
Whilst shared sacrifice may be claimed to prevent a perception of injustice, history 
shows the “politically and economically weak” are almost always burdened with the 
sacrifices (Edelman, 1977: 44). Westminster definers claimed that those with the 
broadest shoulders would make the biggest contribution and the most vulnerable 
would be protected; sacrifice would be distributed proportionate to wealth (see Balls, 
2015b; Cameron, 2015c; Clegg, 2015b; Clegg in Question Time: Election Leaders 
Special, 2015; Clegg in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015). Whilst the wealthiest may 
have made the greatest contribution in monetary terms (although the wealth of the very 
richest has also increased dramatically) evidence suggests they did not shoulder the 
biggest burden because sacrifices were not proportionate to wealth. Empirical 
evidence on the distribution of austerity over the 2010-2015 parliamentary term shows 
those with the narrowest shoulders carried the heaviest burden (see Lupton et al, 2015). 
So whilst statements such as “the top 20% have paid more than the remaining 80 
percent put together” (Cameron in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) may have 
elements of truth it is also misleading. First the tax take from the wealthy is high 
because of inequality (because they are so wealthy). Second, the bottom fifth has paid 
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more in tax as a proportion of their income than those at the top. This has increased 
because of regressive taxation.  
 
The broadest shoulders claim is “closely associated with Rawls…maxim principle” 
which requires that “priority be given to the worst off” (Burchardt, 2011: 9). Rawls’ 
(2001: 97) dictates: “identify the worst outcome of each available alternative and then 
adopt the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst outcomes of all the 
other alternatives”. The burden placed on the vulnerable led to a range of harms, 
including death, whereas the worst outcome of taxing rich individuals or corporations 
more would have been luxuries curtailed or corporations re-domiciling. However, 
welfare benefit reductions, intensified conditionality, and low pay demonstrate that 
elites prioritise the interests of private capital. Discourses aligning private and public 
interests however, argue that burdens on corporations also harm workers seeking to 
obscure that it serves private and not public interests.  
 
To the extent that Osborne (2015d) also recognised the unfair distribution of harm, he 
attempted to excuse it by naturalising harm infliction on the vulnerable in a crisis: 
 
“the poorest in society and the young in society suffer most when 
the economy fails. They are the first victims of failure of economic 
policy and they paid a very heavy price for the mistakes that led to 
the great recession”.   
Naturalisation of sacrifice may be useful for seeking to maintain hegemony despite 
disastrous harm. More honestly, Miliband (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) 
recognised that some vulnerable people suffer more than others because of “unfair 
choices” by a “Conservative Prime Minister”.  
 
Legitimising Inequality: The Importance of Competition, Individual 
Responsibility, and Meritocracy  
Neoliberals construct competition, and its connected moral principles of individual 
responsibility and meritocracy, as morally right (Amable, 2011). Individuals must 
compete to attain work and wealth in a free and fair competition and must bear the 
consequences of their actions (ibid). Poverty and inequality are understood as the 
consequences of individuals’ moral failings, incapability, and absence of self-
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discipline and therefore as natural and fair outcomes of the meritocratic market. The 
state then, should not interfere in the system, as it would hinder ‘fairness’.  
 
Whilst rules of the competition supposedly apply to all, they are applied differentially. 
The rich overwhelmingly ‘earn’ their money through speculation, appreciation or 
inflation of assets, ownership and rent, profit dividends, and through inheritances. 
Those lower down the class hierarchy are told that they must work hard to earn their 
reward, which is significantly lower than that gifted to the rich. As discussed in chapter 
five, whereas the banker is a rational actor who will only work for incentives, deeply 
moralised discourses claim those lower down the hierarchy must work for the good of 
their country and out of moral duty to their fellow citizens.  
 
Upholding this skewed meritocracy, the public were told that bankers must be 
rewarded for their skills. Aligning with Hester, former CEO of RBS (see Shorthose, 
2011), McEwan (2015) argued that bonuses were necessary to attract and reward 
highly skilled people who are able to reform the bank for the public. Rewarding 
bankers because they are able to resolve the crisis for the public contradicts discourses 
claiming that financial elites did not have the expertise to prevent or predict a crisis 
(Sandel, 2009). If a bank’s condition is the result of bankers’ actions, therefore they 
deserve bonuses, then it would follow that they must endure sacrifices for failings 
(ibid).  However, it appears that bankers’ agency changes depending on whether 
discourses are determining causes of the crisis or legitimising continued remuneration. 
Notwithstanding their “self-professed ignorance” (Barton et al, forthcoming) and 
inability to prevent crisis, extravagant remuneration for financiers was maintained: 
“pay was high when performance was good, and pay was high when performance was 
bad” (Stiglitz, 2012: 99). The principle of meritocracy was partially applied to protect 
bankers’ remuneration whatever their performance in the competition. Whilst those 
lower down the hierarchy must endure the negative consequences of their immoral 
actions, to the extent of sanctions taking away the basics necessary for living, the 
negative consequences of bankers’ ‘immoral’ actions were socialised.  
  
To maintain public satisfaction however, workers must not perceive the “chaos of 
reward” (Young, 1999: 9). Dissatisfaction and resentment may be generated “if the 
spectators are seen to consume free hand-outs without competing” and “the privileged 
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are seen as part of a ‘winner takes all’ culture, where prizes are doled out without 
thought of justification or merit” (ibid: 9). As both material expectations and “material 
uncertainty” have increased under neoliberalism there has developed “a widespread 
sense of demands frustrated and desires unmet” (ibid: 1). Those experiencing relative 
deprivation “gaze upwards” to those privileged with undeserved rewards but they also 
“gaze downwards” towards the ‘idle’ unemployed in “dismay at the relative wellbeing 
of those who although below are on the social hierarchy are perceived as unfairly 
advantaged; they make too easy a living even if it’s not as good as one’s own” (ibid: 
9). To protect hegemony and legitimise neoliberal changes to welfare, Westminster 
definers directed frustration downwards; undeserved rewards of the idle would be 
removed and they would be re-moralised in the interests of the country and the ‘hard-
working taxpayer’.   
 
Notwithstanding increasing numbers of working people requiring food banks due to 
low and stagnant wages, Conservatives framed work as the way out of poverty (see 
Cameron, 2015e, f; Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015). In 
response to an interviewer highlighting that food banks increased from 66 in May 2010 
to 421 in March 2015, Cameron (in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015) 
stated “usage increased”, which implicitly denied that need had increased, and he 
elaborated by suggesting this was: 
 
“partly because the difficulties we face as a country. It is also 
because we changed the rules. The previous government didn’t 
allow job centres to advertise the existence of food banks. They 
thought it would be bad PR”.  
 
The harms of coalition policies were denied. Cameron (in Question Time: Election 
Leaders Special, 2015) insisted, “I don’t want anyone to have to rely on a food bank 
in our country…the most important thing we can do is get more people into work, that 
is the best route out of poverty”. Individuals, Liberal Democrats (2015) stated, should 
ensure their own resilience to their financial crisis and poverty by saving for a rainy 
day. Attention was directed away from state and corporate responsibility for poverty 
and, rather than a reflection of state failure their existence was framed as a result of 
individual failure. Conservatives sought to obscure the widespread reality that for 
millions, working was not a route out of poverty.  
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Conservatives argued that all were given the opportunity to compete and fulfil their 
potential and emphasised the numbers of jobs they had generated once again ignoring 
the problem of in work poverty and drawing upon a myth of equal opportunity (see 
Cameron, 2015e; Conservatives, 2015). This construction was important for framing 
'worklessness' as a choice informed by morality rather than structure. Concerningly, 
trend analysis suggests it became “increasingly likely” for the public to blame 
“individual characteristics “as opposed to “societal issues” for poverty (Rae, 2013).  
Labour, for their part, again failed to fundamentally challenge Conservatives and also 
supported neoliberal rhetoric. It did not question the assertions that people needed to 
work harder and sacrifice more and welfare claimants needed discipline, whilst the 
rich meanwhile were just rich and should be allowed to get richer. They did however 
argue that the Coalition’s approach was not providing opportunities and reward, 
evidencing: low pay and in work poverty, insecure jobs, lack of full time roles and 
graduate jobs, and fixed and zero hours contracts (see Labour, 2015; Miliband in Seven 
Way Leaders Debate, 2015).  
Extraordinarily, welfare claimants, not financial elites, were framed as cheating their 
way to ‘undeserved lifestyles’ at the expense of ‘the hard-working’. Claims of 
excessive welfare benefit incomes (see Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders 
Special, 2015) and deeply moralised constructions of benefit claimants unashamedly 
cheating the system, and over representation of both, were prevalent in Westminster 
discourse, and also in the media (Barton and Davis, 2016). Conservatives spoke of 
families receiving tens of thousands in welfare benefits per year (but did not 
voluntarily specify the low number of families generating the perception the issue was 
more prevalent) to legitimise a cap on welfare benefits per household (see Cameron in 
Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015). The £100,000 incomes of less than 
five families (see Staff Reporter, 2013) were utilised to gain support for a policy 
change that has affected tens of thousands of people. Prior to the election, the cap was 
put at £26,000, the average income of a working family. In the 2015 Conservative 
manifesto a reduction to £23,000 was proposed but following the election Osborne 
informed it would actually be £20,000 outside London (see Syal, 2015a), further 
evidence of the strategy of gradually, selectively, disseminating news.  
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Conservatives constructed a reciprocal relationship between citizens in which ‘the 
workless’ were constructed as not meeting their obligations to ‘hard-working 
taxpayers’ (see Cameron in Hansard, 2015b; Conservatives, 2015). Rather than 
welfare benefits being constructed as necessary entitlements for those in need, they 
were constructed as a vehicle for ‘the immoral’ to exploit ‘the moral’. ‘The workless’ 
were also constructed as unpatriotic (see Miliband in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle 
for No.10, 2015). Those who were not part of ‘alarm clock Britain’, who did not get 
up and work hard for their country (excluding the rich) were framed as immoral and 
as burdening ‘the hard-working’. Comparatively little, and certainly disproportionate, 
attention was given to the wealthy’s fraudulent activity and victimisation of ‘the hard-
working’, despite the DWP (2014) recognition that benefit fraud only costs the UK 
around £1.2bn, and HMRC recognition that uncollected taxes, including from tax 
evasion and avoidance, costs £34bn (see Full Fact, 2016).  
 
From 2013 the media engaged in “poor shaming” and constructing claimants as the 
“shameless poor” (Barton and Davis, 2016: 2, 13). “Where poverty is represented as 
shameless, or even as defiant or proud, empathy will be diminished” (ibid: 13). “The 
greatest vitriol is saved for those who are…unembarrassed, unapologetic, or seemingly 
content with their lot” (ibid: 13). They were portrayed as barefaced in their immorality. 
This construction sought to generate resentment, reduce empathy and perceptions of 
collectivism in order to attain support for a ‘punitive welfare’ system, or in other words 
to generate authoritarian populism. Conservatives told ‘the hard-working’ that the 
‘immorality’ of the ‘workless’ at their expense would no longer go unpunished, 
allowing the state to rollback support and social responsibility.  
 
Baumberg et al’s (2012) research on welfare benefits and stigma has shown that public 
perceptions of deserving and undeserving claimants are based on judgements about 
the extent of an individual’s responsibility for their situation and perceptions of 
‘undeservedness’ had increased over the last 20 years. It also shows public 
overestimations of benefit fraud and a link between negative portrayals of claimants 
and stigma. There is also evidence that as a consequence of stigma some people are 
not claiming welfare benefits and that claimants’ perceptions of self-worth have been 




“three-quarters of people who rely on working age benefits say they 
feel shame about claiming, either sometimes, most or all the time. 
Not only that, but two thirds of people in work agree that claimants 
should feel that way” (Hannah, 2016).  
 
Estimates using DWP data suggest between £10billion to £15billion of benefits are 
not claimed (ibid). Not claiming can lead to financial/economic harms and emotional 
and psychological harm. However, despite the figures being much higher, 
Westminster gave emphasis to benefit fraud not unclaimed benefits. Whilst the state 
polices benefit fraud, encouraging clients to claim is largely a task left to charities.  
 
Neoliberals succeeded in reconstructing the welfare state as workfare. For them, 
recipients must develop their employability and work to earn their right to welfare 
benefit (Amable, 2011). The system shifted from one delivering entitlements to the 
vulnerable for protection from structurally generated conditions to a system for re-
moralisation of the immoral, ‘helping’ individuals to make ‘better choices’ to 
‘improve’ their own lives (Amable, 2011; for an example see Duncan Smith, 2015a). 
The welfare claimant must show evidence of trying to work for their fellow citizens 
and country.  
 “If you want to claim unemployment benefit quite rightly now you 
have to fill in a CV, make yourself available for work, you have to 
attend job interviews. In the past before I became Prime Minister it 
was perfectly possible to sign on and really do very little to show 
you want to get a job. That is the wrong values and the wrong system 
for our country” (Cameron, 2015e).  
 
For those perceived by the state to be inactive, or not active enough to be deemed 
deserving of support, sanctions are given. For Davies (2016a: 330), Britain has shifted 
into a new phase of “punitive neoliberalism”, which operates with “an ethos of heavily 
moralised-as opposed to utilitarian – punishment”. Similarly, Albo and Fanelli (2014: 
21) suggest that during the crisis there has been “a ‘hardening’ of the state and the 
characterisations of a new phase of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism”.    
 
There were further attempts to frame workfare as a moral and compassionate pursuit 
of better lives and dignity for welfare claimants (see Liberal Democrats, 2015; Javid, 
2015). Aligning with Sir Rhodes Boyson’s claims during Thatcherism, the welfare 
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state was destroying society’s moral fibre and hindering moral growth. A ‘reformed’ 
welfare state would ‘free’ people from their immoral dependency and give value to 
their lives. A logic of equivalence was constructed between paid employment and 
dignity, and also between not working and indignity. Cameron (in Question Time: 
Election Leaders Special, 2015) declared “a life on welfare is no life at all, we want to 
give you a life in work”. Somewhat ironically, he argued that a welfare state created 
to ensure quality of life for the vulnerable was hindering welfare claimants in living a 
valuable life, again demonstrating the neoliberal shifts in terrains of debate.   
Conservatives extended their claims of providing opportunities to work (and the 
pursuit of dignity) to disabled persons in an attempt to legitimise planned cuts to 
disability benefits. They framed the inclusion of disabled persons in the competition, 
or in other words the taking away of the safety net, as part of a drive for equal 
opportunities, social inclusion, and social justice (see Conservatives, 2015). Whilst 
removing barriers to develop the freedom of disabled persons to choose to work is 
progressive, cuts to disability benefits coerce93 work, render people dependent on 
others, or place them in deeper poverty. This framed regressive changes as progressive. 
For neoliberals, if disabled persons were given the opportunity to compete then they 
could be responsible for their income. If they chose not to take the opportunity then, 
in accordance with the rules of the competition, the state would have no requirement 
to intervene. In fact it would be unfair if it did. Perhaps believing they had done the 
necessary groundwork, in 2016 Conservatives announced planned cuts to Employment 
and Support Allowance for new claimants that are in the work related activity group 
to ‘incentivise’ work (see Gentleman, 2016), which was met with relatively little 
resistance. However, they later announced a reduction in Personal Independence 
Payments (PIP) for claimants using appliances (see McVeigh, 2016). This 
announcement caused greater resistance94 because it was announced in a budget that 
                                                     
93 For example, Conservatives (2015) stated, “if they [those with long term yet treatable 
conditions] refuse a recommended treatment, we will review whether their benefits should be 
reduced”.   
94  Duncan Smith (2016) when resigning recognised that the targets set, and means for 
achieving them, could be viewed as political rather than economically necessary: 
 “I am unable to watch passively whilst certain policies are enacted in order 
to meet the fiscal self-imposed restraints that I believe are more and more 
 183 
withdrew support from the disabled whilst giving a tax reduction to high earning 
taxpayers, highlighting the injustice of responses.  
If the claims outlined above are believed and the construction internalised, an 
individual can be held responsible for their circumstances and government becomes 
absolved from responsibility for inequality and it actually becomes ‘fair’ (Amable, 
2011). The ‘moral’, ‘noble’ and ‘normal’, the ‘hard-working’ are encouraged to 
believe that all have a chance, they work hard and others choose not to, therefore it 
would be unfair to redistribute reward to privilege ‘undeserving immoral’ others 
(Bauman, 1998). This can cultivate acceptance of, or even active support for, 
withdrawal of welfare benefits.  
In a markedly different tone, however, Conservatives spoke of pensioners, as a 
collective who had all worked hard and therefore all deserved the reward of the ‘good 
life’ – security and dignity in retirement. Pensioners were the only age group whose 
income increased95 (Belfield et al, 2015). Conservatives continued to protect their 
incomes 96  and consequently they were less exposed to harm 97 , although cuts to 
services impacted on poorer pensioners. Conservatives (2015) and Liberal Democrats 
(2015) again drew upon intergenerational claims arguing that protection from cuts was 
a means to thank older people for building a country to be proud of. Conservatives 
argued that pensioners were not able to fully compete therefore they required 
immunity (Cameron, 2015e). If their meritocratic discourse had been applied to 
pensioners in the same way as workers they would have argued that their conditions 
in retirement were a result of their previous poor competitive performance. This is an 
interesting contrast to the treatment of this working generation who are expected to be 
capable of working until significantly older and with less state support.  Conservatives 
                                                     
perceived as distinctly political rather than in the national economic 
interest”.   
95 It is important to note that in the UK 1 in 7 pensioners, 1.6 million or 14 per cent of 
pensioners live in poverty (Age UK, 2017).  
96  The only cut to pensions was an increase in the pension age which effected future 
pensioners, currently working people, which was justified with the argument it was morally 
preferable for pensioners to have “generous” incomes and people work longer (see Osborne, 
2015g).  
97 Pensioners were significantly underrepresented in food bank use (Loopstra and Lalor, 2017) 
and are much less likely to be in relative poverty (see Full Fact, 2017) demonstrating the 
protection progressive social policies, or harm reduction systems, can have. 
 184 
sought to justify not means testing fuel allowance, whilst means testing child benefit, 
and cutting benefits for the working age poor and disabled, by stating they did not 
want “old people struggling with their fuel bills” (Osborne in Ask the Chancellors, 
2015). However, wealthy pensioners did not require an allowance to prevent them 
from struggling to pay for fuel whilst the poor, disabled, needed greater support. On 
resigning Iain Duncan Smith (2016) argued that it would have been fairer if the 
government had made some cuts to pensioners’ incomes and less cuts to others. 
Clearly, the differential response to this generation and different narrative was a 
strategy to achieve more votes as a greater proportion of retired people voted.  
 
Struggling to be the Party of the ‘Hard-working’ 
Conservatives and Labour each competed to present their party as the party of the 
‘hard-working’. Cameron (2015f) stated he was “in it for the people who live within 
the rules, who do the right thing, who set the alarm early in the morning, do the school 
run, clock in at work”. If Miliband (in BBC Election Debate, 2015) were Prime 
Minister he would “always put working families first because that is the way we 
succeed as a country”. Both manifestos explicitly claimed to be written for working 
people (see Cameron, 2015f; Miliband in Labour, 2015). In contrast, the Labour 
manifesto for the General Election 2017 was titled ‘For the Many, Not the Few’ (see 
Labour, 2017).  
Westminster definers constructed their respective party’s tax policies as rewarding 
‘hard-working taxpayers’ (see Cameron, 2015f; Cameron in Hansard, 2015b; Javid, 
2015; Miliband in BBC Election Debate, 2015). Labour committed to tackling tax 
evasion and avoidance (see Labour, 2015; Miliband in Cameron v Miliband: The 
Battle for No.10, 2015) by ending unfair tax breaks for hedge funds (see Labour, 
2015), UK residents use of tax havens (Miliband, 2015e), including nom-domiciled 
status (see Miliband, 2015a), and introducing a review of the HMRC to ensure the rule 
of law was being upheld and harsher responses (see Balls, 2015c). In contrast, Labour 
claimed Conservatives tax policies served the interests of the rich few (see Balls, 
2015d; Miliband, 2015c).  
Conservatives rejected Labour’s claims (see Balls, 2015d; Leslie, 2015; Miliband, 
2015a, e; Miliband in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) and insisted that their tax 
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policies served ‘hard workers’’ interests (see Cameron, 2015c; Cameron in Cameron 
v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015). They committed to reducing workers taxes98 
and framed Labour as taking from the workers’ wallets to spend on unreformed 
welfare for the ‘undeserving’ (see Cameron, 2015e; Cameron in Question Time: 
Election Leaders Special, 2015; Conservatives, 2015). Conservatives constructed 
welfare cuts and low taxes as being in workers’ interests. They sought to disconnect 
income taxes from public spending on social justice measures that support workers’ 
and their families, including welfare benefits.  
“The value of public spending is routinely ignored, underplayed or 
simply forgotten in our tax and spending debates. Anti-tax 
campaigners, the tabloid press and right-wing critics of public 
services all talk about tax revenues as if they were taken and thrown 
into the sea. Tax cuts are touted as if they have no consequences for 
public services” (Horton and Reed, 2010: 13).  
Conservatives claimed they had a world-leading reputation for ensuring corporations 
pay their taxes (see Cameron, 2015e). This conflicted with a number of revelations 
around this moment99. As the HSBC scandal unfolded during the GE15 campaign, 
Conservatives were committing to preventing tax evasion and avoidance whilst 
simultaneously justifying their failure to act. They claimed ignorance to exonerate 
themselves and others, an inability to influence the criminal justice response despite 
failing to previously create necessary legislation, and took a forward looking approach 
to managing tax seeking to deflect attention from past cases. Similarly, Liberal 
Democrats proposed a law for the future criminalisation of banks, accountants, and 
lawyers who facilitated tax evasion (see Alexander, 2015d).  
In a period when the public were told that sacrifices were required to reduce the 
dangerous deficit, the Coalition government significantly reduced corporation tax. It 
was 28 percent in 2010 and is currently set to be 17 percent by 2020. Each year the 
                                                     
98 Liberal Democrats also committed to not increasing taxes for the hard-working on low and 
middle incomes, and tackling tax avoidance (see Liberal Democrats, 2015). They also 
proposed a High Value Property Levy, which was their version of Labour’s mansion tax.  
99 In 2013 it was revealed the HMRC made sweetheart tax deals with large corporations 
resulting in billions of pounds of losses in tax receipts (see Syal 2013). In 2015 it became 
public knowledge that the Swiss arm of the HSBC routinely facilitated tax avoidance (see 
Leigh et al, 2015). In 2016 Panama papers emerged, which revealed David Cameron benefitted 
from a tax avoiding offshore fund and had owned shares in a fund that he sold before becoming 
Prime Minister (Booth et al, 2016). 
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rate was gradually reduced, and it was always by slightly more than forecast the 
previous year. The strengthening of the construction of private capital as the saviour 
of the public from crisis and the gradual delivering of further cuts were strategies for 
gaining public acceptance. 
Whilst Labour and Conservatives professed to be led by the interests of the ‘hard-
working’, responses and proposed responses contradicted their claims. Instead they 
served private capital and rolled back state social responsibility. In addition to cutting 
corporation tax, they reduced welfare support, failed to adequately fund the NHS and 
facilitated its privatisation, as well as supporting the opening up of other public assets 
and services to capital despite evidence showing that this costs the public. They 
insisted ‘hard-working taxpayers’ need to work harder and sacrifice more, but 
excluded the alternatives of fiscal stimulus, or significantly increasing tax on the 
wealthy. Neither party adequately addressed tax evasion and avoidance whilst in 
power. They supported deregulation of private capital and failed to plan or undertake 
fundamental reform of the finance industry despite the harms inflicted by it leaving 
‘hard-working taxpayers’ still vulnerable to carrying the costs of bailout again. 
Conservatives have also reduced the power of workers to resist. However, definers’ 
alignment of private and public interests and the exclusion of alternatives to austerity 
sought to propound the fallacy that ‘hard-working’ taxpayers’ interests were 
determining these policies.  
Manufacturing Ignorance to Maintain Acceptance of Austerity  
Strategies for ignorance manufacture were key, particularly for Conservatives, in 
seeking to gain acceptance of welfare benefit cuts. Conservatives planned to change 
the definition of child poverty to allow for more favourable statistics (see Cameron, 
2015i) obscuring the effect of welfare cuts (see Gentleman, 2015). Notably, parties 
committed themselves to welfare cuts but did not tell the public where they would fall. 
Conservatives in particular were heavily critiqued for not being transparent about 
where £12billion of welfare cuts would be made (see Alexander, 2015e; Sturgeon in 
Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015). In response to direct questions from other 
Westminster definers, media presenters, and interviewers, Conservatives repeated a 
number of discursive responses that maintained public ignorance, which included: 
repeating their commitment to £12billion of welfare cuts (Cameron, 2015a; Duncan 
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Smith, 2015b; Osborne, 2015b) stating where £2billion would fall but not the other 
£10billion (Cameron in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015), claiming 
they had yet to decide where cuts would fall (see Duncan Smith, 2015b), arguing that 
Labour were withholding more plans (see Cameron, 2015d), and stating that the cuts 
were merely a continuation of cuts when they were additional (see Osborne, 2015g). 
Osborne (2015g) effectively stated ‘trust me I am a Tory Chancellor – I will find cuts’. 
Cameron also identified unfavourable alternatives to cuts such as raising taxes, which 
aligned with the negative framing of taxing and public spending (see Cameron in 
Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015; Cameron in Seven Way Leaders 
Debate, 2015). Conservatives strategically chose not to disclose planned disability 
benefit cuts until after the election.  
 
Liberal Democrats strategically made publicly available a DWP proposal to cut child 
benefit and child tax credits and suggested that it might have been a Conservative plan 
for future cuts (see Clegg in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015). Cameron 
(in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015) responded by denying that child 
tax credit would be cut but again did not identify where cuts would fall. Ignorance was 
strategically manufactured about cuts, deliberately preventing the public from making 
an informed choice on Election Day.  
 
Pushing Banking ‘Reform’ Down the Agenda  
With the effects of, and responses to, a crisis triggered by financial crisis still 
dominating both political and economic debate and negatively affecting lives, it might 
appear surprising that the financial industry was not a key issue in televised debates 
and minimal attention moreover, was given to it in manifestos100. The reform focussing 
moment that existed in the early stages of the crisis did not continue into this INM. 
Westminster definers had successfully ensured the transfer of calls for reform and 
intensified regulation from finance to welfare and now immigration. They had 
successfully socialised blame downwards and protected the financial sector.  
                                                     
100 Labour dedicated two thirds of a single page of their manifesto to banking reform, in 
contrast debt and deficit were afforded a full page even before the contents and the topic ran 
throughout the first half of the manifesto. Liberal Democrats had one page in their manifesto 
devoted to summarising their plans for banks whereas debt and deficit was the topic of a whole 
section. In the Conservative manifesto, debt and deficit ran throughout whole sections and 
there was only half a page dedicated to plans for reforming the bank system.   
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Definers continued to exclude the alternative of permanent nationalisation of banks 
from debate, arguing that re-privatisation was necessary to aid the repayment of public 
debt and ensure competition (see Conservatives, 2015; Osborne, 2015h). Shortly after 
the election Osborne sold the first tranche of RBS shares for a loss of £1billion with 
60 percent of the shares being purchased by hedge funds (see Treanor, 2015a). The 
suggestion in GE10 that shares would be re-sold to Cameron’s ‘friends’ in the City 
was accurate. Following seven years of losses, no public dividend but bonuses for 
bankers, the government sold the bank at a loss back into private hands, who will reap 
future dividends and sale profits after the bank recovers. In his statement 
accompanying the first sale, Osborne could not justify the loss in terms of value for 
taxpayers. He argued instead that: 
 
 “the right thing to do for the taxpayer and for British businesses: it 
will promote financial stability, lead to a more competitive banking 
sector, and support the interests of the wider economy. Now is the 
time for RBS to rebuild itself as a commercial bank, no longer reliant 
on the state, but serving the working people of Britain” (Osborne, 
2015h).  
 
Whilst Westminster parties gave lip service to the need for greater competition in the 
banking sector, in the form of challenger banks or regional banks, and a lower 
threshold on market share to prevent an oligopoly where banks are ‘too big to fail’ (see 
Conservatives, 2015; Labour, 2015; Liberal Democrats, 2015) and made lacklustre 
statements supporting economic diversification (see Miliband in Question Time: 
Election Leaders Special, 2015; Osborne, 2015e), significant change addressing the 
power and centrality of finance is yet to materialise (Tombs, 2016a).  
 
Being Friendlier with Private Capital  
Westminster definers continued to argue that corporate success was key to resolving 
the crisis. Therefore, Britain needed to be increasingly ‘business friendly’ (see 
Conservatives, 2015; Liberal Democrats, 2015), which translated to the continuance 
and intensification of neoliberal conditions. Echoing trickledown theory, Osborne (in 
Ask the Chancellors’ 2015) claimed that corporate success would resolve the crisis 
even for the poorest: 
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“when your economy crashes, the people who suffer are 
precisely…the poorest…and the way you can help is by running an 
economy that is stable, that is growing, that is investing, that is 
creating jobs, where business is expanding, that is the best possible 
answer”.   
 
Again, Osborne (2015e) explicitly aligned corporate interests and public interests. This 
mapping of corporate interests onto public interests is a clear example of the 
hegemonic status that neoliberalism had achieved. This construction has gained further 
momentum in the Brexit INM where Conservatives are claiming that the UK must 
become a corporate tax haven in order to attract private capital for all our sakes.  
Further deregulation, corporate tax cuts, and reduced trade union power continued to 
be framed as the path to ‘resolution’ rather than the restoration of the factors that had 
generated crisis in the first place. Javid (2015) declared that “free enterprise” was “the 
lifeblood of any successful economy” and that “creating more jobs, boosting growth, 
greater investment in our economy…[required] free enterprise and…more 
deregulation”. Attention was directed away from the alternative of public sector 
investment and the dangerousness of deregulation. Liberal Democrats (2015) also 
pledged a ‘business’ focused regulatory approach. This was all possible because 
definers had successfully blamed Labour public spending for the crisis. The private 
sector, liberated by ‘business friendly’ conditions, became the logical ‘resolution’.  
Again Conservatives utilised a crisis to reduce labour rights. Actualising 
Conservatives’ GE10 commitment, The Trade Union Bill proposed the following 
rollbacks:    
“in terms of strike laws that there will be some considerable changes, 
we have said there will be a minimum threshold in terms of turnout 
of 50% of those entitled to vote, we have also said that when it comes 
to essential public services, at least 40% of people need to vote for 
strike action, and we have said we are going to lift the ban on the use 
of agency staff when strike action takes place” (Javid, 2015).  
 
Minimum thresholds reduce the viability of a strike, and protection from disruption 
undermines the effectiveness of protest. Conservatives (2015) described a ban on 
hiring agency staff, which facilitates disruption and therefore effectiveness of protest, 
as “nonsensical”.  
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Extraordinarily, protection from trade union power, rather than financial power, was 
constructed as being in the public’s interest in order to legitimise neoliberal responses.  
“We will protect you from disruptive and undemocratic strike 
action…This turnout threshold will be an important and fair step to 
rebalance the interests of employers, employees, the public and the 
rights of trade unions” (Conservatives, 2015).    
 
In sum, depressed real wages, deregulation of finance, and cutting welfare all played 
causal roles in either the origins or the amplification of the crisis of 2007-2008 but for 
Westminster maintaining and intensifying these causes was the way to ‘resolve’ the 
crisis.  
 
The Three-Party Anti-Austerity Challenge 
Anticipation of a hung Parliament101 and strong polling for smaller parties meant that 
the latter contributed to narration of the crisis to a much greater degree than in GE10. 
They were given a greater platform to influence public sense-making, most notably a 
position in televised election debates. This aided their challenge to Westminster’s 
'resolution’.   
 
The SNP, supported by Plaid Cymru and Green party, challenged Westminster’s 
advocacy of austerity and privatisation, including Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnerships102, and argued for a ‘socially just’ alternative for Britain (see Sturgeon, 
2015a; Wood, 2015). As Marr (in Wood, 2015) suggests, in comparison to 
Westminster, they formed “a kind of left block”. Their support of each other’s 
arguments (see Bennett in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015), and their commitment 
to working together toward more progressive goals than Westminster (see Sturgeon, 
2015b; Wood in BBC Election Debate, 2015), strengthened their challenge.  
 
Challenging Westminster’s construction of There Is No Alternative, the three anti- 
austerity parties argued that austerity was economically unnecessary and morally 
undesirable (see Sturgeon in BBC Election Debate, 2015; Wood in BBC Election 
Debate, 2015). They highlighted that it failed to achieve Conservatives’ own targets 
                                                     
101 The polls had (turns out incorrectly) consistently produced results claiming that Labour and 
Conservatives were tied (see Clark and Wintour, 2015), even on the eve of the election 
pollsters said it was “neck and neck” and “too close to call” (Hopkins, 2015).  
102 For an analysis of Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnerships see Sawyer (2016).  
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on debt and deficit (see Sturgeon, 2015b, c) and asserted that economic policies should 
improve lives and that austerity did not (see Sturgeon in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 
2015). The challengers recognised that the exclusion of alternatives from debate was 
political and advocated increased borrowing and public spending, and much greater 
redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation.  
 
“Despite what you have heard there is an alternative to the 
Westminster consensus in favour of more cuts. Austerity is not 
inevitable - it’s a choice. We can have a future where everyone has 
access to decent public services, where everyone can have a decent 
standard of living” (Wood in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015).  
 
The three anti-austerity parties sought to counter Westminster engineered debt and 
deficit hysteria. They drew attention to the country’s wealth and made historical 
comparisons to show that the framing of its fiscal position, and claims of the necessity 
of austerity, were purposefully misleading103. They highlighted that the UK had money 
to spend on Trident during a period of austerity and it was a political choice not to 
spend the money on health (see Sturgeon, 2015d). They recognised that austerity 
placed consequences on the most vulnerable but was chosen by the least vulnerable 
(see Bennett in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015; Sturgeon in Seven Way Leaders 
Debate, 2015; Wood in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015). For Bennett (2015a), 
austerity was a means for making “the poor, the disadvantaged, the young…pay for 
the errors and fraud of the bankers”. The three anti-austerity parties reframed public 
spending as an investment in the nation’s skills and infrastructure, people’s welfare 
and futures. They argued that their approach would end the harms of austerity, increase 
growth, reduce the debt quicker, eventually eliminate the deficit, and ensure adequate 
funding of the NHS and housing. Therefore, austerity and privatisation were 
unnecessary and a ‘progressive’ approach was economically and morally preferable 
(see Bennett in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015; Sturgeon in Seven Way Leaders 
Debate, 2015).  
 
                                                     
103 Bennett (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) recognised that “over the past 100 years 
about half of it Britain ran a higher debt GDP ratio and no one worried about it very much” 
and Wood (in BBC Election Debate, 2015) highlighted that “investment was put in to build 
that welfare state in the 1940s when there was no money in the coffers, when the country’s 
debt was massive”.  
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Whilst fewer Scottish residents voted in the election than the referendum, the 
proportion voting SNP in GE15 was higher than the proportion that voted for 
independence in SIR14104. This could mean that a higher proportion of remain voters/ 
those in favour of BTD’ arguments chose not to vote in the election than in the 
referendum. Possibly, more people might have supported the SNP as a result of 
Westminster’s response following the referendum105. However, arguably, there was 
greater support for an anti-austerity and a ‘pro-social justice’ alternative when it was 
not coupled with independence. Support for the SNP’s approach across Britain also 
suggests that the party’s support was driven by a more socially just ‘resolution’ rather 
than nationalism106. Arguably, in GE15 SNP politicians were increasingly supported 
for being anti-austerity, because immediate independence was not being offered in the 
election, although the voters were aware of the long-term goal of independence.  
Despite alignment over crisis ‘resolution’, the three anti-austerity parties’ results 
varied. Green party and Plaid Cymru only had small increases in their vote shares; 
respectively they attained a 2.8 percent and a 1 percent increase (BBC News, 2015c). 
Regional variations and leader and party variations played their role. The strength and 
duration of the SNP’s campaigning in Scotland, their majority in the Scottish 
Parliament, long-term ‘anti-Tory’ position, and Sturgeon’s communication of 
economic competence (for example by demonstrating knowledge of deficit reduction 
processes) strengthened their opposition. The SNP also received votes from those 
seeking independence. Bennett appeared more radical, which may have reinforced 
public perceptions that Green Party was primarily an environmental protest party. As 
the SNP presented the greatest threat to Westminster’s project and power, Westminster 




Still Struggling Over the Dominant Logic of Equivalence 
                                                     
104  In GE15 the SNP attained 50 per cent of the vote share (BBC News, 2015d) and in SIR14 
the SNP led campaign achieved 44.7 per cent of vote share (BBC News, 2014b) 
105 The SNP argued that Westminster’s vow made in SIR14 was not being upheld. Westminster 
had veto power over Scotland’s welfare changes and restrained Holyrood’s ability to make 
fiscal decisions whilst only the English could vote for English laws (see Sturgeon, 2015d).  
106 ‘Can I Vote for the SNP?’ featured in the list of questions most searched on Google by 
people across Britain after the seven-way leader debate (Mason 2015). 
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To counter the three party anti-austerity challenge and reassert the necessity of 
austerity, Westminster definers continued to target the SNP’s credibility and construct 
its alternative plan as economically unviable. They again portrayed SNP concerns for 
social justice as a façade, hiding their nationalist agenda and their true objective of 
Scottish independence, and claimed the SNP were withholding knowledge of planned 
cuts. Miliband (in BBC Election Debate, 2015) stated, “the other thing you are not 
telling people is that…you’re planning £7.6billion worth of cuts in Scotland”. They 
framed nationalists attaining influence in UK Parliament as a threat, that would not 
only prioritise Scottish interests over the rest of the UK but seek to dismantle the UK 
(see Alexander, 2015d; Cameron, 2015g, h). Conservatives’ posters depicted Miliband 
dancing to Salmond’s tune and in Salmond’s pocket (see Perraudin and Mason, 2015). 
Again Labour attempted to portray the SNP’s social justice agenda as disingenuous 
and Labour’s as genuine (see Miliband in BBC Election Debate, 2015).  
 
Sturgeon (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) countered criticisms of nationalism 
by emphasising that the SNP would work for progressive change for the whole of the 
UK. SNP definers repeatedly and explicitly stated that a vote for the party was a vote 
against austerity and not for independence (see Sturgeon, 2015e; Sturgeon in BBC, 
Election, 2015) and stopping austerity was the “top priority” (Sturgeon, 2015f). To 
highlight the contrast in framings Miliband (in BBC Election, 2015) labelled SNP 
results “a surge of nationalism” whereas Sturgeon (in BBC Election, 2015) called them 
“an overwhelming vote against austerity”.  
 
A Nationalist Challenge to the Free Movement of People 
Whilst UKIP supported the austerity project107 and the free movement of capital, 
driven by a ‘narrow’ nationalist agenda it challenged Westminster’s approach to 
immigration. The party argued that uncontrolled immigration was harming Britain, in 
particular its public services. It argued for a referendum on the UK’s membership of 
the EU, asserting the necessity of independence, the end of the free movement of 
people and the implementation of a strict immigration policy to address Britain’s 
                                                     
107  Farage (in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) supported Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats’ blaming of Labour’s “out of control” spending, criticised the Coalition’s failure 
to deal with “a dreadful debt repayment problem”, and advocated ending spending on foreign 
aid.  
 194 
‘problems’ (see Farage, 2015a). For some neoliberals, the EU provided British 
business with a free market and cheap labour108 and the Westminster parties supported 
Britain remaining in the EU, although portentously a number of high status politicians 
advocated leave. The UKIP challenge and the momentum it achieved109  were to 
become the key driver for the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU and the 
decision to leave.  
 
Importantly, Farage rejected the free market, only, in relation to migrant labour. A 
truly neoliberal approach of course would leave the market to ‘self-manage’ migration 
rather than increasing state regulation. The successful linking of stagnant wages, 
insecure employment, and pressured resources with immigration was in effect a 
significant attack on a neoliberal tenet. However, Farage justified his approach through 
a tenacious interpretation of free, meritocratic competition. He argued that a truly 
competitive managed system would deliver ‘better quality’ immigrants for the UK, 
defined as having skills, financial independence, and not having a criminal record or 
HIV, or requiring maternity services (see Farage, 2015a, b; Farage in BBC Election 
Debate, 2015).  
 
The popularity of anti-immigration parties rose across the West, including the National 
Front in France; Golden Dawn in Greece; Fidesz in Hungary; Party for Freedom in 
Netherlands; True Finns; the Danish People’s party, and perhaps the most concerning 
for those seeking social justice internationally – Donald Trump was elected in the 
United States. Anti-immigration focussed populist parties are widely perceived as 
racist110 and xenophobic111 (see Ford and Goodwin, 2014). 48 percent of UKIP voters 
actually described themselves as either a little or very racially prejudiced112 (see Stone, 
                                                     
108  For other neoliberals its social, employment, and environmental protections were too 
restrictive.  
109 Using Continuous Monitoring Data on voting intentions Clark (2016) charted a surge in 
UKIP support in 2013, and this is reflected in the party’s GE15 results.  
110 Racist is defined as possessing a predisposition to view people differently based on their 
racially determined physical characteristics.  
111 Xenophobic is defined as fearful or hateful of strangers/ foreigners and therefore showing 
hostility towards them.  
112 As only 26 per cent of the general population described themselves as slightly prejudice, 
the statistics suggest that UKIP has a high proportion of racially prejudice voters (Stone, 
2015b). However, when the 26 per cent were asked if they were racist only 28 per cent replied 
yes, which shows that not everyone who identifies as racially prejudice identifies as racist, 
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2015b) and there are cases of UKIP politicians being accused of making racist 
comments (for a recent example see Rawlinson, 2017).  
 
However, Farage denied that his party was racist and constructed its policies as 
patriotic aiming to harness working class nationalism (Ford and Goodwin, 2014).  
 
“I am patriotic I believe in this country, I believe in the people of 
this country. I believe we would be so much better if we controlled 
ourselves, governed our borders and gave ordinary workers a 
chance” (Farage in BBC Election Debate, 2015).  
 
The ‘nation’ and ‘country’ over history has become a powerful concept of the right. It 
is “bound up with imperial supremacy, tinged with racist connotations” (Hall, 1996: 
42). As Hall (1996) recognizes, this meaning is not permanently fixed. Over time the 
left could struggle to break down this meaning and attach a more progressive meaning 
and use it to attain support for social justice measures (ibid). Farage drew on public 
dissatisfaction113 with Westminster, framing himself as distinct from “the politically 
correct political class” (see Farage in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015), as a ‘straight 
talking’ man whom ‘told it like it was’. He understood what ‘ordinary British people’ 
thought, and UKIP policies were informed by ‘common sense’. He was a crusader for 
‘ordinary’ working class interests (see Farage in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015; 
Farage in BBC Election Debate, 2015). He appealed to a public desire for Westminster 
elites to be less powerful. For him, ‘ordinary’ hard-working’ Britons were fed up of 
Westminster allowing them to be exploited by ‘foreigners’. UKIP presented their party 
as understanding their experiences and desires and struggling for them.    
UKIP constructed Britain as being invaded because of a lack of control (see Farage, 
2015c; UKIP, 2015). Reiterations that people could immigrate from ten ‘former 
communist countries’ drew upon stereotypes to encourage a perception of Britain as 
being flooded by poor, low skilled, and therefore burdensome, as opposed to 
                                                     
supporting Van Dijk’s (1998) argument that social actors do not tend to recognise their beliefs 
form part of an ideology if it is described in a way that is different from their sense-making.   
113 Farage was particularly successful in the interpellation of “older, blue-collar voters, citizens 
with few qualifications, whites and men” that felt the working were not being adequately 
represented by Labour and Conservatives in a period of significant social and economic 
change and who held strong views on immigration and national identity (Ford and Goodwin, 
2014: 175). He positioned them as moral, as working hard for themselves, their families and 
their country but not achieving just rewards, including adequate healthcare because 
Westminster policies facilitated exploitation by the immigrant.  
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economically valuable, immigrants. In the British EU membership Referendum 2016, 
UKIP presented a poster of a walking crowd of mainly non-white refugees and 
migrants with the slogan “Breaking Point: The EU has Failed Us All’ (see Stewart and 
Mason, 2016a). It was heavily criticised, including by Westminster definers, for 
inciting racial hatred for its close resemblance to Nazi propaganda (ibid).  
 
In periods of wage stagnation and pressures on housing and public services, parties 
can gain support by identifying blameworthy subjects who become scapegoats of 
crisis 114 . However, the subjects are rarely political or financial elites. Rather, 
vulnerable groups are often the targets, as was the case in the construction of ‘Broken 
Britain’ in GE10. Anti-immigration populism draws on and develops nationalist 
nostalgia, and class grievance about ‘them’ taking ‘our’ jobs and applying downward 
pressure on ‘our’ wages (see Younge et al, 2016). UKIP exploited public 
dissatisfaction and anxieties caused by neoliberal conditions and channelled them 
towards immigrants to gain populist support for their pursuit of nationalist ‘freedom’ 
from the EU. UKIP blamed immigrants for the housing crisis, depressed wages and 
pressure on the NHS (see Farage, 2015a; Farage in BBC Election Debate, 2015; Farage 
in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015). Othering of immigrants sought to generate 
public hostility and openness to the physical exclusion of ‘the other’ from Britain. 
British media reporting of the migrant crisis115 in 2014-2015 particularly by right-wing 
tabloid newspapers, constructed ‘illegal immigration’ as a major threat to the NHS and 
welfare state (see Berry et al, 2015). Cameron responded to UKIP by emphasising his 
own punitive approach to criminals and apathy towards refugees. He advocated 
targeting “criminal gangs”, “turning back the boats where we can”, and deterring 
refugees (Cameron in Hansard, 2015a).  
Westminster definers’ reinforced the blaming of immigrants deflecting blame from 
neoliberalism but their framing had the concomitant response of further cuts to welfare 
benefits, redirecting Britain away from independence from the EU and towards further 
austerity in line with Westminster’s desired ‘resolution’ (see Conservatives, 2015; 
Labour, 2015; Miliband in BBC Election Debate, 2015). It constructed a logic of 
                                                     
114 For a comprehensive analysis of how right-wing populist discourses generate fear of the 
other and the threat they pose to ‘us’ and ‘our nation’ (see Wodak, 2015).  
115 The migrant crisis referred to the tens of thousands of refugees and migrants fleeing mainly 
the Syrian civil war and crossing by sea to enter Europe resulting in many deaths and harmful 
living conditions.  
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equivalence between immigration and welfare benefits suggesting that immigrants 
came to Britain for welfare support (see Cameron, 2015a). For Cameron (in Question 
Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015), “freedom of movement was always meant to 
be about the freedom to take a job, it was not freedom to go and claim benefits so those 
rules need to be tougher, that is not what our benefit system is there for”.  In reality, 
“both EU and non-EU migrants are underrepresented among the key out-of-work 
benefits recipients” (Full Fact, 2015). However, they are “more likely to receive tax 
credits than people born in the UK” due to low waged jobs (ibid), but immigrants tend 
only to be in low paid jobs, for which they are over skilled, in the short term and then 
move on into more skilled jobs (Carney, 2015). The anti-immigrant narrative had the 
concomitant response of cutting welfare entitlement for immigrants. Supporting the 
argument that Westminster parties offered only variations of very similar policies, both 
Labour and Conservatives advocated controlling ‘problematic’ immigration by 
stopping child benefit for persons whose children lived abroad (Miliband in Cameron 
v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015; Miliband in Labour, 2015; Cameron in 
Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015), and Conservatives advocated 
preventing immigrants claiming benefits for the first four years 116  whilst Labour 
proposed to do this for two years (see Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders 
Special, 2015; Labour, 2015).  
 
Strengthening their logic of equivalence between Labour and irresponsibility, 
Conservatives blamed Labour’s ‘opening of the doors’ for ‘immigration problems’ 
(see Cameron in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015; Conservatives, 
2015). To strengthen their portrayal of their economic approach as successful they 
narrated their own failure to meet their immigration targets by arguing that immigrants 
from European countries with unsuccessful economic plans were attracted to the 
British economy (see Cameron in Cameron v Miliband: The Battle for No.10, 2015; 
Osborne, 2015d). However, in contrast, Carney (2015) expressed he would “dampen 
                                                     
116  Additionally Cameron (in Question Time: Election Leaders Special, 2015) proposed, 
“anyone coming from and EU country cannot claim unemployment benefit while they are 
looking for a job…if they are here after six months and haven’t got a job they have to go 
home”. 
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down” explanations blaming immigration 117  and he attributed low wages to poor 
productivity and a British labour surplus. Many people needed to work longer to afford 
living costs.  
 
The three anti-austerity parties also recognised that immigrants made a net 
contribution to public finances (see Sturgeon in BBC Election Debate, 2015) and 
highlighted the inanity therefore of calling for reduced immigration, which would lead 
to lower tax contributions (see Wood in BBC Election Debate, 2015). They countered 
UKIP’s claim that immigrants threatened the NHS by arguing they were necessary for 
it to function (see Bennett in BBC Election Debate, 2015; Bennett, in Seven Way 
Leaders Debate, 2015). The SNP, Plaid Cymru, and the Green Party highlighted that 
scapegoating of immigrants deflected blame from the real causes of pressure on wages 
and public services, which were government policies including cuts to public spending 
and reduction of trade union power (see Bennett, 2015a; Bennett in BBC Election 
Debate, 2015). They recognised that scapegoating the vulnerable removed 
responsibility from the powerful and legitimised unjust responses (see Wood in Seven 
Way Leaders Debate, 2015). The three anti-austerity parties criticised the dangerous 
terrain onto which UKIP had steered the immigration debate and Westminster had 
followed (see Bennett in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015) for developing an “anti-
immigration climate” (Wood in BBC Election Debate, 2015), and intolerance of 
immigrants (Sturgeon in BBC Election Debate, 2015). The thesis conclusion explores 
the dangerous terrain of the crisis narrative.  
 
Conclusion  
In GE15 Westminster definers continued to debate with narrow boundaries and offer 
variations of neoliberal responses. They constructed a façade of difference despite 
debating only the pace and depth of austerity, the extent of NHS privatisation, and 
immigrants’ welfare entitlements. Labour failed again to present a fundamental 
opposition to Conservatives. Westminster successfully shifted the terrain of debate to 
facilitate neoliberal intensification.  
 
                                                     
117 Carney (2015) highlighted that there were more older people working, people were working 
longer hours and this had increased by 500,000, whereas net migration had increased by 
50,000.  
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The narrative largely continued to identify ideologically advantageous ‘causes’ to 
legitimise neoliberal responses and deflect attention from neoliberal causes. Whilst 
Labour recognised high spending was a consequence of the crisis, not a cause, they 
maintained the austerity consensus. Welfare benefit claimants were demonised and 
shamed for their ‘immorality’ in order to legitimise a punitive shift in the welfare state. 
Westminster supported UKIP’s blaming of immigration for problems caused by 
neoliberal conditions, but blamed the levels of immigration on economic success and 
generous welfare benefits in order to frame the ‘necessary’ responses as continuing 
austerity and reductions in welfare support. Conservatives’ blaming of public spending 
for crisis and consensus around the necessity of austerity pushed the agenda decisively 
towards spending cuts. Significantly less attention was given to banking reform in 
GE15 than GE10 and deregulation was pushed down the agenda. Extraordinarily, 
‘shameless’ ‘exploitative’ welfare benefit claimants and immigrants became targets of 
responses as opposed to bankers.  
 
Despite its failings and definers’ decisions to slow its implementation, definers 
continued to construct austerity as successful and encouraged an inaccurate 
understanding of Britain’s fiscal position. They argued that it was necessary to build 
‘resilience’ to future crises. It was also framed as morally imperative. Claims of 
intergenerational fairness, rewarding those living ‘moral’ lives (defined in accordance 
with neo-conservatism), and patriotism were used.  
 
Meritocratic principles were differentially applied to justify different responses. ‘The 
undeserving’ ‘workless’ had to experience the consequences of ‘their failings’ and the 
‘hard-working’ had to work hard for less and endure sacrifice for the good of their 
country, as a moral duty for their fellow citizens, and to achieve the reward of the 
‘good life’. In contrast, the banker and the corporation were rational actors working 
for high remuneration. The negative consequences of their failings were socialised but 
they were personally and organisationally rewarded for ‘success’ and ‘ability’. 
Blaming poverty on individual moralities, as opposed to structure, legitimised welfare 
as re-moralisation. The welfare state was reframed as obstructing claimants’ paths to 
‘dignified’ hard-working lives.  
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Over time, the NHS was constructed as suffering, particularly from underfunding 
which (in line with the claim Britain had run out of money) the public sector was not 
able to address. Simultaneously, the framing of private capital as the saviour 
strengthened. Both enabled Westminster to argue that further privatisation of the NHS 
was necessary.   
 
In response to the SNP’s continued opposition to austerity, Westminster definers 
continued to frame its alternative as unviable and insist that SNP’s claims were a 
facade to hide its ‘true’ agenda and presented the party attaining power as a threat to 
the UK. The following chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the strategies used 
in the three moments, discussing the condition of hegemony, and developments and 





















Rationalising the Irrational? 
Introduction  
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This conclusion first summarises Westminster definers’ key strategies for narrating 
the crisis that have been detailed over the three previous chapters. It is argued that 
false, inaccurate, and misleading representations were central to rationalising the 
‘resolution’, and the significance of inaccurate representations of reality and 
withholding of information in the moments of the UK EU Membership Referendum 
2016 and Donald Trump’s election as the President of the US is noted. Attention is 
then turned to discussing the Corbyn-led challenge that has emerged since GE15, and 
comparisons are drawn with the Sanders-led challenge in the US. The conclusion 
considers the condition of hegemony in Britain between 2010 and 2015 and after, 
suggesting hypotheses for the relationship between Westminster narration and 
hegemony. Ideas for future research emanating from this project are suggested. 
Finally, the concluding remarks highlight the contribution this research makes to the 
literature for understanding this period in British history and reflects on the 
contemporary political moment in Britain.  
 
Framing the Irrational as Rational: The Strategies  
“Empiricism and the practices of modern science have bequeathed 
us a conception of knowledge as derived from the examination of 
objective phenomena and sense perceptions via experimentation and 
repeatable processes of verification. However...[the selected crisis 
resolution suggests] that this empirical model of knowledge is no 
longer prevalent. Lack of evidence is no longer a hindrance to the 
further entrenchment of a belief system” (Curtis, 2013: 74).  
 
Neither empirical evidence nor sound social or economic reasoning determined 
Westminster’s crisis ‘resolution’. Crisis-causing conditions were reproduced and 
deepened. Austerity continued despite evidence widely discrediting it. If, using 
historical and contemporary evidence, neoliberalism is evaluated as a method for 
successful economic functioning (defined as operating without crisis and delivering 
good quality of life for all) and the neoliberal ‘resolution’ is assessed as a means for 
‘resolving’ the crisis (determined by whether it addresses real causes and its ability to 
move the economy and the public out of crisis as swiftly as possible with minimal 
harm), they are absurd. On the other hand, if the ‘resolution’ and the neoliberal project 
more widely, are viewed as part of class-based project the decisions do assume a 
rational shape. To maintain hegemony, Westminster definers narrated the crisis to 
rationalise responses that deepened real causes, inflicting harm and injustice, and 
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therefore allowed structural flaws to continue (consequently heightening the 
likelihood of reoccurrence that will perhaps be even more devastating (Kay, 2015; 
Rajan, 2010)). They sought to disguise an advancement of a longstanding class-based 
project.  
 
In attempting to achieve active consent or at least acquiescence, Westminster definers 
restricted debate within narrow boundaries to exclude non-neoliberal alternatives and 
their merits and reinforce the ‘necessity’ of neoliberal responses. They identified 
ideologically advantageous ‘causes’ that had concomitant neoliberal responses. 
Definers favourably structured Britain’s agenda of concern, shifting debate onto more 
neoliberal terrain. They sought to generate misunderstanding of Britain’s fiscal 
position to justify responses, and constructed neoliberal responses as moral 
imperatives. At the same time they countered challenges by constructing alternatives 
as unviable and immoral, inaccurately representing parties and their ‘resolutions’, and 
reinforcing an attribution of blame but redirected towards the Westminster 
‘resolution’.  
 
Restricting Debate within Neoliberal Boundaries: The Power of Consensus  
Between 2010 and 2015 Westminster debate was confined within narrow boundaries, 
attempting to limit mental horizons and construct a neoliberal ‘resolution’ as 
necessary. The main Westminster parties did not present a fundamental challenge to 
each other. They maintained consensus around the necessity of austerity, ‘business 
friendly’ conditions, including further privatisation of both the NHS and nationalised 
banks. Alternative explanations, responses and their merits were excluded. For 
Westminster, there was no real alternative, merely variations.  
 
Westminster debated comparatively minor variations of responses, including the 
timing and depth of austerity, the extent of NHS privatisation, and the number of years 
before immigrants’ entitlements to benefits should begin. Definers constructed a 
façade of major difference, debate, and choice, relying heavily on logics of difference 
portraying parties as clashing from extreme ends of the political spectrum. 
Paradoxically, consensus around responses despite supposed ‘opposition’ was used as 
evidence for their necessity. The absence of a challenge for much of the period aided 
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this narration. Challengers later in the crisis however, began to contest this dominant 
and narrow narrative.  
 
Identifying Ideologically Advantageous ‘Causes’ with Concomitant Neoliberal 
Responses  
Westminster definers attributed blame to ideologically advantageous but false 
‘causes’. These had concomitant neoliberal responses that obscured the ‘resolutions’ 
absurdity. Inaccurately attributing blame to neoliberalism’s targets prompted 
responses that allowed the project to advance. For the most part, real neoliberal causes 
were excluded from Westminster’s blame attribution discourses in order to lower 
expectations of what would be more logical responses for avoiding crisis and moving 
the economy out of crisis but which would conflict with neoliberal tenets. Narration 
sought to obscure the ‘resolution’s’ failure to confront the real structural origins of the 
crisis and political selection of responses.  
 
Conservatives’ assertions that Labour’s ‘reckless’ public spending had caused 
‘threateningly’ high debt and deficit framed austerity as a logical response. The 
‘unaffordable’ public sector, framed as wasteful, encouraging ‘dependence’ and 
‘exploitation’, became the problem to be addressed with private capital positioned as 
the antidote. This framing rationalised reductions in the public sector, further 
privatisation, and the protection, and deepening, of other ‘business friendly’ 
conditions, including lower corporation tax, deregulation, and reduced social and 
labour rights and protectionism.  
 
Whilst media and public perceptions pressured Westminster definers into discussing 
the ‘problem’ of the financial industry, their narration was limited to bankers’ 
‘reckless’ and irresponsible behaviour. This was not contextualised within 
neoliberalism itself.  Blame for Britain’s ‘decline’ was attributed to the behaviour of 
those at the bottom of the class hierarchy, dependent and exploitative ‘workless’ 
welfare claimants and poor immigrants, rather than structural flaws. Focus on family 
lifestyles when attributing blame for poverty sought to deflect blame from structural 
conditions and framed responses, including cuts to welfare benefits, as ‘encouraging’ 
‘responsibility’. Public dissatisfaction with falling real wages, a struggling NHS, and 
a lack of social housing was directed towards the poor immigrant. This framed 
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withdrawal, and increasing conditionality of welfare benefits as necessary for re-
moralisation and protection of both ‘hard-working taxpayers’ and Britain. “Deviant 
others” in Young’s words became “a scapegoat” “for the systemic problems which 
society faces” (Young, 1999: 20, 96, 105). Welfare claimants and particularly poor 
immigrants were constructed as morally distinct from ‘us’ – ‘the hard-working’. 
Definers operated to generate a further shift away from, in Young’s (1999: 1) 
terminology, collectivism, “assimilation and incorporation” and towards 
individualism, separation and exclusion. This encouraged a climate of intolerance and 
active support of harmful responses, or at least acquiescence. In Hall’s (1979: 15) 
terminology they were seeking to generate “authoritarian populism”. 
 
In the current phase of “punitive neoliberalism”, “governments and societies unleash 
hatred and violence upon members of their own populations” (Davies, 2016a: 130). 
The harms discussed in the thesis introduction and in Cooper and Whyte (2017) 
evidence the violence of the government’s austerity policies. Whilst neoliberalism 
inherently supports individualism and often blames the vulnerable for their 
vulnerability, the denigration of the vulnerable has moved into more dangerous terrain. 
Adam Perkins (2016a: 140), a neurobiologist at King’s College London, argued: 
 
 “a welfare state which boosts the number of children born into 
disadvantaged households will…undermine the nation’s stock of 
human capital by boosting the number of children in the population 
who develop employment–resistant personality profiles”.  
 
He advocated welfare support for children, particularly potential children, should be 
reduced. For social Darwinists unconditional redistribution hinders the competition 
from playing out and allows the “survival of the unfittest” (Amable, 2011: 8). Whilst 
this perspective is marginal, that Perkin’s thesis gained significant media coverage - 
most notably he published an article in the Daily Mail and he was invited to speak at 
the London School of Economics (see Perkins, 2016b) - signifies openness to 
dangerous and previously unacceptable way of speaking about the vulnerable. Protests 
from students, led to the lecture being postponed, perhaps signifying a simultaneously 
growing resistance. Conservatives’ ‘two child policy’ means that a family who has a 
third child from April 2017 will no longer receive housing benefit or tax credits for 
that child or subsequent children (see HM Revenue and Customs, 2017). 
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Conservatives have framed the policy, which has “serious implications for 
reproductive rights and family wellbeing” (Lowe, 2015), as morally imperative to 
ensure ‘fairness’ for children and ‘hard-working taxpayers’118 rather than as a means 
to improve the ‘quality’ of the population.  
 
Key political definers have also made comments suggesting that some vulnerable 
populations are less valuable and that their human entitlements and freedoms should 
be withdrawn. Nigel Farage asserted that Britain’s immigration policies should protect 
the country from exploitation by HIV positive immigrants seeking healthcare. UKIP’s 
campaign poster of mainly non-white refugees resembled Nazi propaganda. David 
Cameron dehumanised those seeking refuge from war by describing them as a 
“swarm” (Elgot and Taylor, 2015) a term meaning a dense group of insects, and 
advocating Britain turn back boats. Whilst there has been critique of these comments, 
including by other political elites, the growth in support for Conservatives and UKIP 
when portraying the vulnerable in such ways signifies dangerous terrain.   
 
A strengthening of nationalism marks the current period. UKIP and Westminster’s 
blaming of immigrants has generated populist support for an exclusionary approach to 
‘them’. In addition to the support for Conservatives and UKIP, the vote for Britain to 
leave the EU is in part a reflection of nationalism and response to ‘problematic 
immigration’. Nationalism is challenging the free movement of people and demanding 
more intense regulation of migration. In the US, whilst there has been the Sanders-led 
movement there has also been a nationalist populist driven challenge to the freedom 
of movement of people and indeed industry. A fundamental commitment of Trump’s 
campaign for US presidency was that he would take a punitive approach to 
immigration in the interests of American citizens. He committed to developing the 
national manufacturing industry to generate valuable jobs for Americans, an economic 
strategy more closely associated with Keynesianism than neoliberalism. These may 
reflect a move away from neoliberal globalism to Americanism (Trump in Berenson, 
                                                     
118 Iain Duncan Smith (cited in Mulholland, 2012) stated, “it's…about those children growing 
up in workless households. Their lives are destroyed by this. They need also to learn that it's 
the right thing for parents to go to work". Grant Shapps (cited in Chapman, 2013) stated it was 
“fair to the taxpayer” because it creates “a choice for people on welfare, which mirrors that 
which millions of people in work who aren’t receiving state support have to make”. 
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2016; Trump in Los Angeles Times Staff, 2016). On the other hand, Trump is also 
seeking to rollback Obama’s affordable healthcare policies, part of Steve Bannon’s 
dismantling of the ‘administrative state’. His project cannot yet be understood as a 
rejection of neoliberalism; there are conflicting movements. Moreover, Trump’s 
presidency itself is precarious. Should he be removed from office it may be that a more 
‘traditional’ neoliberal conservatism would be re-asserted. Nationalism, for its part, is 
already inflicting harm on, particularly poor, immigrants. The House of Commons has 
allowed ‘Brexit’ legislation to be passed without guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens 
living and working in the UK (see Asthana et al, 2017). Recently elected, Donald 
Trump is seeking to implement Executive Order 13769 titled ‘Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, which suspends entry of people 
from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, and suspends the US refugee 
programme (see Lee and Salama, 2017). As the threat of further economic insecurity 
looms heavy as Britain leaves the EU tensions may become even more acute and 
responses to the vulnerable more punitive. Britain may be moving into more dangerous 
terrain.  
 
Structuring a Favourable Agenda, Shifting Debate onto More Neoliberal Terrain 
Over this period, neoliberal causes of crisis were minimised, neutralised, or ignored 
shaping public expectation of responses. Comparing narration between the two 
General Elections shows that Westminster parties maintained their diagnoses of crisis, 
framed their responses as remaining necessary, and with great chutzpah, called for 
more of the same ‘successful’ approach. In short, the need for neoliberal ‘resolution’ 
and a return to neoliberal normality was asserted in GE10 and re-asserted in GE15. 
 
A comparative analysis of the two elections shows that Westminster blame attribution 
discourses operated to push neoliberal targets up the agenda of concern. The relatively 
radical commitments to regulating finance and displacing it from its central position 
in the economy made in GE10 diminished in prominence as the crisis developed. By 
GE15, whilst there were still some claims that the state needed to reduce the power of 
finance they were lacklustre and marginal. Private sector disaster and regulation of 
finance were not key topics. In sharp contrast, the ‘problems’ of public spending, debt, 
deficit and the welfare state dominated, and assertions of the importance of Britain’s 
‘business friendly’ conditions strengthened, overshadowing any demands for radical 
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change. In GE10, immigration was not a key topic of debate but Westminster’s 
endorsement of UKIP’s blaming of immigrants for austerity conditions meant that by 
GE15 tackling the ‘problem’ of immigration was at the top of the agenda. Westminster 
definers successfully ensured that the calls for reform and intense regulation shifted 
from finance and bankers to welfare and immigration rationalising an unjust response.  
 
In GE10 the NHS was low down the agenda. However, by GE15 its underfunding and 
the emphasis given to its unaffordability placed it towards the top of Britain’s agenda. 
Given the public value of the NHS it would have been difficult to immediately assert 
that the necessary response to financial crisis was to further privatise the service. 
Rather the news that the NHS was in crisis and private capital was the only ‘resolution’ 
was delivered to the public over the period to optimise likelihood of acceptance of the 
next stage of neoliberalism’s privatisation of healthcare. In Fairclough’s (2000) 
terminology, the ground was prepared.  
 
Definers also sought to shift the terrain of debate even further in a neoliberal direction. 
This was facilitated by Westminster consensus around key responses. It allowed 
debate to focus on extents of neoliberal responses. Before the financial crisis there was 
a degree of consensus between Westminster parties around higher public spending 
levels. However, Conservatives’ powerful construction of high public spending as a 
cause, not powerfully countered by Labour, shifted the terrain of the debate so that the 
parties then competed by committing to ever greater public spending cuts. Rather than 
framing the welfare state as protection from structurally generated conditions David 
Cameron was able to argue that it was undignified for individuals to be dependent 
upon unearned ‘handouts’. According to him, the system was preventing claimants 
from living a valuable and dignified life. Westminster parties then competed by 
expressing their commitment to ‘the hard-working’ who would be rewarded 
eventually, as opposed to ‘the dependent’ who would be disciplined through cuts.  
 
Encouraging an Inaccurate Understanding of the UK’s Fiscal Position  
Crucially, to cultivate concern about debt and deficit and rationalise austerity 
Westminster definers disseminated incorrect accounts of the UK’s fiscal position and 
presented misleading comparisons. The public were inaccurately informed that the 
country had run out of money – that it had met its borrowing and spending limits. The 
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alternative of fiscal stimulus and/or redistribution and their merits were excluded. This 
construction was key to positioning austerity and the sacrifices it required as necessity 
rather than choice. This notion that the government could not spend any more even if 
it wanted to was key to portraying the NHS as unaffordable and private investment as 
necessary. Definers used metaphors that encouraged the public to make sense of 
national finances through their understanding of household finances. They told the 
public that the UK had been irresponsible and needed to change its excessive spending 
habit and produce a surplus that could form a rainy day fund in order to build resilience 
to future crisis. These metaphors positioned austerity and its continuation as 
responsible. Westminster definers sought to generate debt and deficit hysteria by 
suggesting that the UK’s fiscal position was similar to that of Greece, which had, 
however misleadingly, been constructed as the epitome of national irresponsibility. 
The major differences between the UK case and Greek case and the fact that the 
predicament of the latter was intimately related to neoliberalism and disastrously 
exacerbated by austerity, were disingenuously ignored to generate anxiety as support 
for austerity. Cutting public spending became the moralising focus as opposed to the 
regulation and limiting of finance capital, the boosting of a sagging economy, and the 
remedying of other structural flaws, such as inequality, and low investment and 
demand.  
 
Despite the evidence that austerity was counterproductive to achieving growth to the 
extent that the UK’s credit rating was reduced119, Osborne was forced to abandon the 
emergency plan, and that austerity failed to meet ‘necessary’ debt and deficit targets, 
Conservatives constructed the plan as successful. Osborne did not explicitly recognise 
this failure or change in his approach. Rather, he sought to generate ignorance, or at 
least ambiguity, about its failings. Discursively unfaltering, he asserted the 
Conservative plan for resolution was working and needed to be continued into the next 
parliamentary term (although the plan was actually modified to a slightly slower 
journey of austerity). This supports in part Clarke and Newman’s (2012: 302) 
assessment that when it came to austerity “apparent failure [led] not to reconsideration 
and reassessment but the imposition of more of the same”.  
                                                     
119  This contrasted with Conservatives’ 2010 claim that austerity was necessary to protect the 
credibility of Britain’s brand.  
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Framing Neoliberal Conditions as Moral Sacrifices  
The case for the economic ‘necessity’ of austerity was reinforced by a proclamation 
of its moral necessity (see Clarke and Newman, 2012). As Konzelmann (2014: 701) 
recognises “appeals to ethics and morality” are key tools of those seeking to justify 
austerity.  Working hard whilst accepting sacrifices was framed as fulfilling a moral 
duty that would enable Britain to make a comeback and the ‘deserving’ (those living 
their lives in accordance with neo-conservative values) to enjoy the ‘good life’. Social 
images of British people as hard workers, disciplined towards national and personal 
goals (see Hall et al, 1978) were drawn upon to argue that Britain was capable (unlike 
Greece) of patriotic sacrifice. As Clarke and Newman (2012: 307) argue, justifications 
for austerity tried to use “the memory of post-war collective solidarities” and 
“rationing, making do, and mending”. Elite definers did not utilise the same framing 
when discussing bankers’ pay. They were rational actors who required high 
remuneration to be motivated to operate in Britain’s interests. This framing fostered 
the injustice of sacrifice being borne by those who did not cause the crisis.  
 
Definers argued that it was morally right for this generation to pay for its 
irresponsibility. The construction of the crisis as the result of the mistakes of a 
generation justified sacrifice being experienced by the many not the few and 
‘resolving’ the problem immediately rather than over time. It was framed as morally 
wrong to pass down deficit and debt to the next generation. Austerity was framed in 
the working generation’s children and grandchildren’s interests. However, cuts 
impacted the younger generation. They led to university tuition fees being almost 
trebled, swathes of economic activity being undertaken on a ‘zero hours’ basis under 
fixed term contracts, and a rise in child poverty. It was also unfair to ask the previous 
working generation (who represented a large portion of Conservative voters) to 
sacrifice, when they had passed down a country, supposedly, in a good condition.  
Welfare cuts were framed as ensuring that the ‘moral hard-working’ were rewarded 
whilst disciplining and re-moralising ‘the immoral’. Sacrifices would be placed on the 
shoulders of the ‘undeserving’. Moral framings of deservingness were contradictory 
when narrating banker’s remuneration. Bankers deserved the reward for success but 
did not require withdrawal of reward for failings. Rather they required a reward to 
motivate success. There were also attempts to frame welfare benefit cuts as in the 
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interests of welfare claimants themselves, as helping them attain self-esteem, self-
respect, dignity, and a valuable life. Cuts to disability benefit, in similar fashion, were 
framed as part of a progressive plan to open up opportunities.  
 
Here, I directly address the research questions. Westminster definers’ narrative 
relocated the origins of crisis in public spending as opposed to private capital. This 
was achieved by framing the crisis as caused by Labour’s public spending. It blamed 
immorality firstly of bankers, and then directed attention towards the ‘immorality’ of 
neo-conservative targets. Some blame attribution discourses were more accurate than 
others but there was a shared commitment to limiting criticisms of structural flaws. 
Ideologically advantageous causes were blamed that had concomitant neoliberal 
responses.  
 
Responses then, targeted discursively constituted causes and there was an absence of 
responses addressing real causes. Responses were framed as economically, as well as 
morally necessary. Inaccurate constructions of Britain’s fiscal position helped to frame 
austerity and its continuation as necessary. The discourse of success was key to 
legitimising responses that were not only harmful but were detrimental to economic 
recovery. To be moral, Britain had to sacrifice and individuals needed to be disciplined 
and learn the values of individual responsibility and dignity. Debate was limited to 
exclude alternatives and Westminster restrained the choice to variations of the same 
responses.  
 
In terms of how the narrative developed, in GE10 and GE15 Westminster continuously 
and collectively engaged in the strategies. They failed to present genuine oppositions 
to one another. In GE15 they called for more of the successful approach they had 
constructed as necessary in GE10. As the crisis developed issues and responses were 
pushed up and down the agenda, causes that had connected anti-neoliberal responses 
were pushed down and causes that had neoliberal responses were pushed up. By GE15 
banking and financial reform had been successfully pushed down whilst addressing 
deficit and welfare reform to counter the immorality of the poor were at the top. 
Comparative analysis of the two elections shows that the ground was prepared for 
intensification of neoliberal responses. In GE10 Conservatives suggested that public 
return for reprivatisation of the banks may need to be balanced against ensuring 
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competitiveness and by GE15 banks were reprivatised at a loss in the name of 
competitiveness. In GE10 Conservatives declared a willingness to reduce trade union 
power if required, by GE15 they were proposing how this would be done. Rarely 
mentioned in GE10, by GE15 the NHS was at the top of the agenda. The ground had 
been prepared for further privatisation. The discourse of private capital as public’s 
saviour was applied to the NHS, and the construction that Britain had run out of money 
framed this as necessary.  
 
There were shifts in debate. Before the crisis Labour and Conservatives competed by 
committing to spending more, framing cutting spending as responsible allowed them 
to compete by committing to cuts. Whereas previously, welfare benefits were means 
to a basic standard of living now for Conservatives ‘living on’ benefits was no life at 
all. There were also clear differences in the narratives of SIR14 and those of the 
elections. In SIR14 the Labour party constructed itself as the party of social justice 
which was juxtaposed against its claims and commitments of the elections. Similarly, 
in SIR14 the public were spoken of as collective, they were neighbours and family, 
which contrasted with the scapegoating evident in the narratives of the elections. 
Narratives also developed within moments. In the SIR14 Cameron eventually 
produced an embattled language in response to support for the SNP’s offering of 
change. BTD shifted from emphasising the positives of the relationship to the 
consequences of divorce as support grew and the referendum grew closer. Attention is 
now turned to Westminster’s strategies for countering challenges, the focus of the 




Countering Challenges: The Strategies 
As challenges developed, Westminster definers’ sought to counter them. The SNP, 
Green Party, and Plaid Cymru’s challenges sought to break the boundaries of debate, 
identify real, but previously excluded, causes and advocate alternative responses. They 
struggled to change the agenda and shift debate off neoliberal terrain, share more 
accurate representations of the UK’s fiscal position, and frame austerity and 
privatisation as unnecessary and socially unjust. In answer to research question three, 
Westminster definers, to assert the ‘rationality’, the ‘necessity’ and ‘desirability’ of 
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their neoliberal ‘resolution’, constructed alternatives as unviable and immoral, and 
presented inaccurate representations of parties and their ‘resolutions’. Also, in 
response to the UKIP challenge they reinforced the blaming of immigration but their 
framing strategically redirected Britain towards Westminster’s neoliberal ‘resolution’.  
 
‘Idealistic’ and ‘Unviable’ Visions  
Oppositional movements’ plans were constructed as idealistic and unviable. For 
Westminster, if Scotland were to be independent the absence of a reputable ‘brand’ 
would mean that borrowing would become incredibly expensive, which would be 
harmful for national and household finances. Corporations, particularly the RBS, 
would flee or stay but either way they would threaten the smaller economy. Higher 
costs would be imposed; again this would be harmful for national and household 
finances. Taxes would inevitably have to rise, as Scotland would struggle to maintain 
existing social justice measures never mind fund more, especially as it was relying on 
declining oil revenues. Borrowing and spending could not increase. The UK was 
already burdened with unaffordable debt, so the plans of the three anti-austerity parties 
were unviable. Westminster neoliberals excluded the merits of alternatives’ and 
asserted that any divergence from the neoliberal ‘resolution’ would always lead to a 
bad ending. Particularly in the SIR14 INM their narration sought to generate fear and 
anxiety about the consequences of voting for the SNP’s alternative.  
 
Inaccurate Representations of Parties and their ‘Resolutions’  
To encourage a rejection of political parties’ alternative visions Westminster definers 
inaccurately represented parties. During SIR14, BTD represented Labour as the party 
of social justice referring to past progressive achievements in order to encourage those 
voters who were seeking a socially just ‘resolution’ to reject the SNP alternative. The 
construction contrasted with Labour’s wider crisis narrative, which, mirroring the 
Conservatives, appealed to the moral value of so-called ‘fairness’ to legitimise 
reversals of social justice. This portrayal sought to obscure the Labour party’s dramatic 
shift to the right under neoliberalism. This was a party after all that chose to abstain 
on the Conservative governments’ welfare bill in July 2015.  
 
In GE10 Conservatives and Liberal Democrats portrayed their parties as committed to 
equality, giving particular emphasis to social mobility. However, whilst the personal 
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income tax allowance was raised, what followed were five years of an economic 
approach that sharply widened inequality and reduced social mobility. In GE15 
Westminster parties competed to be the party of the ‘hard-working’. However, their 
political choices of austerity, further privatisation of the NHS and other public assets, 
as well as Conservatives commitment to further withdrawing labour rights, 
contradicted this claim.  
 
BTD capitalised on the fact that the SNP’s anti-austerity arguments developed as part 
of a movement for independence arguing that their ‘falsehoods’ about austerity were 
engineered as a façade for their true ‘narrow’ nationalist agenda. This was also 
particularly useful for reasserting Westminster’s arguments for austerity; if the SNP 
could not be believed then, neither could their anti-austerity arguments. Seeking to 
undermine their credibility, they constructed the SNP as attempting to manufacture 
public ignorance of their true plans, most notably cuts.  
 
Framing Alternatives as Immoral  
In the SIR14 INM BTD’ narration encouraged emotional sense-making by 
disseminating deeply moralised constructions. The metaphor of a personal relationship 
framed voting for independence as an immoral act. It was likened to a parent walking 
away from their marriage and their family home, leaving their children to an uncertain 
future, or leaving their neighbour in a time of difficulty. The ‘right’ thing to do was to 
stand by your neighbour, your children, and wider family. An independent Scotland 
was portrayed as abandoning Britain’s collective struggle against the ‘Tories’ and 
therefore reducing Britain’s ability to struggle for social justice at home and abroad. 
The relationship metaphor, again facilitated by the fact that the arguments emerged as 
part of a campaign for independence, allowed voting for an anti-austerity alternative 
to be framed as not truly valuing social justice because walking away did not reflect 
the values of compassion or solidarity (even though Westminster was advocating 
austerity).  
 
Reinforcing but Redirecting  
In GE15 in response to UKIP’s nationalist pursuit of UK ‘independence’ from the EU 
seeking to restrain the movement of people, and appealing to anti-establishment 
resentments, Westminster endorsed UKIP’s blaming of immigration and need for a 
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more authoritarian response. This framing however, was used to argue for further cuts 
to welfare and to counter the argument that leaving the EU was necessary. They 
utilised the attribution of blame but their framing sought to redirect Britain away from 
independence from the EU and towards further austerity measures.  
 
A Deceitful Narrative? Discouraging Genuine Understanding  
False, inaccurate, and misleading representations were central, systematic, and 
ubiquitous. This thesis supports Davies’s (2016a: 132, emphasis added) argument that 
many crisis narratives from above have an absence of both “critical forms of 
knowledge, which necessarily represent the deficiencies of the present” and an 
“epistemological or semiotic aspiration to represent reality”.  
 
Genuine understanding about causes of the crisis was not encouraged, and definers 
sought to obscure the continuation of causes in the ‘resolution’. Alternatives and their 
merits were excluded. Real understanding of the UK’s fiscal freedom was not 
encouraged. Empirical evidence and knowledge about the failings of austerity was 
withheld, as were Conservative plans for English votes for English laws, and 
forthcoming benefits cuts. When challengers brought previously excluded ideas and 
knowledge into debate, Westminster definers discredited both the opposition and the 
ideas and knowledge they were sharing. Blame was attributed to false or non-causes 
and the public were inaccurately told that the UK had met its borrowing limit, that 
higher taxes would send talent abroad, and that economic stimulus was economically 
unviable, despite ample evidence to the contrary. Parties were strategically 
misrepresented. Framings, particularly through the use of metaphors and comparisons, 
were misleading. Unemployment and poverty were misrepresented as the result of an 
individual’s moral failings. Focus was misleadingly deflected away from Britain’s 
structural flaws and towards neoliberal targets. Over the course of the crisis false 
causes and desired responses were pushed to prominence whilst real causes were 
pushed down, and moved off, the agenda. Deeply moralised claims framed neoliberal 
responses as right and necessary for a moral ‘resolution’. ‘Facts’ were shared that were 
not actual lies but Westminster framings meant they did not reflect, and actually 
misrepresented, reality. Powerful definers did not encourage genuine understanding. 
They chose not to share available authentic knowledge representing evidence, chose 
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to strategically withhold information, and through inaccurate representations 
misrepresented reality.  
 
At the meso level, it served banks’ interests to prevent understanding of financial 
products, particularly their risks. Uninformed consumers were more likely to buy 
mortgages they could not afford, personal payment insurance they did not need, 
endowment mortgages that would not pay out, and they were more likely to invest in 
hedge funds that bought toxic and potentially valueless ‘assets’. At the micro level, 
Cioffi and Tannin, two former Bearn Stearns hedge fund managers, kept their clients 
in ignorance of the risks they were taking, causing them to lose £1.6billion when the 
funds collapsed (Davies and McGoey, 2012). Then, in court, contrary to the evidence, 
they pleaded ignorance of risks to avoid individual accountability and were determined 
not guilty (ibid). Rojan (2010: 1) states that “some hedge fund managers and traders 
in investment banks put their money instead of their mouths to work”, only a few 
financiers openly expressed concerns. Westminster definers, in similar fashion, 
claimed that politicians and bankers could not have predicted the risks posed by an 
industry that was oversized, narrowly motivated by profit accumulation, and 
unrestrained by effective regulation. Discouraging genuine understanding can clearly 
be of significant value for those seeking to protect hegemony of a project, profit 
accumulation of a corporation, and themselves and others from accountability. Davies 
and McGoey (2012: 65) suggest, “ignorance, not knowledge, has been the most 
indispensible resource throughout the crisis”.  
 
In both the UK EU Membership Referendum 2016 and Trump’s inauguration as 
President of the US and early presidency, key political definers attempted to deceive 
the public with a brazenness that was alarmingly reminiscent of authoritarian and 
totalitarian excesses. Central to the leave campaign in the UK EU membership 
referendum 2016, was the statement “we send the EU £350million a week let’s fund 
our NHS instead’, which was emblazoned on the side of the leave campaign bus 
(Stone, 2016). This was clearly meant to be decoded as meaning that an additional 
£350million per week would be spent on the NHS. Before the vote there was no 
attempt by any leave campaigners to stop people believing this. However, speaking 
the morning after voting day Farage, both a key player in building support for a 
referendum and a prominent political figure advocating leave, said the funding could 
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not be guaranteed and that it was a mistake to suggest it could (ibid). Again, timing of 
the news after the vote was strategic. In response to a question about why he supported 
leaving the EU when corporate, including financial, elites were advocating stay, 
Michael Gove (2016), a Conservative MP and key leave campaigner, declared “I think 
people in this country have had enough of experts”. He asserted that because the 
experts belonged to organisations that had advocated the conditions that led to crisis 
the public were not interested in what ‘experts’ had to say. There is disingenuousness 
here: an architect of policies that have inflicted harm, injustice, and continued causes, 
at the same time blames the ‘experts’ and claims common sense ‘alongside’ the victims 
of the disasters he and his colleagues have wrought.  
 
One phenomenon that has developed is referred to as ‘Trump speak’ (see Douglas, 
2017). Blatantly disregarding empirical evidence, US President Donald Trump 
disseminates falsehoods to gain support for his presidency and policies. Rather than 
using his resources to attain truth and share it, and in a reversal of the 
primary/secondary definer relationship, Trump justifies the dissemination of 
numerous falsehoods by asserting that he is merely repeating news from the media 
(see Shugerman, 2017). Seeking to legitimise his immigration policy, for example, 
early in 2017 Trump suggested that Sweden was suffering from refugees’ criminality 
and when ‘caught’ lying cited Fox News (see Bengtsson and Scruton, 2017). This 
seems even more absurd given research shows that viewers of Fox News are less 
informed about international political issues than those who do not watch any news 
(see Huffington Post, 2011). Whilst Trump blasts mainstream news as ‘fake’, his 
advisor Kellyanne Conway in the week of Trump’s inauguration referred to Trump 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s, inaccurate statements about attendance at Trump’s 
inauguration as “alternative facts” (see Osborne, 2017). ‘Fake news’ (ironically 
appropriated by its main exponent), which refers to intentionally fabricated ‘news’ 
predicated on falsehoods and created without an intention to reflect reality, has become 
a key political issue. Hersh (2004: 3) in a statement that has even greater pertinence 
now, states: 
“it would not be surprising if future generations look upon our era as 
‘the age of newspeak’ or doublespeak: half-truths and lies being used 
to justify policies and actions which are in opposition to established 
norms of morality and decency”.  
 217 
In his thesis of inverted totalitarianism, Wolin (2008: 49) argues that in the US and to 
a lesser extent the UK, democratic principles, including debate and decision-making, 
appear to be generally adhered to but actually lose their “substance”. There is a 
“shallowness of democracy” and a “pseudo-democratic” system exists (ibid: 53, 60).  
Entities become “nominally democratic” (Harvey, 2005: 205). This, should not be 
surprising, as McChesney (1999: 9) notes: “neoliberalism works best when there is 
formal electoral democracy, but when the population is diverted from the information, 
access and public forums necessary for meaningful participation in decision making”. 
In GE10 and GE15 there were not fundamentally oppositional parties for Britain to 
choose between. Rather, key ‘oppositional’ parties offered variations of similar 
responses. Definers debated within limited boundaries whilst those without power and 
legitimacy in the system struggled to have their voices heard. Transparency and 
openness were claimed but evidence, knowledge, and information were withheld from 
official discourses and reality misrepresented. Westminster definers did not facilitate 
the public making genuinely informed decisions and being able to vote for a party that 
reflected their perspective.  
 
Change on the Horizon 
Since GE15 an oppositional movement to Westminster’s narration of crisis and 
‘resolution’ has developed from within the Labour party. Jeremy Corbyn, a 
longstanding Labour MP, has led a challenge that offers an alternative vision of a full 
movement away from neoliberal capitalism and towards a political economic 
transformation that would reinstate a version of social democratic capitalism. The 
Corbyn-led movement has put ending austerity and investing in public services back 
on the agenda and, confounding mainstream media commentators, is drawing 
increasing support. The 2017 Labour Party Manifesto signalled the ending of the 
party’s support for neoliberalism and its offering of a genuine alternative vision. At 
the time of writing real cracks have appeared in the edifice upon which the 
Westminster ‘resolution’ has been built. Part of Labour has effectively detached itself 
from the consensual ‘resolution’ of 2010-2015 and has begun engaging in real 
discursive struggle. Dominant consensus in official discourse, which was remarkably 
resilient over the three INMs, has started to unravel.  
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Following GE15, voices from within the Labour party, most notably Corbyn and John 
McDonnell, diagnosed the party’s election failure as a result of failing to offer an 
alternative vision. For Corbyn, the Labour plan “wasn’t fundamentally redistributive” 
despite severe inequality (Corbyn in Hattenstone, 2015). The diagnosis was in 
significant contrast to New Labour’s quite extraordinary explanation that blamed 
Miliband for being too far left despite the failure to provide a real opposition to 
Conservatives (see Blair, 2015a, d; Mandelson, 2015). This differential framing was 
central to the battle within the party over its direction that was played out publicly 
between the aftermath of GE15 until the 2017 General Election.  
 
The emerging alternative Labour narrative comes much closer to the real causes of the 
financial crisis and recognises the responses that have deepened them, inflicting 
inequality, injustice, poverty, desperation, and harm (see Corbyn cited in Hattenstone, 
2015; Corbyn, 2015b, c; McDonnell, 2015a). Corbyn’s moralistic narrative is inverted 
and located within a structural critique of inequality and deregulation.  
 
“The banking crisis was not caused by firefighters, street cleaners, 
nurses, teachers, or anyone else in our valuable public services. It 
was caused by deregulation; it was caused by sheer levels of greed. 
Whilst taking banks into public ownership was absolutely the right 
thing to do, the problem was they were not kept in public ownership; 
the banks were not forced to work for the rest of us in the economy, 
they were allowed to carry on in their own sweet way. So when it 
got to the 2010 election we were offering more austerity, more cuts, 
more punishment on the poorest in this country. David Cameron 
claimed we were all in it together. I don’t think so, David 
Cameron…I think you think everybody else is in it together except 
you and your party and the people around you…when we came to 
2015 surely we should have been able to offer something more than 
austerity” (Corbyn, 2015d). 
 
 
Corbyn and McDonnell have argued that austerity was a political choice (see Corbyn, 
2015b, Corbyn in Hattenstone, 2015; McDonnell, 2015). Corbyn (2015a) recognised 
the arguments against austerity:  
“the austerity process makes…[the debt and deficit problem] worse 
because it lowers income, lowers wages, lowers income tax, 
increases demand on welfare because of the levels of poverty in 
Britain, and so it actually is a cycle of decline. Surely it’s better to 
invest in an economy, to grow income and grow prosperity?”  
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Recognising Westminster’s inaccurate constructions, McDonnell (2015a) committed 
to embarking “on the immense task of changing the economic discourse in this 
country” and “opening up a national discussion on the reality of the roles of deficits, 
surpluses, long-term investment, debt, and monetary policy”. Drawing upon the work 
of economists, including Keynes, Stiglitz, Piketty, and Blanchflower, the alternative 
plan was to borrow and invest to grow the economy (see Corbyn, 2015e; McDonnell, 
2015a). The strategy included people’s quantitative easing120 (see Corbyn, 2015f), 
progressive taxation121 (see Corbyn, 2015f; McDonnell, 2015a, b) and the permanent 
nationalisation of banks, railways, energy companies, and full nationalisation of the 
NHS (Corbyn, 2015a, b, g). Moreover, seemingly in support of strengthening 
democracy and moving away from dangerous terrain, Corbyn (2015e) called for public 
“engagement”, “discussion” and “activism”, and “kinder politics and a more caring 
society” (Corbyn, 2015b).   
 
Westminster, particularly New Labour politicians, supported by large swathes of the 
mainstream media, launched a fierce discursive effort to counter, and ideally end, the 
movement. The critique had two core elements: Corbyn was unelectable as Prime 
Minister (see Blair, 2015a, c; Brown, 2015; Davies, 2015; Dominiczak et al, 2015; 
Kinnock, 2015; Newton Dunn et al, 2015) and the alternative vision was an idealistic 
“throwback” to a period of economic failure (see Blair, 2015a, c). The latter was of 
course ironic given that Westminster definers were advocating a set of idealisms that 
even recent history had proved economically flawed.  
 
New Labour MPs, later joined by some of Corbyn’s allies most notably MP Angela 
Eagle, Corbyn’s Shadow Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
                                                     
120  Drawing on Richard Murphy’s idea, they advocated the government buy bonds in a 
National Infrastructure Bank that funds projects such as railway and broadband improvements 
(see Leftly, 2015). Murphy (2015) argues the policy would allow investment in skills and 
publicly funded building of schools and hospitals as well as leading to higher wages and higher 
tax receipts, which are necessary to cut the deficit. McDonnell (2015b) argued that people’s 
QE could be adjusted to prevent too high inflation, and could be more effective in delivering 
investment, growth, and jobs than banks’ QE. Murphy (2015) recognised banks QE had been 
largely unsuccessful in boosting growth because the money had been used for bonuses and 
other banks costs whereas PQE would invest in the real economy.  
121 This involved commitments to reinstating the 50p tax rate and a higher rate of inheritance 
tax, ending some tax reliefs, for example on companies that do not produce enough jobs, and 
tackling tax avoidance and evasion (see Corbyn, 2015h; McDonnell, 2015b).  
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instigated a further leadership contest in 2016, only a year after the previous one. New 
Labour politicians openly undermined Corbyn in an attempt to weaken the power of 
his challenge. This was explicitly recognised by the architect of New Labour Peter 
Mandelson’s assertion that he “work[ed] every single day in some small way to bring 
forward the end of [Corbyn’s tenure in office]” (Mason and Elgot, 2017). As a result 
of this movement, the crisis, which at the beginning of this research only ever seemed 
like it would be a crisis within neoliberalism, finally has the potential to become a 
crisis of neoliberalism.  
 
Similarities can be drawn between the Corbyn-led movement in Britain and the Bernie 
Sanders-led movement in the US. From 2015 Senator Sanders, also a longstanding left 
wing politician, led an oppositional movement centered on addressing the issue of 
class inequality that also emerged from within a key political party that had clear 
disagreement over direction. Like Corbyn, Sanders argued that the political economic 
approach was not improving the lives of the majority of the public. He highlighted that 
globalisation had delivered massive profits for the wealthy and decline in working and 
living conditions for workers. He called for higher education to be subsidised, a 
universal healthcare system, and progressive taxation (see Roberts and Asthana, 
2017). Sanders has himself recognised the similarity of his and Corbyn’s movements, 
stating “there is a real similarity between what he has done and what I did - he has 
taken on the establishment of the Labour party, he has gone to the grassroots and he 
has tried to transform that party”. Sanders, like Corbyn, has received significant public 
support, particularly from the younger generation (see Bump, 2016).  
 
The narratives in the General Election 2017 were different from the previous narratives 
of the crisis (Richards, 2017). Whilst Conservatives in particular continued many 
familiar arguments and continued to advocate a neoliberal ‘resolution’, the Labour 
manifesto had significant breaks. Arguably for the first time in forty years the Corbyn-
led movement shifted the terrain of the debate more towards the left (ibid). It struggled 
to push key social issues up the agenda. Tax rises, social care funding, industrial 
strategy, a fully nationalised NHS, responding to the housing crisis and food poverty 
crisis were on the agenda and key real causes of crisis, most notably inequality, and 
the desperately slow ‘recovery’ from it became a focus of the narrative.    
 221 
These developments require the attention of future research projects. The intense 
narration moments of the two Labour leadership elections, and the General Election 
2017 could be subjected to a comprehensive critical discourse analysis to understand 
the narration and development of the Corbyn-led movement. Narratives, contestation, 
challenges, countering, and the condition of hegemony over the intense narration 
moments of the 2008 bailout, GE10, SIR14, GE15, the UK EU Membership 
Referendum 2016 and ‘Brexit’, the two Labour leadership elections, and General 
Election 2017 could be analysed. The shift of a crisis within neoliberalism towards a 
crisis of neoliberalism could be mapped.  
 
The Condition of Hegemony and Westminster Narration: Some Hypotheses  
The purpose of this research has been to examine official discourse. It has not analysed 
public sense-making of the crisis, public decoding of elites’ texts, or essentially the 
relationship between Westminster narration of the crisis and the condition of 
hegemony. As the theoretical framework explains, political elite narration plays a key 
role in attaining and maintaining hegemony but the condition of hegemony in Britain 
cannot be wholly attributed to Westminster narration, or even that of all political elite 
definers. Public sense-making is more complex than this. This conclusion now 
considers the condition of hegemony up to 2015 using existing, but limited, research 
and election and referendum results. Some hypotheses for the relationship between 
Westminster narration and public sense-making of the crisis, that is to say, the extent 
of the ‘success’ of Westminster’s narration, are suggested.  
 
Misunderstanding and Active Support: ‘Successful’ Encoding?  
The limited analyses of public sense-making of austerity indicate that Westminster 
narration ‘successfully’ generated some misunderstanding of the crisis and active 
support particularly for welfare reform. Stanley (2014: 21) conducted focus groups 
between May and October 2012 to analyse sense-making of austerity among 
“homeowners from middle-income areas and community volunteers from poorer 
areas”. He found that public debt was at the top of the agenda, as opposed to financial 
crisis or a lack of growth, and there was a belief that austerity was necessary to deal 
with “excessive indebtedness” (ibid: 22). It was also perceived that the government 
and households had overspent before the crisis and “there was a mood that ‘we must 
reap what we sow’”: Britain and the British public had to endure the consequences for 
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prior irresponsibility (ibid: 22). Stanley’s research reflects 2010 polls that showed a 
strong public belief that Labour’s ‘over-public spending’ was the cause of the crisis 
and in the necessity, and the claimed virtues, of austerity (YouGov cited in Berry, 
2015). These findings suggest that Westminster narration had ‘successfully’ 
encouraged the public to make sense of the crisis as a public debt crisis, blame public 
spending and households’ irresponsibility, and to believe in the necessity and morality 
of austerity. 
 
The Trades Union Congress (2013) found that in 2012 “widespread ignorance about 
spending on welfare, the reality of unemployment, the generosity of benefits and the 
level of [benefit] fraud” helped to gain support for benefit cuts. The poll identified the 
following misconceptions: 
 
“on average people think that 41 percent of the entire welfare budget 
goes on benefits to unemployed people, while the true figure is 3 
percent…that 27 percent of the welfare budget is claimed 
fraudulently, while the government's own figure is 0.7 percent…that 
almost half the people…who claim Jobseeker's Allowance go on to 
claim it for more than a year, while the true figure is around 10 
percent…an unemployed couple with two school-age children 
would get £147 in Jobseeker's Allowance - more than 30 percent 
higher than the £111.45 they would actually receive - a £35 over-
calculation”.  
 
Discussing the poll the General Secretary of the Trade Union Congress, O’Grady, 
stated:  
“it is not surprising that voters want to get tough on welfare. They 
think the system is much more generous than it is in reality, is riddled 
with fraud and is heavily skewed towards helping the unemployed, 
who they think are far more likely to stay on the dole than is actually 
the case. Indeed if what the average voter thinks was true, I'd want 
tough action too”.  
 
As discussed in chapter seven, many claimants felt shame in claiming welfare benefits 
and there was evidence of a strong public belief that they should be ashamed (see 
Hannah, 2016). Rae (2013) also found the public were increasingly blaming individual 
characteristics for poverty. It seems that misunderstanding of the level of welfare 
support, poverty and its causes, generated support for a punitive shift in the ‘welfare’ 
system. This indicates that Westminster’s construction of ‘the workless’ as 
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contributing to Britain’s decline, the over emphasis on benefit fraud, and the over-
representation of a few families who received high benefit payments, and not least, the 
framing of unemployment as a lifestyle choice influenced public sense-making.  
 
Grudging Acquiescence and Resistance: Successful and Unsuccessful Encoding?  
“Resistance ranges from the small, silent and personal through to the multitudinous, 
spectacular, and momentous” (Stanley and McCulloch, 2013: 4). Some personally 
rejected the neoliberal project, whilst some have engaged in physical resistance as part 
of groups such as Occupy and UK Uncut, and/or challenges to Westminster’s 
responses ‘resolution’. The number of “strikes, demonstrations and riots” suggests that 
austerity was not entirely popular in the period (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 309). 
However, although there was both active support and resistance, between 2010 and 
2015 the condition of hegemony was passive consent. Clarke and Newman (2012: 
307) captured it as “grudging acquiescence”, a passive consent’ rather than a popular 
mobilisation, and for Gilbert (2013: 13, 18) there was “resigned compliance” and “a 
broadly shared culture of disaffected consent”. There was a: 
“delicate balance in which consent is (still) being given: there is only 
limited dissent and active counter-mobilisation…but this consent is 
conditional and grudging, rather than enthusiastic. It may be 
compliant (and even calculating). But it is certainly characterised by 
forms of ‘disaffectedness’: unsatisfied, uncommitted, disgruntled 
and, perhaps, disengaged” (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 315).  
Mathiesen (2004) has recognised that in addition to coercion people are brought more 
subtly and silently to order through acquiescence using a range of means (as discussed 
in chapter five “absorption” is one of those means). Whilst support for emerging 
challenges was growing, in GE15 those rejecting and resisting the neoliberal 
‘resolution’ by supporting a powerful counter-movement had yet to become powerful 
enough to successfully challenge neoliberalism. Westminster definers may not have 
generated widespread active consent or successfully closed down challenges, but they 
contained opposition over the period. Westminster’s failure to achieve widespread 
active, and positive support for their ‘resolution’ would come to aid challengers. 
Clarke and Newman (2012: 308) state acquiescence “leads to both withdrawal from 
politics and the rise of populist ‘anti-political’ parties and movements. It produces 
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increasing cynicism and scepticism alongside new forms of commitment and 
mobilisation”. Developments since GE15 have proved their accuracy.  
Whilst Westminster narration may have sought to generate an inaccurate 
understanding the continuation of neoliberalism should not be reduced to the idea of a 
ubiquitous false consciousness or perceived as the outcome of public active support 
(Curtis, 2013). 
 
“There is still a good deal of what Gramsci called ‘good sense’ 
around - the conviction that, though, as Mr Cameron says, ‘We are 
all in this together’, the rich and powerful will do ordinary people 
over if they get half a chance; and that what corporate spokespersons 
say in their defence on TV is often misleading, sometimes 
deliberately evasive double-talk, smoke-and-mirrors ‘spin’” (Hall, 
2011: 724).   
 
Whilst “they may not fully understand the problem of capitalist over-production, so 
many people appear to know that it was the banks and the failures of the financial 
sector’s watchdogs that got us into this mess” (Curtis, 2013: 74-75).  
The perception that political elites had failed to prevent the financial crisis and were 
then implicated in the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal was detrimental to Westminster’s 
credibility. The scandal became a focussing event for growing public dissatisfaction, 
frustration, disillusion with, and detachment from, Westminster politicians. MPs’ 
betrayal of public trust and abuse of position drew attention to other problematic 
actions in British politics, including party funding, appointment of peerages, MPs’ 
second jobs, and lobbying, corporate posts after political careers, and unsackable MPs. 
Many people were withdrawn, detached and disenfranchised from, and sceptical and 
cynical about, Westminster politics (Clarke, 2010a; Clarke and Newman, 2012; 
Newman and Clarke, 2013). For Streeck (2014: 40), 
 “among ordinary people, there…[was] a pervasive sense that [party] 
politics…[could] no longer make a difference in their lives, as 
reflected in common perceptions of deadlock, incompetence, and 
corruption among what…[seemed] an increasingly self-contained 
and self-serving political class, united in their claim that ‘there is no 
alternative’ to them and their policies”.   
Somewhat counterproductively, Westminster definers competed to present their 
respective parties as credible by accusing others of manufacturing ignorance but 
 225 
themselves in contrast, as honest 122 . Such competing accusations of ignorance 
manufacturing may reinforce public perceptions that MPs are untrustworthy and ‘all 
the same’ engendering dissatisfaction, frustration, and detachment. Individual 
competition in party interests in this sense conflicted with the overarching project of 
repairing Westminster’s credibility.  
 
McChesney (1999: 10) suggests that “the neoliberal system” created a “citizenry 
marked by apathy and cynicism”.  It demoralised and generated a feeling of social 
powerlessness. Some rationalise that resistance is not worth the personal consequences 
or is not effective (Ross, 2015). An absence of resistance may have been “the result of 
conformity”, in Lambs’ terms (1975) “a learned belief in the infallibility of authority”, 
or a belief that [if it does not directly] “affect me personally, why get involved” (Ross, 
2015: 368).  
 
Weeks (2014: xiii) argues that there has been a “systematic fostering of ignorance over 
the last 30 years” about mainstream economics leaving many struggling to be able to 
“evaluate competing claims about the state of the economy” and obscuring economic 
reality. Some may have struggled to assess the narrative and responses presented to 
them, and therefore the necessity and desirability of the ‘resolution’. They may have 
been unable to evaluate economic arguments and feel unsure about whose claims to 
trust and therefore, from a position of ambivalence, passively consented. 
 
Research on the topic of public sense-making of this crisis could explore the possible 
existence of ‘contradictory consciousness’. It could examine whether there was or is 
belief in both official constructions and, in conflicting ideas: whether Westminster was 
                                                     
122  Accusations included gaps between texts and actions (see Clegg in Second Prime 
Ministerial Debate, 2010), breaking promises in government (see Cameron in First Ministerial 
Debate, 2010; Darling in The Chancellors’ Debate, 2010), lying (see Cameron in Second 
Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Clegg in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010) or 
disseminating false ‘facts’, sometimes framed as intentional and other times as out of genuine 
ignorance to position them as incapable (see Cameron in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 
2010), misleading the public (ibid) and intentionally withholding knowledge for the purposes 
of manipulation (see Brown in Final Prime Ministerial Debate, 2010; Cameron in First 
Ministerial Debate 2010). Definers each proclaimed their own honesty and made moral 
appeals for others to be honest (see Brown in First Ministerial Debate 2010; Cameron in First 
Ministerial Debate 2010; Clegg in First Ministerial Debate 2010; Conservatives, 2015; 
Miliband, 2015e). 
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able to attain belief in their construction of the crisis and responses despite it 
contradicting other constructions. In January 2017, sales of George Orwell’s 1984 
book significantly rose (see Guardian Staff, 2017). Orwell, writing about a political 
party’s attempt to rewrite history to supress critical thought and generate support for 
the party’s desired normality, wrote of “doublethink, “a form of mental discipline” 
where people are “able to believe two contradictory truths at the same time” (Pynchon, 
2003: x). Introducing the book Pynchon (2003: xi) writes: 
 
“every day public opinion is the target of rewritten history, official 
amnesia and outright lying, all of which is benevolently termed 
‘spin’, as if it were no more harmful than a ride on the merry-go-
round. We know better than what they tell us, yet hope otherwise. 
We believe and doubt at the same time – it seems a condition of 
political thought in a modern superstate to be permanently of at least 
two minds on most issues. Needless to say, this is of inestimable use 
to those in power who wish to remain there, preferably forever”.  
 
Similarly, it has been claimed Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World of 1931 has 
accurately anticipated the contemporary condition whereby the public are inundated 
with, and consume, trivial and irrelevant information deflecting attention from key 
issues.  
 
Westminster definers’ consensus around a neoliberal ‘resolution’ and the absence of 
challenges for many years seems to be a key reason for acquiescence. Whilst some did 
not believe in the existing narrative or actively support the ‘resolution’, they did not 
have a national oppositional movement with an alternative vision to support. As Leys 
(1990: 127) argued, “for an ideology to be hegemonic, it is not necessary that it be 
loved. It is merely necessary that it have no serious rival”. 
“In the case of neoliberalism, it is clear…that only the core 
neoliberal elite and key strategic sectors of its periphery (notably 
corporate management) have to be recruited to any kind of active 
belief in neoliberal norms, as long as no singular alternative wins 
widespread popular support, in order for the rest of a population to 
remain convinced of the unviability of any political challenge to 
those norms. The result may well be a broadly shared culture of 
‘disaffected consent’, wherein a general dissatisfaction with 
neoliberalism and its social consequences is very widespread, but no 
popular alternative is able to crystallise or cohere with sufficient 
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potency to develop the necessary critical mass to [successfully] 
challenge neoliberal hegemony” (Gilbert, 2013: 18). 
Similarly, Stanley (2014: 16-17) argues that, “without an alternative economic policy 
paradigm to neoliberalism to choose from, the public have no option but to accept 
more of the same”. Corbyn (2015h) recognised that many of those perceived as non-
political because they did not vote were political but there was not a political party 
presenting an alternative vision that resonated with them. The results of the General 
Election 2017 support this analysis.  
 
The momentum of the SNP campaign in SIR14, the SNP winning Scotland in GE15123, 
UKIP rising to the party with the third highest vote share in GE15124, ‘Brexit’, and the 
momentum of the Corbyn-led movement contributing to a hung Parliament in GE17 
are all signs of a rejection of ‘there is no alternative’ and strong desire for change125. 
Belatedly emerging challenges are now achieving major public support, which can be 
conceptualised as expressions of discontent with the Westminster neoliberal 
‘resolution’ and its ‘rationalising’ narrative.  
 
In part, Britain’s vote to leave the EU in 2016 can be understood as an expression of 
public belief in a UKIP led and Westminster endorsed blaming of immigration for 
conditions caused by neoliberalism, and of public support for UKIP’s challenging of 
the free movement of people. It can be also be understood as the result of a “long 
festering discontent with ‘globalisation’” from the working classes (Streeck, 2017a: 
10) and as part a struggle for change borne out of frustration with inequality126 
                                                     
123 The SNP had its vote share reduced in the General Election 2017 seemingly because of its 
suggestion of a second referendum on independence from the UK.  
124 UKIP’s vote share dramatically dropped in the General Election 2017 arguably because the 
reason people voted for the party in GE15 had been achieved – ‘Brexit’. Paul Nuttall, the 
leader of the party, (cited in Crampton, 2017) accurately summarised this by stating “UKIP 
has been a victim of its own success”.  The ‘success’ of UKIP led to a monumental change for 
the UK.  
125 Challenger movements offered their supporters hope of an alternative. Hope is a core theme 
of popular left wing parties across Europe, including Syrzia and En Comu in Barcelona. After 
his election Tsipras (cited in BBC News, 2015j) stated, “hope has made history”. The SNP, 
Plaid Cymru, and Green party also stated that they offered hope in contrast to Westminster 
elites politics of fear (see Bennett in Seven Way Leaders Debate, 2015).  
126 Whilst “social and council tenants voted leave”, most leave voters were categorised as 
reasonably wealthy, they owned their houses outright and had good pensions (Williams, 2016). 
Middle class England is not as well off as it was, it has a smaller share of wealth because those 
who are richer take a bigger share and this fuels resentment (Dorling, 2016a). Concerns about 
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(Dorling, 2016a, b). Dissatisfaction with inequality and a desire for change expressed 
itself in a decision that has already inflicted harm and injustice on immigrants and will 
likely place more power in the hands of Westminster elites whose policies have 
deepened inequality.  
 
“Almost all other European countries tax more effectively, spend 
more on health, and do not tolerate our degree of economic 
inequality. To distract us from these national failings, we have been 
encouraged to blame immigration and the EU…In contrast to other 
European states, the UK has been systematically underfunding 
education and training, increasing student loans and debt, tolerating 
increasingly unaffordable housing, introducing insecure work 
contracts, and privatising the services the young will need in future 
…their ire should instead be directed at the post-1979 UK 
governments that have allowed economic inequalities to rise so 
high…and that have placed future generations in peril” (Dorling, 
2016a). 
 
Public support empowering the Corbyn-led movement was evident in queues around 
buildings for his speeches and overflowing rally meetings leading to him speaking to 
people in the streets. He attained an overwhelming majority in the 2015 Labour 
leadership election with 59.5 percent of the vote, and 83.3 percent of registered 
supporters’ votes127 (BBC News, 2015e). In the 2016 Labour leadership campaign he 
attained a majority of 61.8 percent (Stewart and Mason, 2016b). It is also evident in 
Labour attaining 40 percent of the vote in the 2017 General Election128 (see BBC 
News, 2017) compared to 30.4 in GE15 (BBC News, 2015c). Also, in 2017 there was 
a sharp increase of 43 percent in the turnout of 18-24 year olds compared to GE15 and 
63 percent of young people voted for Labour (see Agerholm, 2017). The results 
evidence that Corbyn “was speaking a language and voicing concerns that a broad 
cross-section of the public could understand and identify with” (Jacques, 2017). Whilst 
Conservatives remained (perhaps temporarily) in a minority government following the 
snap election, support of the Corbyn-led movement has pressured the party to 
                                                     
healthcare also made the additional NHS funding of £350billion per week particularly 
appealing (ibid).  
127 Registered voters, of which there were 121,295, are not Labour members but paid £3 to 
register to vote in the leadership election (see BBC News, 2015e). 
128 The Labour Party and Conservative party increased their vote share to 82.4 per cent (BBC 
News, 2017) compared to 67.3 per cent in GE15 (BBC News, 2015c) and the share of smaller 
parties reduced. Arguably, this is in response to Labour offering a real alternative to 
Conservatives.  
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reconsider some of their austerity policies and is encouraging a progressive shift of the 
terrain of debate and ‘resolution’ (see Richards, 2017). There is evidence that what 
Froud et al (2010b: 37) termed “a coalition of losers” and an oppositional alliance 
between those who Harvey (2011: 240) called the “discontented, the alienated, the 
deprived, and the dispossessed” has formed. In Streeck’s (2017a: 13) terminology, 
Westminster may be experiencing “the return of the repressed”. The Corbyn-led 
movement is operating to seize the opportunities of the crisis and Britain it now seems 
if we are to be optimistic could be at the beginning of the end of neoliberalism. The 
movement this is to say may have the potential to force a crisis of neoliberalism.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Projects  
There are related areas for exploration emanating from this research that would need 
to be undertaken in further projects due to limits on time and space in the thesis. The 
natural trajectory from this research would be to undertake comprehensive analyses of 
political elite narration in the INMs since GE15, which in Streeck’s terminology form 
a ‘new phase’. Given the significance of the Corbyn-led movement, I plan to undertake 
critical discourse analysis of the two Labour leadership elections and the General 
Election 2017 INMs. Narration of the ‘Brexit’ INM including the UK EU Membership 
Referendum 2016 campaign period, its aftermath, and the lead up to and the triggering 
of Article 50 and the aftermath could also be analysed. Collectively these projects 
coupled with this research could form a comprehensive analysis of narratives, 
contestation, challenges, countering, and the struggles of the neoliberal crisis, and the 
shift of a crisis within neoliberalism towards perhaps a crisis of neoliberalism could be 
mapped.  
 
Another project emanating from the research is an analysis of public narratives of the 
conjuncture. Stanley’s (2014) research has contributed some knowledge to the area of 
public sense-making of the crisis. Building on this research, it would be interesting to 
analyse public sense-making of challenges, and its relationship to Westminster 
narration of them. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups could be undertaken 
and participants could be asked to reflect retrospectively on their sense-making in the 
INMs analysed in this research and discuss their perceptions in the current period. I 
particularly want to analyse the sense-making of those burdening the heaviest 
consequences of crisis, for example users of food banks and to examine their decoding 
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of Westminster constructions and how this relates to their perceptions of lived reality. 
Perhaps the research could explore how social actors evaluate themselves and their 
behaviour, and that of others they are categorised with, in a context where government 
definers construct them as morally inferior. Working in advice and support agencies 
with people living in poverty, ‘clients’ have often apologised for needing services and 
justified their deservedness for welfare benefits or food parcels by explaining they 
have worked hard and ‘put into the system’. There have also been expressions of 
frustration with dominant representations of welfare claimants. Analysis of their 
sense-making would allow the exploration of perceptions of individual responsibility 
and ‘deviant’ groups, structure and agency.  
 
Closing Remarks  
Policing the Crisis (1978) drew upon the work of Gramsci to examine the 1970s 
conjuncture, narration of the social democratic capitalist crisis, and the generation of 
support for a neoliberal neo-conservative ‘resolution’. The book coupled with some of 
Hall’s other work (see Hall 1979, 1988a [1980], 1988b [1980], 1988 [1987]; Hall and 
Jacques, 1983) captures the period leading up to the formation of a new historical bloc 
and early years of its dominance. The work not only contributes ideas that continue to 
facilitate sense-making of a range of contemporary critical criminological issues (see 
Coleman et al, 2009), it also provides a critical examination of narration in a major 
moment in Britain’s political history that set the political economic trajectory for 
decades to come, and it allows the reader to understand the narration of the crisis and 
the effects it had in Britain during the period.  
 
This thesis has drawn upon the work of Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall to critically 
examine narration of a different major moment in Britain’s political history that is also 
marked by capitalist crisis. It contributes a detailed critical analysis of Westminster’s 
narration of a ‘resolution’ that deepened real causes and challenges that emerged 
before and during GE15. This research contributes to the existing literature a 
comprehensive, detailed, systematic, and rigorous analysis, of three INMs to develop 
an understanding of Westminster’s strategies for ‘rationalising’ the neoliberal 
‘resolution’, and seeking to maintain hegemony. Its scope allows it to show which 
discourses emerged, became prominent and dominated and which faded and were 
marginalised, the gradual dissemination of ideas and arguments, the timing of definers’ 
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‘news’, the shifts in the terrain of the debate, and a reflection on continuities and 
differences.  
 
Perhaps, as Streeck (2017a: 14) suggests, there is now a “new phase of crisis”. It is 
perhaps a period of what Gramsci termed ‘interregnum’, “a period of uncertain 
duration in which an old order is dying but a new one cannot yet be borne” (ibid: 14). 
The “new order” may still need “to be created” and what it “will look like is uncertain” 
(ibid: 14). It is a period of “tremendous insecurity” with “unexpected” and “abnormal” 
events (ibid: 14). Since GE15, despite it only being a relatively short time ago, there 
has been a referendum on the UK’s membership of EU resulting in the triggering of 
Britain’s exit in the next two years, Prime Minister David Cameron resigned, Labour 
has held two leadership election campaigns electing the same leader, the Conservatives 
have held one, and reminiscent of Heath in 1974, Prime Minister Theresa May called 
an early General Election resulting in a minority government. The changes in the 
political landscape reflect a strong and powerful public desire for change.  
 
 The contemporary period may be of momentous importance. Whilst the neoliberal 
‘resolution’ continues to be implemented and Conservatives at present continue in 
government seeking to make neoliberalism hold, there is the emerging possibility that 
major change emanating from some, or all, current challenges maybe on the horizon. 
Whether a political and economic transformation will be achieved is still unknown. 
Britain is in a profound period of political, but also economic uncertainty. Leaving the 
EU, presents, in combination with continuing financial precarity, the threat of future 
crises but with a Conservative government in power that would likely be blamed. For 
Jacques (2017) “the relative economic prospects for the country are far worse than 
they have been at any time since 1945”. Whilst the Corbyn-led movement has the 
potential to successfully struggle for a less harmful form of capitalism, Britain, as well 
as the US, is also experiencing a period in which as Jacques (2017) states, “forces of 
conservatism, nativism, racism and imperial nostalgia remain hugely powerful”. This 
constitutes a dangerous terrain upon which to formulate Britain’s trajectory from 
crisis. There is evidence of support for harsh and harmful responses to welfare 
claimants and immigrants. The current period further demonstrates the pertinence of 
Hall’s (2011: 728) comment that  “the ‘emergent’…[are] the reason why history is 
never closed but maintains an open horizon towards the future”.   
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The outcome of the current struggles will likely determine political and economic 
trajectories for years to come. For Critical Criminologists seeking to challenge harmful 
and unjust practices this struggle is important and engagement with it is essential. As 
Gouldner (1973) argued being on the side of the less powerful needs to be 
accompanied with challenges to the powerful. We have to be critical voices 
contributing critical studies of the powerful in support of the less powerful. We have 
to directly engage, speak truth to power, and challenge dominant narratives that justify 
and sustain inequality, harm, and injustice. Falsehoods and misrepresentations must 
be identified, recognised as strategies that form part of a class-based project, and 
countered. Harm reduction needs to be pushed up the agenda. It is hoped that the 
analysis of Westminster’s narrative contributed by this thesis, evidencing the 
centrality, ubiquity, and systematic nature of false, inaccurate, and misleading 
representations in official discourse can contribute to this endeavour. The momentum 
of Corbyn’s challenge in particular, shows the power and potential the dissemination 
of an accurate representation and challenging of an inaccurate narrative, can have. 
When I began planning this research it seemed as though the crisis would be 
definitively contained within neoliberalism. Neoliberal hegemony appeared assured, 
despite the crisis. Now there are challenges that have the potential to make it a crisis 
of neoliberalism. As a critical theorist my pursuit of critical and emancipatory 
knowledge is currently directed towards contributing to the movement for challenging 
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